Malicious code in spl-token-utils (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-13351
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f95b625c92e85b1c0d5c10a192c70f8f82cf8d3b2ac7b66c034635b680785654) On require, index.js serializes the full process.env together with hostname, username, homedir, platform, cwd, and package metadata, base64-encodes the payload, and sends it via an HTTPS GET to api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage with a hardcoded chat_id (8969499041). A marker file in the OS tmpdir suppresses repeat sends. The package presents itself as a drop-in replacement for @solana/spl-token and attempts to require and re-export the real @solana/spl-token so consumers see functional behavior while the exfiltration has already fired. Bulk process.env harvest at import time captures whatever credentials the installer's Node process has in environment — cloud keys, CI/publish tokens, database URLs — none of which relate to any legitimate SPL/Solana utility function. The typosquat name (spl-token-utils vs @solana/spl-token) makes accidental installs likely.
- Source published
- 5 Aug 2026 15:39:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Aug 2026 16:51:08 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.