Malicious code in boxy-lcd (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-13052
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (85c7174f43951c87b6b7ffb67430170a9b655978a1fe64654729c87fe35ced60) The package's index.js top-level requires setup.js, which on load fetches an OS-specific executable from string-concat-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) and additional hosts under dl.wel1.ru (sdk./ext./pkg./net.), with a DNS-TXT base64 fallback channel. The fetched bytes are written to a hidden temp path with masquerading names such as.cache_<hex> and dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh or cmd. Network destinations and the child_process require string are assembled at runtime from split literals to evade static analysis; the exported BoxyLcd class is a non-functional stub, and opt-out env vars are named to resemble legitimate telemetry (analytics_state, DISABLE_TELEMETRY). Any consumer that installs or requires boxy-lcd triggers download-and-execute of an opaque, author-controlled binary on the installer's host.
- Source published
- 5 Aug 2026 14:30:45 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Aug 2026 15:51:59 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.