Malicious code in delivery-ci-validate (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-12688
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (95a6fb547c4fb156493439557692dc83b73f44deee6687ec535882f7e8ccf490) Requiring delivery-ci-validate loads _polyfill.js, which assembles destination hostnames from split string fragments joined at runtime (e.g. 'oob-'+'worker.cf100-416.workers.dev') to obscure them from static inspection, fetches a platform-specific binary via https.get from those Cloudflare Workers URLs with no version pin and no integrity check, and falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel over subdomains of dl.wel1.ru that pulls chunked base64-encoded payload bytes. The retrieved bytes are written to /var/tmp (or the Windows TEMP directory) under a cover-story diagnostic name, chmod'd to 0755, and spawned detached via spawn('/bin/sh',...) or spawn('cmd',...). The entry point index.js requires _polyfill.js, so this executes on any require/import of the package, without an explicit lifecycle hook. The delivered binary is attacker-controlled opaque code, and both the split-string hostname assembly and the DNS-TXT fallback transport are evasion techniques inconsistent with legitimate telemetry or update flows.
- Source published
- 5 Aug 2026 13:55:07 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Aug 2026 14:36:26 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.