`rustix::fs::Dir` iterator with the `linux_raw` backend can cause memory explosion
cve-program · CVE-2024-43806
PublishedRustix is a set of safe Rust bindings to POSIX-ish APIs. When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in `rustix::fs::Dir::read_more`, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application. The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. Full details can be read on the GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm repo advisory. If a program tries to access a directory with its file descriptor after the file has been unlinked (or any other action that leaves the `Dir` iterator in the stuck state), and the implementation does not break after seeing an error, it can cause a memory explosion. As an example, Linux's various virtual file systems (e.g. `/proc`, `/sys`) can contain directories that spontaneously pop in and out of existence. Attempting to iterate over them using `rustix::fs::Dir` directly or indirectly (e.g. with the `procfs` crate) can trigger this fault condition if the implementation decides to continue on errors. An attacker knowledgeable about the implementation details of a vulnerable target can therefore try to trigger this fault condition via any one or a combination of several available APIs. If successful, the application host will quickly run out of memory, after which the application will likely be terminated by an OOM killer, leading to denial of service. This issue has been addressed in release versions 0.35.15, 0.36.16, 0.37.25, and 0.38.19. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2023-2715
PublishedRustix is a set of safe Rust bindings to POSIX-ish APIs. When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in `rustix::fs::Dir::read_more`, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application. The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. Full details can be read on the GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm repo advisory. If a program tries to access a directory with its file descriptor after the file has been unlinked (or any other action that leaves the `Dir` iterator in the stuck state), and the implementation does not break after seeing an error, it can cause a memory explosion. As an example, Linux's various virtual file systems (e.g. `/proc`, `/sys`) can contain directories that spontaneously pop in and out of existence. Attempting to iterate over them using `rustix::fs::Dir` directly or indirectly (e.g. with the `procfs` crate) can trigger this fault condition if the implementation decides to continue on errors. An attacker knowledgeable about the implementation details of a vulnerable target can therefore try to trigger this fault condition via any one or a combination of several available APIs. If successful, the application host will quickly run out of memory, after which the application will likely be terminated by an OOM killer, leading to denial of service. This issue has been addressed in release versions 0.35.15, 0.36.16, 0.37.25, and 0.38.19. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2024-43806
PublishedRustix is a set of safe Rust bindings to POSIX-ish APIs. When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in `rustix::fs::Dir::read_more`, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application. The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. Full details can be read on the GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm repo advisory. If a program tries to access a directory with its file descriptor after the file has been unlinked (or any other action that leaves the `Dir` iterator in the stuck state), and the implementation does not break after seeing an error, it can cause a memory explosion. As an example, Linux's various virtual file systems (e.g. `/proc`, `/sys`) can contain directories that spontaneously pop in and out of existence. Attempting to iterate over them using `rustix::fs::Dir` directly or indirectly (e.g. with the `procfs` crate) can trigger this fault condition if the implementation decides to continue on errors. An attacker knowledgeable about the implementation details of a vulnerable target can therefore try to trigger this fault condition via any one or a combination of several available APIs. If successful, the application host will quickly run out of memory, after which the application will likely be terminated by an OOM killer, leading to denial of service. This issue has been addressed in release versions 0.35.15, 0.36.16, 0.37.25, and 0.38.19. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm
Published### Summary When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in `rustix::fs::Dir::read_more`, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application. ### Details #### Discovery The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. See [this post](https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284#issuecomment-1754321993) and the [Discord thread](https://discord.com/channels/273534239310479360/1161137828395237556) for details. #### Diagnosis This issue is caused by the combination of two independent bugs: 1. Stuck iterator - The `rustix::fs::Dir` iterator can fail to halt after encountering an IO error, causing the caller to be stuck in an infinite loop. 2. Memory over-allocation - `Dir::read_more` incorrectly grows the read buffer unconditionally each time it is called, regardless of necessity. Since `<Dir as Iterator>::next` calls `Dir::read`, which in turn calls `Dir::read_more`, this means an IO error encountered during reading a directory can lead to rapid and unbounded growth of memory use. ### PoC ```rust fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> { // create a directory, get a FD to it, then unlink the directory but keep the FD std::fs::create_dir("tmp_dir")?; let dir_fd = rustix::fs::openat( rustix::fs::CWD, rustix::cstr!("tmp_dir"), rustix::fs::OFlags::RDONLY | rustix::fs::OFlags::CLOEXEC, rustix::fs::Mode::empty(), )?; std::fs::remove_dir("tmp_dir")?; // iterator gets stuck in infinite loop and memory explodes rustix::fs::Dir::read_from(dir_fd)? // the iterator keeps returning `Some(Err(_))`, but never halts by returning `None` // therefore if the implementation ignores the error (or otherwise continues // after seeing the error instead of breaking), the loop will not halt .filter_map(|dirent_maybe_error| dirent_maybe_error.ok()) .for_each(|dirent| { // your happy path println!("{dirent:?}"); }); Ok(()) } ``` ### Impact If a program tries to access a directory with its file descriptor after the file has been unlinked (or any other action that leaves the `Dir` iterator in the stuck state), and the implementation does not break after seeing an error, it can cause a memory explosion. As an example, Linux's various virtual file systems (e.g. `/proc`, `/sys`) can contain directories that spontaneously pop in and out of existence. Attempting to iterate over them using `rustix::fs::Dir` directly or indirectly (e.g. with the `procfs` crate) can trigger this fault condition if the implementation decides to continue on errors. An attacker knowledgeable about the implementation details of a vulnerable target can therefore try to trigger this fault condition via any one or a combination of several available APIs. If successful, the application host will quickly run out of memory, after which the application will likely be terminated by an OOM killer, leading to denial of service.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
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cve-program · CVE-2024-43806
Published`rustix::fs::Dir` iterator with the `linux_raw` backend can cause memory explosion
Rustix is a set of safe Rust bindings to POSIX-ish APIs. When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in `rustix::fs::Dir::read_more`, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application. The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. Full details can be read on the GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm repo advisory. If a program tries to access a directory with its file descriptor after the file has been unlinked (or any other action that leaves the `Dir` iterator in the stuck state), and the implementation does not break after seeing an error, it can cause a memory explosion. As an example, Linux's various virtual file systems (e.g. `/proc`, `/sys`) can contain directories that spontaneously pop in and out of existence. Attempting to iterate over them using `rustix::fs::Dir` directly or indirectly (e.g. with the `procfs` crate) can trigger this fault condition if the implementation decides to continue on errors. An attacker knowledgeable about the implementation details of a vulnerable target can therefore try to trigger this fault condition via any one or a combination of several available APIs. If successful, the application host will quickly run out of memory, after which the application will likely be terminated by an OOM killer, leading to denial of service. This issue has been addressed in release versions 0.35.15, 0.36.16, 0.37.25, and 0.38.19. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.
- Source published
- 26 Aug 2024 18:43:22 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Aug 2024 19:40:46 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2023-2715
PublishedRustix is a set of safe Rust bindings to POSIX-ish APIs. When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue…
Rustix is a set of safe Rust bindings to POSIX-ish APIs. When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in `rustix::fs::Dir::read_more`, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application. The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. Full details can be read on the GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm repo advisory. If a program tries to access a directory with its file descriptor after the file has been unlinked (or any other action that leaves the `Dir` iterator in the stuck state), and the implementation does not break after seeing an error, it can cause a memory explosion. As an example, Linux's various virtual file systems (e.g. `/proc`, `/sys`) can contain directories that spontaneously pop in and out of existence. Attempting to iterate over them using `rustix::fs::Dir` directly or indirectly (e.g. with the `procfs` crate) can trigger this fault condition if the implementation decides to continue on errors. An attacker knowledgeable about the implementation details of a vulnerable target can therefore try to trigger this fault condition via any one or a combination of several available APIs. If successful, the application host will quickly run out of memory, after which the application will likely be terminated by an OOM killer, leading to denial of service. This issue has been addressed in release versions 0.35.15, 0.36.16, 0.37.25, and 0.38.19. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 26, 2024, 6:43:22 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 26, 2024, 7:40:46 PM
14 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
SUSE-SU-2025:02809-1: Security update for rust-keylime
CVE-2023-26964 · CVE-2024-12224 · CVE-2024-32650 · CVE-2024-43806 · CVE-2025-3416 · CVE-2025-58266
SUSE-SU-2025:02810-1: Security update for rust-keylime
CVE-2023-26964 · CVE-2024-12224 · CVE-2024-32650 · CVE-2024-43806 · CVE-2025-3416 · CVE-2025-58266
SUSE-SU-2024:3404-1: Security update for rage-encryption
CVE-2024-43806
openSUSE-SU-2024:14354-1: rage-encryption-0.10.0+0-3.1 on GA media
CVE-2024-43806
SUSE-SU-2025:4411-1: Security update for librsvg
CVE-2024-12224 · CVE-2024-43806
SUSE-SU-2025:20858-1: Security update for rust-keylime
CVE-2024-12224 · CVE-2024-43806 · CVE-2024-58266 · CVE-2025-3416 · CVE-2025-55159
openSUSE-SU-2025:15294-1: keylime-ima-policy-0.2.7+70-2.1 on GA media
CVE-2024-12224 · CVE-2024-43806
openSUSE-SU-2026:20396-1: Security update for librsvg
CVE-2024-12224 · CVE-2024-43806
openSUSE-SU-2024:14306-1: 389-ds-3.1.1~git13.a9c7ff9-1.1 on GA media
CVE-2024-43806
SUSE-SU-2025:20057-1: Security update for rust-keylime
CVE-2024-32650 · CVE-2024-43806
msrc_CVE-2024-43806: `rustix::fs::Dir` iterator with the `linux_raw` backend can cause memory explosion
CVE-2024-43806
SUSE-SU-2025:02811-1: Security update for rust-keylime
CVE-2023-26964 · CVE-2024-12224 · CVE-2024-32650 · CVE-2024-43806 · CVE-2025-3416 · CVE-2025-58266
SUSE-SU-2026:20910-1: Security update for librsvg
CVE-2024-12224 · CVE-2024-43806
SUSE-SU-2026:20755-1: Security update for librsvg
CVE-2024-12224 · CVE-2024-43806
- Source published
- Aug 26, 2024, 6:43:22 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 26, 2024, 7:40:46 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 15 Nov 2026 02:34:27 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd · CVE-2024-43806
PublishedRustix is a set of safe Rust bindings to POSIX-ish APIs. When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue…
Rustix is a set of safe Rust bindings to POSIX-ish APIs. When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in `rustix::fs::Dir::read_more`, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application. The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. Full details can be read on the GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm repo advisory. If a program tries to access a directory with its file descriptor after the file has been unlinked (or any other action that leaves the `Dir` iterator in the stuck state), and the implementation does not break after seeing an error, it can cause a memory explosion. As an example, Linux's various virtual file systems (e.g. `/proc`, `/sys`) can contain directories that spontaneously pop in and out of existence. Attempting to iterate over them using `rustix::fs::Dir` directly or indirectly (e.g. with the `procfs` crate) can trigger this fault condition if the implementation decides to continue on errors. An attacker knowledgeable about the implementation details of a vulnerable target can therefore try to trigger this fault condition via any one or a combination of several available APIs. If successful, the application host will quickly run out of memory, after which the application will likely be terminated by an OOM killer, leading to denial of service. This issue has been addressed in release versions 0.35.15, 0.36.16, 0.37.25, and 0.38.19. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-400
Original publisher date fields
published: 2024-08-26T19:15:08.190
lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:51:44.960
- Source published
- 26 Aug 2024 19:15:08 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 07:51:44 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 00:17:28 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv · GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm
Publishedrustix's `rustix::fs::Dir` iterator with the `linux_raw` backend can cause memory explosion
### Summary When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in `rustix::fs::Dir::read_more`, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application. ### Details #### Discovery The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. See [this post](https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284#issuecomment-1754321993) and the [Discord thread](https://discord.com/channels/273534239310479360/1161137828395237556) for details. #### Diagnosis This issue is caused by the combination of two independent bugs: 1. Stuck iterator - The `rustix::fs::Dir` iterator can fail to halt after encountering an IO error, causing the caller to be stuck in an infinite loop. 2. Memory over-allocation - `Dir::read_more` incorrectly grows the read buffer unconditionally each time it is called, regardless of necessity. Since `<Dir as Iterator>::next` calls `Dir::read`, which in turn calls `Dir::read_more`, this means an IO error encountered during reading a directory can lead to rapid and unbounded growth of memory use. ### PoC ```rust fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> { // create a directory, get a FD to it, then unlink the directory but keep the FD std::fs::create_dir("tmp_dir")?; let dir_fd = rustix::fs::openat( rustix::fs::CWD, rustix::cstr!("tmp_dir"), rustix::fs::OFlags::RDONLY | rustix::fs::OFlags::CLOEXEC, rustix::fs::Mode::empty(), )?; std::fs::remove_dir("tmp_dir")?; // iterator gets stuck in infinite loop and memory explodes rustix::fs::Dir::read_from(dir_fd)? // the iterator keeps returning `Some(Err(_))`, but never halts by returning `None` // therefore if the implementation ignores the error (or otherwise continues // after seeing the error instead of breaking), the loop will not halt .filter_map(|dirent_maybe_error| dirent_maybe_error.ok()) .for_each(|dirent| { // your happy path println!("{dirent:?}"); }); Ok(()) } ``` ### Impact If a program tries to access a directory with its file descriptor after the file has been unlinked (or any other action that leaves the `Dir` iterator in the stuck state), and the implementation does not break after seeing an error, it can cause a memory explosion. As an example, Linux's various virtual file systems (e.g. `/proc`, `/sys`) can contain directories that spontaneously pop in and out of existence. Attempting to iterate over them using `rustix::fs::Dir` directly or indirectly (e.g. with the `procfs` crate) can trigger this fault condition if the implementation decides to continue on errors. An attacker knowledgeable about the implementation details of a vulnerable target can therefore try to trigger this fault condition via any one or a combination of several available APIs. If successful, the application host will quickly run out of memory, after which the application will likely be terminated by an OOM killer, leading to denial of service.
- Source published
- 18 Oct 2023 18:27:47 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:03 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Publisher rating · MODERATE