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Service accounts can see namespaces of other tenants in capsule-proxy

CVSS 3.1 4.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 4.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 4.3 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 4.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/projectcapsule/capsule 0.4.5Fixed by github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy 0.4.5KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2023-46254

Published

capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for Capsule kubernetes multi-tenancy framework. A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name. For example consider two tenants `solar` and `wind`. Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar`. Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind`. The Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct. The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions: 1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`) and 2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces. This vulnerability doesn't allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this. This issue has been addressed in version 0.4.5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2023-2895

Published

capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for Capsule kubernetes multi-tenancy framework. A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name. For example consider two tenants `solar` and `wind`. Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar`. Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind`. The Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct. The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions: 1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`) and 2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces. This vulnerability doesn't allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this. This issue has been addressed in version 0.4.5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2023-46254

Published

capsule-proxy is a reverse proxy for Capsule kubernetes multi-tenancy framework. A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name. For example consider two tenants `solar` and `wind`. Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar`. Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind`. The Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct. The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions: 1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`) and 2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces. This vulnerability doesn't allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this. This issue has been addressed in version 0.4.5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-6758-979h-249x

Published

### Summary A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by `capsule-proxy` gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name. ### Details - Tenant `solar`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `solar` - Tenant `wind`, owned by a ServiceAccount named `tenant-owner` in the Namespace `wind` > Please, notice the same ServiceAccount name, although in different namespaces. The Tenant owner `solar` would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant `wind` and vice-versa, although this is not correct. The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions: 1. `capsule-proxy` runs with the `--disable-caching=false` (default value: `false`) 2. Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces. The CVE doesn't allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2023-46254

Published

capsule-proxy

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "projectcapsule",
                    "product": "capsule-proxy",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 0.4.5",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2023-2895

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Nov 6, 2023, 6:34:13 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 8:37:40 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2023-46254

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · NVD-CWE-noinfo

Original publisher date fields

published: 2023-11-06T19:15:09.230

lastModified: 2026-06-17T06:30:31.747

2 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:clastix:capsule:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:clastix:capsule-proxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-6758-979h-249x

Published

github.com/projectcapsule/capsule

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 0.4.5

github.com/projectcapsule/capsule-proxy

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 0.4.5

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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