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coreos-installer · Vulnerability

cve-program · severity unknowneuvd · severity unknownCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 7.8 HIGHCVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary 6.8 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by coreos-installer 0.10.1CVSS_V3 Fixed by coreos-installer 0.10.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2021-20319

Published

An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.

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euvd · EUVD-2021-2149

Published

An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2021-20319

Published

An improper signature verification vulnerability was found in coreos-installer. A specially crafted gzip installation image can bypass the image signature verification and as a consequence can lead to the installation of unsigned content. An attacker able to modify the original installation image can write arbitrary data, and achieve full access to the node being installed.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-3r3g-g73x-g593

Published

### Impact coreos-installer fails to correctly verify GPG signatures when decompressing gzip-compressed artifacts. This allows bypass of signature verification in cases where coreos-installer decompresses a downloaded OS image, allowing an attacker who can modify the OS image to compromise a newly-installed system. Default installations from ISO or PXE media in Fedora CoreOS, RHEL CoreOS, and RHEL for Edge are **not** affected, as coreos-installer installs from an OS image shipped as part of the install media. These flows are affected: 1. Installing with `--image-file`, `--image-url`, or `coreos.inst.image_url`. For example, if a user has a local mirror of installation images, an attacker could replace an image with a gzip-compressed alternative (even if the file extension is `.xz`). The result: ``` $ coreos-installer install --image-url http://localhost:8080/image.xz /dev/loop0 Downloading image from http://localhost:8080/image.xz Downloading signature from http://localhost:8080/image.xz.sig > Read disk 749.9 MiB/749.9 MiB (100%) gpg: Signature made Mon 20 Sep 2021 02:41:50 PM EDT gpg: using RSA key 8C5BA6990BDB26E19F2A1A801161AE6945719A39 gpg: BAD signature from "Fedora (34) <[email protected]>" [ultimate] Install complete. ``` Notice that GPG reports a bad signature, but coreos-installer continues anyway. Automation that relies on coreos-installer's exit status will not notice either. 2. `coreos-installer download --decompress --image-url`: ``` $ coreos-installer download --decompress --image-url http://localhost:8080/image.xz > Read disk 749.9 MiB/749.9 MiB (100%) gpg: Signature made Mon 20 Sep 2021 02:41:50 PM EDT gpg: using RSA key 8C5BA6990BDB26E19F2A1A801161AE6945719A39 gpg: BAD signature from "Fedora (34) <[email protected]>" [ultimate] ./image ``` Again, coreos-installer reports success. 3. Installing with default parameters, when **not** installing from the image built into live ISO or PXE media, if the hosting service is compromised or if an active attacker gains control of the HTTPS response. 4. `coreos-installer download --decompress` if the hosting service is compromised or if an active attacker gains control of the HTTPS response. ### Patches The vulnerability is [fixed](https://github.com/coreos/coreos-installer/pull/659) in coreos-installer 0.10.1. ### Workarounds For `coreos-installer download`, do not use the `-d` or `--decompress` options. For `coreos-installer install`, manually inspect the stderr output. If `BAD signature` appears, do not boot from the target disk. Note, however, that some OS services may have already accessed data on the compromised disk. ### References For more information, see [PR 655](https://github.com/coreos/coreos-installer/pull/655). ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, [open an issue in coreos-installer](https://github.com/coreos/coreos-installer/issues/new/choose) or email the CoreOS [development mailing list](https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/).

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osv · RUSTSEC-2022-0103

Published

The coreos-installer is a program to fetch a disk image and stream it to a target disk. During the installation process the installation image gpg signatures are verified. The signature verification can be bypassed for gzip-compressed images due to a flaw in gzip coreos-installer wrapper. When the decoder encounters the gzip trailer, it signals EOF to its output and does not continue reading from its input. As a result, earlier wrappers don't notice that they've reached EOF. In particular, the GPG wrapper does not check the exit code of GPG. Thus, if an attacker can substitute an attacker-controlled gzipped disk image, installation will complete successfully without a valid signature. This vulnerability impacts only specific, User-Provisioned Infrastructure (UPI) installation methods where coreos-installer is used and where gzip-compressed images are configured as the installation source. The Installer-Provisioned Infrastructure (IPI) bare-metal installs do use coreos-installer, but this installation method uses an install image embedded in the live OS image (ISO or PXE image), therefore is not affected by this vulnerability. This vulnerability is specific to some upstream Fedora CoreOS installation flows.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2021-20319 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2021-2149

GHSA-3r3g-g73x-g593

RUSTSEC-2022-0103

cve-program · CVE-2021-20319

euvd · EUVD-2021-2149

nvd · CVE-2021-20319

osv · GHSA-3r3g-g73x-g593

osv · RUSTSEC-2022-0103

Related changes

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