Dynatrace MCP Server is an MCP server for Dynatrace Observability. Prior to 1.8.7, the create_dynatrace_notebook registration in src/index.ts performs a persistent document-write action without calling requestHumanApproval, although the project's other write tools use that gate to obtain operator consent. A caller can create tenant-visible notebooks containing attacker-controlled Markdown or DQL content, and tenant users may later execute embedded DQL when opening the notebook. The tool also lacks a destructiveHint annotation that would signal its side effects to MCP clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.8.7.
Dynatrace MCP Server is an MCP server for Dynatrace Observability. Prior to 1.8.7, the create_dynatrace_notebook registration in src/index.ts performs a persistent document-write action without calling requestHumanApproval, although the project's other write tools use that gate to obtain operator consent. A caller can create tenant-visible notebooks containing attacker-controlled Markdown or DQL content, and tenant users may later execute embedded DQL when opening the notebook. The tool also lacks a destructiveHint annotation that would signal its side effects to MCP clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.8.7.
Dynatrace MCP Server is an MCP server for Dynatrace Observability. Prior to 1.8.7, the create_dynatrace_notebook registration in src/index.ts performs a persistent document-write action without calling requestHumanApproval, although the project's other write tools use that gate to obtain operator consent. A caller can create tenant-visible notebooks containing attacker-controlled Markdown or DQL content, and tenant users may later execute embedded DQL when opening the notebook. The tool also lacks a destructiveHint annotation that would signal its side effects to MCP clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.8.7.
### Summary
A missing human-approval gate on the `create_dynatrace_notebook` tool allows a caller to create persistent tenant-visible documents containing arbitrary content (including embedded DQL that other users execute when opening the notebook) without operator consent.
### Details
`dynatrace-mcp-server` registers six write tools: `send_slack_message`, `send_email`, `send_event`, `create_workflow_for_notification`, `make_workflow_public`, and `create_dynatrace_notebook`. Five of these call `requestHumanApproval()` before executing the side-effect, which elicits the operator's explicit consent through the MCP elicitation protocol. The CHANGELOG explicitly states these approval gates were added "to ensure user consent and prevent unintended actions."
`create_dynatrace_notebook` does not call `requestHumanApproval()`. The tool was introduced in a separate release from the approval-gate retrofit and was left ungated. As a result, a caller can create persistent, tenant-visible Dynatrace notebooks containing arbitrary content with no operator confirmation. Notebooks can include embedded DQL queries that later execute under the permissions of any tenant user who opens them.
The vulnerable code is in `src/index.ts`, lines 1563-1601:
```typescript
tool(
'create_dynatrace_notebook',
'Create Dynatrace Notebook',
'Create a new notebook in the Dynatrace platform ...',
{
name: z.string().describe(/* ... */),
description: z.string().optional().describe(/* ... */),
content: z.array(z.object({
type: z.enum(['dql', 'markdown']),
text: z.string(),
})).describe(/* ... */),
},
{
readOnlyHint: false,
},
async ({ name, content, description }) => {
const dtClient = await createAuthenticatedHttpClient(allRequiredScopes);
const data = await createDynatraceNotebook(dtClient, name, content, description);
// No requestHumanApproval() call.
// No destructiveHint annotation.
// Scopes requested are allRequiredScopes (the broadest possible set)
// even though only document:documents:write is needed.
return data
? `Document created successfully: ${dtEnvironment}/ui/apps/dynatrace.notebooks/notebook/${data.id}`
: 'document creation failed';
},
);
```
By comparison, every other write tool calls `requestHumanApproval()` as its first action:
- `send_email` (line 1274): `const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);`
- `send_slack_message` (line 652): `const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);`
- `send_event` (line 1367): `const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);`
- `create_workflow_for_notification` (line 1069): `const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);`
- `make_workflow_public` (line 1118): `const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);`
### PoC
Tested end-to-end against a real Dynatrace tenant. The MCP server was started in HTTP mode with the operator's Platform Token:
```bash
export DT_ENVIRONMENT=https://<tenant>.apps.dynatrace.com
export DT_PLATFORM_TOKEN=dt0s16....
npx -y @dynatrace-oss/[email protected] --http --port 3000
```
A single unauthenticated POST from a process with no Dynatrace credentials of its own:
```bash
curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:3000/ \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
-d '{
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "create_dynatrace_notebook",
"arguments": {
"name": "Unapproved notebook",
"description": "Created without operator approval.",
"content": [
{"type": "markdown", "text": "# This notebook was created without approval"},
{"type": "dql", "text": "fetch logs | limit 10"}
]
}
}
}'
```
The response:
```
event: message
data: {"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"Document created successfully:
https://<tenant>.apps.dynatrace.com/ui/apps/dynatrace.notebooks/notebook/<uuid>"}]},
"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1}
```
The notebook is visible in the operator's Notebooks app within seconds. No elicitation prompt was sent to any operator client.
By contrast, the same harness invoking `send_email` or `send_slack_message` returns:
```
"Operation cancelled: Human approval was not granted for sending this email."
```
The gate logic exists and is wired up for all other write tools - it is simply missing on `create_dynatrace_notebook`.
### Impact
- A caller (an unauthenticated network attacker over the HTTP transport when authentication is missing, or a prompt-injected LLM in stdio mode) can silently create persistent tenant-visible documents.
- The notebook content is attacker-controlled. Embedded DQL queries execute under the permissions of any tenant user who later opens the notebook - a stored-DQL pattern that crosses identity boundaries within the tenant.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 9, 2026, 9:02:43 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 10, 2026, 4:14:46 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-862
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-09T22:18:37.437
lastModified: 2026-11-12T22:18:51.470
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.