Plate media is an open source, rich-text editor for React. Editors that use `MediaEmbedElement` and pass custom `urlParsers` to the `useMediaState` hook may be vulnerable to XSS if a custom parser allows `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be embedded. Editors that do not use `urlParsers` and consume the `url` property directly may also be vulnerable if the URL is not sanitised. The default parsers `parseTwitterUrl` and `parseVideoUrl` are not affected. `@udecode/plate-media` 36.0.10 resolves this issue by only allowing HTTP and HTTPS URLs during parsing. This affects only the `embed` property returned from `useMediaState`. In addition, the `url` property returned from `useMediaState` has been renamed to `unsafeUrl` to indicate that it has not been sanitised. The `url` property on `element` is also unsafe, but has not been renamed. If you're using either of these properties directly, you will still need to validate the URL yourself. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure that any custom `urlParsers` do not allow `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be returned in the `url` property of their return values. If `url` is consumed directly, validate the URL protocol before passing it to the `iframe` element.
Plate media is an open source, rich-text editor for React. Editors that use `MediaEmbedElement` and pass custom `urlParsers` to the `useMediaState` hook may be vulnerable to XSS if a custom parser allows `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be embedded. Editors that do not use `urlParsers` and consume the `url` property directly may also be vulnerable if the URL is not sanitised. The default parsers `parseTwitterUrl` and `parseVideoUrl` are not affected. `@udecode/plate-media` 36.0.10 resolves this issue by only allowing HTTP and HTTPS URLs during parsing. This affects only the `embed` property returned from `useMediaState`. In addition, the `url` property returned from `useMediaState` has been renamed to `unsafeUrl` to indicate that it has not been sanitised. The `url` property on `element` is also unsafe, but has not been renamed. If you're using either of these properties directly, you will still need to validate the URL yourself. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure that any custom `urlParsers` do not allow `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be returned in the `url` property of their return values. If `url` is consumed directly, validate the URL protocol before passing it to the `iframe` element.
Plate media is an open source, rich-text editor for React. Editors that use `MediaEmbedElement` and pass custom `urlParsers` to the `useMediaState` hook may be vulnerable to XSS if a custom parser allows `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be embedded. Editors that do not use `urlParsers` and consume the `url` property directly may also be vulnerable if the URL is not sanitised. The default parsers `parseTwitterUrl` and `parseVideoUrl` are not affected. `@udecode/plate-media` 36.0.10 resolves this issue by only allowing HTTP and HTTPS URLs during parsing. This affects only the `embed` property returned from `useMediaState`. In addition, the `url` property returned from `useMediaState` has been renamed to `unsafeUrl` to indicate that it has not been sanitised. The `url` property on `element` is also unsafe, but has not been renamed. If you're using either of these properties directly, you will still need to validate the URL yourself. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure that any custom `urlParsers` do not allow `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be returned in the `url` property of their return values. If `url` is consumed directly, validate the URL protocol before passing it to the `iframe` element.
### Impact
Editors that use `MediaEmbedElement` and pass custom `urlParsers` to the `useMediaState` hook may be vulnerable to XSS if a custom parser allows `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be embedded. Editors that do not use `urlParsers` and instead consume the `url` property directly may also be vulnerable if the URL is not sanitised.
The default parsers `parseTwitterUrl` and `parseVideoUrl` are not affected.
Examples of vulnerable code:
```tsx
const { embed } = useMediaState({
urlParsers: [
// Custom parser that does not use an allowlist or validate the URL protocol
(url) => ({ url }),
],
});
return (
<iframe
src={embed!.url}
// ...
/>
);
```
```tsx
const { url } = useMediaState();
return (
<iframe
// url property used directly from useMediaState() with no sanitisation
src={url}
// ...
/>
);
```
```tsx
const { url } = element;
return (
<iframe
// url property used directly from element with no sanitisation
src={url}
// ...
/>
);
```
### Patches
`@udecode/plate-media` 36.0.10 resolves this issue by only allowing HTTP and HTTPS URLs during parsing. This affects only the `embed` property returned from `useMediaState`.
In addition, the `url` property returned from `useMediaState` has been renamed to `unsafeUrl` to indicate that it has not been sanitised. The `url` property on `element` is also unsafe, but has not been renamed. If you're using either of these properties directly, you will still need to validate the URL yourself.
### Workarounds
Ensure that any custom `urlParsers` do not allow `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be returned in the `url` property of their return values.
If `url` is consumed directly, validate the URL protocol before passing it to the `iframe` element.
### References
How to verify the protocol of a URL: https://stackoverflow.com/a/43467144
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 15, 2024, 6:21:16 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 4:33:11 AM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-79
Original publisher date fields
published: 2024-07-15T19:15:03.700
lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:46:12.367
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.