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Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in media embed element when using custom URL parsers in plate media

CVSS 3.1 8.1 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 8.1 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.1 HIGHCVSS_V3 CVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by @udecode/plate-media 36.0.10KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-40631

Published

Plate media is an open source, rich-text editor for React. Editors that use `MediaEmbedElement` and pass custom `urlParsers` to the `useMediaState` hook may be vulnerable to XSS if a custom parser allows `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be embedded. Editors that do not use `urlParsers` and consume the `url` property directly may also be vulnerable if the URL is not sanitised. The default parsers `parseTwitterUrl` and `parseVideoUrl` are not affected. `@udecode/plate-media` 36.0.10 resolves this issue by only allowing HTTP and HTTPS URLs during parsing. This affects only the `embed` property returned from `useMediaState`. In addition, the `url` property returned from `useMediaState` has been renamed to `unsafeUrl` to indicate that it has not been sanitised. The `url` property on `element` is also unsafe, but has not been renamed. If you're using either of these properties directly, you will still need to validate the URL yourself. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure that any custom `urlParsers` do not allow `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be returned in the `url` property of their return values. If `url` is consumed directly, validate the URL protocol before passing it to the `iframe` element.

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euvd · EUVD-2024-2354

Published

Plate media is an open source, rich-text editor for React. Editors that use `MediaEmbedElement` and pass custom `urlParsers` to the `useMediaState` hook may be vulnerable to XSS if a custom parser allows `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be embedded. Editors that do not use `urlParsers` and consume the `url` property directly may also be vulnerable if the URL is not sanitised. The default parsers `parseTwitterUrl` and `parseVideoUrl` are not affected. `@udecode/plate-media` 36.0.10 resolves this issue by only allowing HTTP and HTTPS URLs during parsing. This affects only the `embed` property returned from `useMediaState`. In addition, the `url` property returned from `useMediaState` has been renamed to `unsafeUrl` to indicate that it has not been sanitised. The `url` property on `element` is also unsafe, but has not been renamed. If you're using either of these properties directly, you will still need to validate the URL yourself. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure that any custom `urlParsers` do not allow `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be returned in the `url` property of their return values. If `url` is consumed directly, validate the URL protocol before passing it to the `iframe` element.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-40631

Published

Plate media is an open source, rich-text editor for React. Editors that use `MediaEmbedElement` and pass custom `urlParsers` to the `useMediaState` hook may be vulnerable to XSS if a custom parser allows `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be embedded. Editors that do not use `urlParsers` and consume the `url` property directly may also be vulnerable if the URL is not sanitised. The default parsers `parseTwitterUrl` and `parseVideoUrl` are not affected. `@udecode/plate-media` 36.0.10 resolves this issue by only allowing HTTP and HTTPS URLs during parsing. This affects only the `embed` property returned from `useMediaState`. In addition, the `url` property returned from `useMediaState` has been renamed to `unsafeUrl` to indicate that it has not been sanitised. The `url` property on `element` is also unsafe, but has not been renamed. If you're using either of these properties directly, you will still need to validate the URL yourself. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should ensure that any custom `urlParsers` do not allow `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be returned in the `url` property of their return values. If `url` is consumed directly, validate the URL protocol before passing it to the `iframe` element.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-h3pq-667x-r789

Published

### Impact Editors that use `MediaEmbedElement` and pass custom `urlParsers` to the `useMediaState` hook may be vulnerable to XSS if a custom parser allows `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be embedded. Editors that do not use `urlParsers` and instead consume the `url` property directly may also be vulnerable if the URL is not sanitised. The default parsers `parseTwitterUrl` and `parseVideoUrl` are not affected. Examples of vulnerable code: ```tsx const { embed } = useMediaState({ urlParsers: [ // Custom parser that does not use an allowlist or validate the URL protocol (url) => ({ url }), ], }); return ( <iframe src={embed!.url} // ... /> ); ``` ```tsx const { url } = useMediaState(); return ( <iframe // url property used directly from useMediaState() with no sanitisation src={url} // ... /> ); ``` ```tsx const { url } = element; return ( <iframe // url property used directly from element with no sanitisation src={url} // ... /> ); ``` ### Patches `@udecode/plate-media` 36.0.10 resolves this issue by only allowing HTTP and HTTPS URLs during parsing. This affects only the `embed` property returned from `useMediaState`. In addition, the `url` property returned from `useMediaState` has been renamed to `unsafeUrl` to indicate that it has not been sanitised. The `url` property on `element` is also unsafe, but has not been renamed. If you're using either of these properties directly, you will still need to validate the URL yourself. ### Workarounds Ensure that any custom `urlParsers` do not allow `javascript:`, `data:` or `vbscript:` URLs to be returned in the `url` property of their return values. If `url` is consumed directly, validate the URL protocol before passing it to the `iframe` element. ### References How to verify the protocol of a URL: https://stackoverflow.com/a/43467144

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