Malicious code in css-starting-style-polyfill (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-17488
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (713c302594ab7c41e8034ca95478045afafba98e223ea62def160f080cb879cd) thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on module load that executes host reconnaissance commands via child_process.execSync (id, whoami, uname -a, ifconfig/ip addr, cat /etc/hosts) and transmits the collected output together with hostname, platform, and pid to a hardcoded external URL https://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f via fetch. The package exports factories under names matching Wix internal registry modules (thunderboltRegistry, corvidRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, documentManagementRegistry) and ships a manifest referencing parastorage.com URLs, so any environment loading it as a drop-in Wix thunderbolt registry triggers the exfiltration payload on require(). The declared CSS @starting-style polyfill purpose has no relationship to the shipped behavior.
- Source published
- 4 Oct 2026 23:15:24 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Oct 2026 23:30:05 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.