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runc can be confused to create empty files/directories on the host

CVSS 3.1 3.6 LOWEUVD CVSS 3.1 3.6 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 3.6 LOWCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 3.6 LOWCVSS_V3 CVSS_V4 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/opencontainers/runc 1.1.14Fixed by github.com/opencontainers/runc 1.2.0-rc.3osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/opencontainers/runc 1.1.14Fixed by github.com/opencontainers/runc 1.2.0-rc.3KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-45310

Published

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with `os.MkdirAll`. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use `/etc/sub[ug]id`), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-2819

Published

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with `os.MkdirAll`. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use `/etc/sub[ug]id`), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-45310

Published

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with `os.MkdirAll`. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use `/etc/sub[ug]id`), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-jfvp-7x6p-h2pv

Published

### Impact runc 1.1.13 and earlier as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with os.MkdirAll. While this can be used to create empty files, existing files **will not** be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The CVSS score for this vulnerability is CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N (Low severity, 3.6). ### Workarounds Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use /etc/sub[ug]id), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though we haven't thoroughly tested to what extent the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack. ### Patches Fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. * `main` patches: * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/4359 * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/63c2908164f3a1daea455bf5bcd8d363d70328c7 * `release-1.1` patches: * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/8781993968fd964ac723ff5f360b6f259e809a3e * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/f0b652ea61ff6750a8fcc69865d45a7abf37accf ### Credits Thanks to Rodrigo Campos Catelin (@rata) and Alban Crequy (@alban) from Microsoft for discovering and reporting this vulnerability.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2024-3110

Published

Can be confused to create empty files/directories on the host in github.com/opencontainers/runc

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

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This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2024-45310

Published

runc can be confused to create empty files/directories on the host

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with `os.MkdirAll`. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use `/etc/sub[ug]id`), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.

Source published
3 Sep 2024 19:07:34 UTC
Source modified
21 Feb 2025 18:03:30 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 3.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2024-2819

Published

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host…

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with `os.MkdirAll`. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use `/etc/sub[ug]id`), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 3, 2024, 7:07:34 PM

dateUpdated: Feb 21, 2025, 6:03:30 PM

25 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

SUSE-SU-2024:3222-1: Security update for runc

CVE-2024-45310

openSUSE-SU-2026:21379-1: Security update for ctop

CVE-2022-21698 · CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2026-10722 · CVE-2026-33814 · CVE-2026-39821

SUSE-SU-2025:02198-1: Security update for runc

CVE-2024-45310

openSUSE-SU-2026:10842-1: apptainer-1.4.5-5.1 on GA media

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2026-33814 · CVE-2026-39827 · CVE-2026-39831 · CVE-2026-39832 · CVE-2026-39835

SUSE-SU-2025:20046-1: Security update for runc

CVE-2024-45310

openSUSE-SU-2026:11153-1: cadvisor-0.60.3-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2026-10722 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-39821

RHSA-2026:3406: Red Hat Security Advisory: New container image: rhceph-9.0

CVE-2021-23358 · CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2024-51744 · CVE-2024-55565 · CVE-2025-6176 · CVE-2025-7783 · CVE-2025-14104 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-26791 · CVE-2025-50181 · CVE-2025-50182 · CVE-2025-66418 · CVE-2025-66471 · CVE-2026-21441

SUSE-SU-2025:02198-2: Security update for runc

CVE-2024-45310

SUSE-SU-2026:20571-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

SUSE-SU-2025:20353-1: Security update for runc

CVE-2024-45310

msrc_CVE-2024-45310: runc can be confused to create empty files/directories on the host

CVE-2024-45310

SUSE-SU-2026:20610-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

openSUSE-SU-2024:14312-1: runc-1.2.0~rc3-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2024-45310

openSUSE-SU-2026:20281-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

openSUSE-SU-2026:20834-1: Security update for apptainer

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2026-33814 · CVE-2026-39827 · CVE-2026-39828 · CVE-2026-39829 · CVE-2026-39830 · CVE-2026-39831 · CVE-2026-39832 · CVE-2026-39833 · CVE-2026-39834 · CVE-2026-39835 · CVE-2026-42508 · CVE-2026-46595 · CVE-2026-46597 · CVE-2026-46598

openSUSE-SU-2025:15424-1: govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20250807T150727-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2015-7561 · CVE-2016-9962 · CVE-2017-1000056 · CVE-2017-1002102 · CVE-2018-1002100 · CVE-2018-1002101 · CVE-2018-16733 · CVE-2018-19184 · CVE-2019-1002100 · CVE-2019-1002101 · CVE-2019-11245 · CVE-2019-11251 · CVE-2019-11253 · CVE-2020-26240 · CVE-2020-26241 · CVE-2020-8551 · CVE-2020-8555 · CVE-2020-8557 · CVE-2020-8558 · CVE-2020-8562 · CVE-2020-8563 · CVE-2020-8566 · CVE-2021-25735 · CVE-2021-25736 · CVE-2021-25737 · CVE-2021-25741 · CVE-2021-25743 · CVE-2021-30465 · CVE-2022-29162 · CVE-2022-29177 · CVE-2022-3162 · CVE-2022-3294 · CVE-2023-2431 · CVE-2023-25809 · CVE-2023-2727 · CVE-2023-2728 · CVE-2023-27561 · CVE-2023-28642 · CVE-2023-5528 · CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2024-5321 · CVE-2025-3445 · CVE-2025-47907 · CVE-2025-47908

WID-SEC-W-2025-0632: IBM MQ: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2024-9341

SUSE-SU-2025:1374-1: Security update for runc

CVE-2024-45310

SUSE-SU-2026:0439-1: Security update for apptainer

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22869 · CVE-2025-22870 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-27144 · CVE-2025-47913 · CVE-2025-47914 · CVE-2025-58181 · CVE-2025-65105 · CVE-2025-8556

SUSE-SU-2026:20551-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

openSUSE-SU-2026:21265-1: Security update for cadvisor

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2026-10722 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-39821

SUSE-SU-2024:3324-1: Security update for runc

CVE-2024-45310

RHSA-2026:37387: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.22.0 security, enhancement & bug fix update

CVE-2024-25621 · CVE-2024-40635 · CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-8766 · CVE-2025-21613 · CVE-2025-21614 · CVE-2025-22870 · CVE-2025-47911 · CVE-2025-52881 · CVE-2025-54410 · CVE-2025-58058 · CVE-2025-64329 · CVE-2025-66506 · CVE-2026-22772 · CVE-2026-23831 · CVE-2026-24117 · CVE-2026-25680 · CVE-2026-25681 · CVE-2026-25934 · CVE-2026-27136 · CVE-2026-27141 · CVE-2026-27903 · CVE-2026-33540 · CVE-2026-33747 · CVE-2026-33748 · CVE-2026-33814 · CVE-2026-34986 · CVE-2026-35172 · CVE-2026-35469 · CVE-2026-39821 · CVE-2026-39827 · CVE-2026-39828 · CVE-2026-39829 · CVE-2026-39830 · CVE-2026-39831 · CVE-2026-39832 · CVE-2026-39833 · CVE-2026-39834 · CVE-2026-39835 · CVE-2026-39883 · CVE-2026-41506 · CVE-2026-41567 · CVE-2026-41568 · CVE-2026-42502 · CVE-2026-42506 · CVE-2026-42508 · CVE-2026-44740 · CVE-2026-45571 · CVE-2026-46595 · CVE-2026-46597 · CVE-2026-46598

SUSE-SU-2025:20335-1: Security update for runc

CVE-2024-45310

SUSE-SU-2026:0479-1: Security update for kubevirt, virt-api-container, virt-controller-container, virt-exportproxy-container, virt-exportserver-container, virt-handler-container, virt-launcher-container, virt-libguestfs-tools-container, virt-operator-container, virt-pr-helper-container, virt-synchronization-controller-container

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-64435

Source published
Sep 3, 2024, 7:07:34 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Feb 21, 2025, 6:03:30 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 03:42:08 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 3.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

nvd · CVE-2024-45310

Published

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host…

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with `os.MkdirAll`. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use `/etc/sub[ug]id`), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-61 · CWE-363

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-09-03T19:15:15.243

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:54:00.017

3 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.2.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.2.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
3 Sep 2024 19:15:15 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 07:54:00 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 00:17:28 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 3.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 3.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

osv · GHSA-jfvp-7x6p-h2pv

Published

runc can be confused to create empty files/directories on the host

### Impact runc 1.1.13 and earlier as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with os.MkdirAll. While this can be used to create empty files, existing files **will not** be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The CVSS score for this vulnerability is CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N (Low severity, 3.6). ### Workarounds Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use /etc/sub[ug]id), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though we haven't thoroughly tested to what extent the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack. ### Patches Fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. * `main` patches: * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/4359 * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/63c2908164f3a1daea455bf5bcd8d363d70328c7 * `release-1.1` patches: * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/8781993968fd964ac723ff5f360b6f259e809a3e * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/f0b652ea61ff6750a8fcc69865d45a7abf37accf ### Credits Thanks to Rodrigo Campos Catelin (@rata) and Alban Crequy (@alban) from Microsoft for discovering and reporting this vulnerability.

Source published
3 Sep 2024 19:49:32 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:18 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/U:Green

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2024-3110

Published

Can be confused to create empty files/directories on the host in github.com/opencontainers/runc

Can be confused to create empty files/directories on the host in github.com/opencontainers/runc

Source published
6 Sep 2024 20:43:50 UTC
Source modified
4 Feb 2026 02:23:26 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 13:53 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current