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Dynatrace MCP Server: create_dynatrace_notebook missing the human-approval gate

CVSS 3.1 3.7 LOWEUVD CVSS 3.1 3.7 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 3.7 LOWCVSS_V3 Publisher rating LOWFixed by @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server 1.8.7KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-123812

Published

Dynatrace MCP Server is an MCP server for Dynatrace Observability. Prior to 1.8.7, the create_dynatrace_notebook registration in src/index.ts performs a persistent document-write action without calling requestHumanApproval, although the project's other write tools use that gate to obtain operator consent. A caller can create tenant-visible notebooks containing attacker-controlled Markdown or DQL content, and tenant users may later execute embedded DQL when opening the notebook. The tool also lacks a destructiveHint annotation that would signal its side effects to MCP clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.8.7.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-120447

Published

Dynatrace MCP Server is an MCP server for Dynatrace Observability. Prior to 1.8.7, the create_dynatrace_notebook registration in src/index.ts performs a persistent document-write action without calling requestHumanApproval, although the project's other write tools use that gate to obtain operator consent. A caller can create tenant-visible notebooks containing attacker-controlled Markdown or DQL content, and tenant users may later execute embedded DQL when opening the notebook. The tool also lacks a destructiveHint annotation that would signal its side effects to MCP clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.8.7.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-123812

Published

Dynatrace MCP Server is an MCP server for Dynatrace Observability. Prior to 1.8.7, the create_dynatrace_notebook registration in src/index.ts performs a persistent document-write action without calling requestHumanApproval, although the project's other write tools use that gate to obtain operator consent. A caller can create tenant-visible notebooks containing attacker-controlled Markdown or DQL content, and tenant users may later execute embedded DQL when opening the notebook. The tool also lacks a destructiveHint annotation that would signal its side effects to MCP clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.8.7.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-pc2w-4mq8-32qw

Published

### Summary A missing human-approval gate on the `create_dynatrace_notebook` tool allows a caller to create persistent tenant-visible documents containing arbitrary content (including embedded DQL that other users execute when opening the notebook) without operator consent. ### Details `dynatrace-mcp-server` registers six write tools: `send_slack_message`, `send_email`, `send_event`, `create_workflow_for_notification`, `make_workflow_public`, and `create_dynatrace_notebook`. Five of these call `requestHumanApproval()` before executing the side-effect, which elicits the operator's explicit consent through the MCP elicitation protocol. The CHANGELOG explicitly states these approval gates were added "to ensure user consent and prevent unintended actions." `create_dynatrace_notebook` does not call `requestHumanApproval()`. The tool was introduced in a separate release from the approval-gate retrofit and was left ungated. As a result, a caller can create persistent, tenant-visible Dynatrace notebooks containing arbitrary content with no operator confirmation. Notebooks can include embedded DQL queries that later execute under the permissions of any tenant user who opens them. The vulnerable code is in `src/index.ts`, lines 1563-1601: ```typescript tool( 'create_dynatrace_notebook', 'Create Dynatrace Notebook', 'Create a new notebook in the Dynatrace platform ...', { name: z.string().describe(/* ... */), description: z.string().optional().describe(/* ... */), content: z.array(z.object({ type: z.enum(['dql', 'markdown']), text: z.string(), })).describe(/* ... */), }, { readOnlyHint: false, }, async ({ name, content, description }) => { const dtClient = await createAuthenticatedHttpClient(allRequiredScopes); const data = await createDynatraceNotebook(dtClient, name, content, description); // No requestHumanApproval() call. // No destructiveHint annotation. // Scopes requested are allRequiredScopes (the broadest possible set) // even though only document:documents:write is needed. return data ? `Document created successfully: ${dtEnvironment}/ui/apps/dynatrace.notebooks/notebook/${data.id}` : 'document creation failed'; }, ); ``` By comparison, every other write tool calls `requestHumanApproval()` as its first action: - `send_email` (line 1274): `const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);` - `send_slack_message` (line 652): `const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);` - `send_event` (line 1367): `const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);` - `create_workflow_for_notification` (line 1069): `const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);` - `make_workflow_public` (line 1118): `const approved = await requestHumanApproval(...);` ### PoC Tested end-to-end against a real Dynatrace tenant. The MCP server was started in HTTP mode with the operator's Platform Token: ```bash export DT_ENVIRONMENT=https://<tenant>.apps.dynatrace.com export DT_PLATFORM_TOKEN=dt0s16.... npx -y @dynatrace-oss/[email protected] --http --port 3000 ``` A single unauthenticated POST from a process with no Dynatrace credentials of its own: ```bash curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:3000/ \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \ -d '{ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "create_dynatrace_notebook", "arguments": { "name": "Unapproved notebook", "description": "Created without operator approval.", "content": [ {"type": "markdown", "text": "# This notebook was created without approval"}, {"type": "dql", "text": "fetch logs | limit 10"} ] } } }' ``` The response: ``` event: message data: {"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"Document created successfully: https://<tenant>.apps.dynatrace.com/ui/apps/dynatrace.notebooks/notebook/<uuid>"}]}, "jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1} ``` The notebook is visible in the operator's Notebooks app within seconds. No elicitation prompt was sent to any operator client. By contrast, the same harness invoking `send_email` or `send_slack_message` returns: ``` "Operation cancelled: Human approval was not granted for sending this email." ``` The gate logic exists and is wired up for all other write tools - it is simply missing on `create_dynatrace_notebook`. ### Impact - A caller (an unauthenticated network attacker over the HTTP transport when authentication is missing, or a prompt-injected LLM in stdio mode) can silently create persistent tenant-visible documents. - The notebook content is attacker-controlled. Embedded DQL queries execute under the permissions of any tenant user who later opens the notebook - a stored-DQL pattern that crosses identity boundaries within the tenant.

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