ixo Blockchain x/bonds DID-resolved payer drain + x/entity ICA authorization bypass

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

The ixo Blockchain is a Layer 1 blockchain that runs on both Testnet and Mainnet. Prior to version 8.0.0, the x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor. Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain. This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk. This was fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBlocker is a no-op so no further reserve movements can occur. All node operators and validators must upgrade to v8.0.0. The flaw is in chain state-machine logic and can only be remediated by running the patched binary. There is no application-level workaround. The vulnerability is in consensus logic; remediation requires the network to run the patched (v8.0.0) binary. The bonds module remains disabled in v8.0.0 and will only be re-enabled in a future release once the signer-authorization model has been corrected.

Source published

24 Sep 2026 17:45:20 UTC

Source modified

24 Sep 2026 18:04:39 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 4.0 · 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The ixo Blockchain is a Layer 1 blockchain that runs on both Testnet and Mainnet. Prior to version 8.0.0, the x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor. Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain. This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk. This was fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBlocker is a no-op so no further reserve movements can occur. All node operators and validators must upgrade to v8.0.0. The flaw is in chain state-machine logic and can only be remediated by running the patched binary. There is no application-level workaround. The vulnerability is in consensus logic; remediation requires the network to run the patched (v8.0.0) binary. The bonds module remains disabled in v8.0.0 and will only be re-enabled in a future release once the signer-authorization model has been corrected.

Source published

Sep 24, 2026, 5:45:20 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Sep 24, 2026, 6:04:39 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

11 Nov 2026 15:02:45 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The ixo Blockchain is a Layer 1 blockchain that runs on both Testnet and Mainnet. Prior to version 8.0.0, the x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor. Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain. This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk. This was fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBlocker is a no-op so no further reserve movements can occur. All node operators and validators must upgrade to v8.0.0. The flaw is in chain state-machine logic and can only be remediated by running the patched binary. There is no application-level workaround. The vulnerability is in consensus logic; remediation requires the network to run the patched (v8.0.0) binary. The bonds module remains disabled in v8.0.0 and will only be re-enabled in a future release once the signer-authorization model has been corrected.

Source published

24 Sep 2026 18:17:15 UTC

Source modified

30 Sep 2026 17:32:07 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 14:19:22 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Impact Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds. The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor. Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain. This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk. Patches Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBlocker is a no-op so no further reserve movements can occur. All node operators and validators must upgrade to v8.0.0. The flaw is in chain state-machine logic and can only be remediated by running the patched binary. Workarounds There is no application-level workaround. The vulnerability is in consensus logic; remediation requires the network to run the patched (v8.0.0) binary. The bonds module remains disabled in v8.0.0 and will only be re-enabled in a future release once the signer-authorization model has been corrected.

Source published

24 Sep 2026 19:22:53 UTC

Source modified

1 Oct 2026 20:55:42 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

ixo Blockchain x/bonds DID-resolved payer drain + x/entity ICA authorization bypass in github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain

Source published

1 Oct 2026 20:23:38 UTC

Source modified

1 Oct 2026 20:45:15 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.