An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.
An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.
An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.
### Impact
coreos-installer fails to correctly verify GPG signatures when decompressing gzip-compressed artifacts. This allows bypass of signature verification in cases where coreos-installer decompresses a downloaded OS image, allowing an attacker who can modify the OS image to compromise a newly-installed system.
Default installations from ISO or PXE media in Fedora CoreOS, RHEL CoreOS, and RHEL for Edge are **not** affected, as coreos-installer installs from an OS image shipped as part of the install media.
These flows are affected:
1. Installing with `--image-file`, `--image-url`, or `coreos.inst.image_url`. For example, if a user has a local mirror of installation images, an attacker could replace an image with a gzip-compressed alternative (even if the file extension is `.xz`). The result:
```
$ coreos-installer install --image-url http://localhost:8080/image.xz /dev/loop0
Downloading image from http://localhost:8080/image.xz
Downloading signature from http://localhost:8080/image.xz.sig
> Read disk 749.9 MiB/749.9 MiB (100%)
gpg: Signature made Mon 20 Sep 2021 02:41:50 PM EDT
gpg: using RSA key 8C5BA6990BDB26E19F2A1A801161AE6945719A39
gpg: BAD signature from "Fedora (34) <[email protected]>" [ultimate]
Install complete.
```
Notice that GPG reports a bad signature, but coreos-installer continues anyway. Automation that relies on coreos-installer's exit status will not notice either.
2. `coreos-installer download --decompress --image-url`:
```
$ coreos-installer download --decompress --image-url http://localhost:8080/image.xz
> Read disk 749.9 MiB/749.9 MiB (100%)
gpg: Signature made Mon 20 Sep 2021 02:41:50 PM EDT
gpg: using RSA key 8C5BA6990BDB26E19F2A1A801161AE6945719A39
gpg: BAD signature from "Fedora (34) <[email protected]>" [ultimate]
./image
```
Again, coreos-installer reports success.
3. Installing with default parameters, when **not** installing from the image built into live ISO or PXE media, if the hosting service is compromised or if an active attacker gains control of the HTTPS response.
4. `coreos-installer download --decompress` if the hosting service is compromised or if an active attacker gains control of the HTTPS response.
### Patches
The vulnerability is [fixed](https://github.com/coreos/coreos-installer/pull/659) in coreos-installer 0.10.1.
### Workarounds
For `coreos-installer download`, do not use the `-d` or `--decompress` options.
For `coreos-installer install`, manually inspect the stderr output. If `BAD signature` appears, do not boot from the target disk. Note, however, that some OS services may have already accessed data on the compromised disk.
### References
For more information, see [PR 655](https://github.com/coreos/coreos-installer/pull/655).
### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, [open an issue in coreos-installer](https://github.com/coreos/coreos-installer/issues/new/choose) or email the CoreOS [development mailing list](https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/).
The coreos-installer is a program to fetch a disk image and
stream it to a target disk.
During the installation process the installation image gpg
signatures are verified.
The signature verification can be bypassed for gzip-compressed
images due to a flaw in gzip coreos-installer wrapper.
When the decoder encounters the gzip trailer, it signals EOF
to its output and does not continue reading from its input.
As a result, earlier wrappers don't notice that they've reached
EOF.
In particular, the GPG wrapper does not check the exit code of GPG.
Thus, if an attacker can substitute an attacker-controlled
gzipped disk image, installation will complete successfully
without a valid signature.
This vulnerability impacts only specific, User-Provisioned
Infrastructure (UPI) installation methods where coreos-installer
is used and where gzip-compressed images are configured as
the installation source.
The Installer-Provisioned Infrastructure (IPI) bare-metal
installs do use coreos-installer, but this installation
method uses an install image embedded in the live OS image
(ISO or PXE image), therefore is not affected by this
vulnerability.
This vulnerability is specific to some upstream Fedora
CoreOS installation flows.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Mar 4, 2022, 5:05:50 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 3, 2024, 5:37:23 PM
5 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
RHSA-2021:4008: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.6.49 security update
CVE-2021-20319
RHSA-2021:3934: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.9.4 packages and security update
CVE-2021-20319
RHSA-2021:3926: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.8.17 security and bug fix update
CVE-2021-20319
RHSA-2021:3930: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.7.36 security and bug fix update
CVE-2021-20319
RHSA-2022:0055: Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.10.3 bug fix and security update
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Modified
Weakness classifications: CWE-347
Original publisher date fields
published: 2022-03-04T18:15:08.060
lastModified: 2026-06-17T03:33:39.947
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:redhat:coreos-installer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.