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pgEdge Control Plane generates pg_hba.conf with trust authentication for local and loopback connections

CVSS 3.1 7.8 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.8 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.8 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/pgEdge/control-plane 0.11.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-125323

Published

pgEdge Control Plane is a distributed application for managing and orchestrating Postgres databases across multiple hosts. From 0.1.0 to 0.10.1, generated pg_hba.conf files began with hard-coded trust entries for Unix-socket and loopback connections. Because PostgreSQL evaluates the file from top to bottom, those entries also preempted operator-supplied rules in the pg_hba_conf field. Under the systemd orchestrator, any unprivileged operating-system account on a database host could authenticate as any PostgreSQL role, including the superuser, without credentials and obtain full control of the host's databases. Under Docker Swarm, reaching the container-local socket or loopback interface required code execution inside the database container. Publishing the PostgreSQL port to the host did not expose these trust rules because host connections did not appear to originate from 127.0.0.1 or ::1. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-121705

Published

pgEdge Control Plane is a distributed application for managing and orchestrating Postgres databases across multiple hosts. From 0.1.0 to 0.10.1, generated pg_hba.conf files began with hard-coded trust entries for Unix-socket and loopback connections. Because PostgreSQL evaluates the file from top to bottom, those entries also preempted operator-supplied rules in the pg_hba_conf field. Under the systemd orchestrator, any unprivileged operating-system account on a database host could authenticate as any PostgreSQL role, including the superuser, without credentials and obtain full control of the host's databases. Under Docker Swarm, reaching the container-local socket or loopback interface required code execution inside the database container. Publishing the PostgreSQL port to the host did not expose these trust rules because host connections did not appear to originate from 127.0.0.1 or ::1. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-125323

Published

pgEdge Control Plane is a distributed application for managing and orchestrating Postgres databases across multiple hosts. From 0.1.0 to 0.10.1, generated pg_hba.conf files began with hard-coded trust entries for Unix-socket and loopback connections. Because PostgreSQL evaluates the file from top to bottom, those entries also preempted operator-supplied rules in the pg_hba_conf field. Under the systemd orchestrator, any unprivileged operating-system account on a database host could authenticate as any PostgreSQL role, including the superuser, without credentials and obtain full control of the host's databases. Under Docker Swarm, reaching the container-local socket or loopback interface required code execution inside the database container. Publishing the PostgreSQL port to the host did not expose these trust rules because host connections did not appear to originate from 127.0.0.1 or ::1. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-vq9p-w6wv-cr25

Published

### Summary Every `pg_hba.conf` generated by the pgEdge Control Plane begins with a hard-coded block of `trust` entries covering Unix-socket and loopback connections. Any operating-system account that can reach the Postgres socket or the loopback interface on a database host can authenticate as any Postgres role, including the superuser, without presenting a credential. ### Details The generated file opens with the following six entries: ``` local all all trust host all all 127.0.0.1/32 trust host all all ::1/128 trust local replication all trust host replication all 127.0.0.1/32 trust host replication all ::1/128 trust ``` Postgres evaluates `pg_hba.conf` top-down and stops at the first matching rule. Because these entries are emitted at the top of the file, they also pre-empt every rule below them — including entries supplied by an operator through the `pg_hba_conf` field of a database node specification, which are appended lower in the file and are therefore never reached for local or loopback connections. Both supported orchestrators emit these entries, but exposure differs by deployment model: * **systemd** — the database runs on a shared multi-user host. Any local account on that host can connect as the Postgres superuser. This is the higher-severity case and the one the CVSS score below reflects. * **Docker Swarm** — the Unix socket and the loopback interface belong to the Postgres container, so reaching these entries requires code execution inside that container. Publishing the Postgres port to the host does not change this: such connections are not seen by Postgres as originating from `127.0.0.1` or `::1`, so they do not match the entries above. The practical exposure is correspondingly narrower. An operator who verifies their own deployment can confirm the issue by inspecting the generated `pg_hba.conf` on a database node for the entries above. ### Impact An unprivileged local operating-system account on an affected database host obtains full control of every Postgres database on that host: read of all data, modification or destruction of all data, and any action available to a Postgres superuser. Under the systemd orchestrator this converts any local account into a database superuser with no additional prerequisites. ### Affected versions pgEdge Control Plane v0.1.0 through v0.10.1, inclusive. ### Patches Fixed in **v0.11.0**. Generated `pg_hba.conf` files no longer contain `trust` entries, and operator-supplied local authentication rules take effect. Upgrading to v0.11.0 or later is the recommended and, on v0.9.0 and later, the only complete remedy. ### Workarounds The available mitigation differs by version, and no mitigation is complete on current releases. **v0.1.0 – v0.8.1.** An operator could take the authentication files out of Patroni's control entirely: copy the generated `pg_hba.conf` and `pg_ident.conf`, edit the copies, and point the `hba_file` and `ident_file` settings at them through node-level `postgresql_conf`. This is effective but must be repeated per instance, including for every node added afterwards. **v0.9.0 – v0.10.1.** The above no longer applies. API validation rejects the `hba_file` and `ident_file` settings, and entries supplied through the `pg_hba_conf` specification array are appended below the hard-coded block rather than overriding it, so they do not take effect for local or loopback connections. The only partial mitigation available is to restrict the Unix socket: set `unix_socket_permissions` to `0700`, or to `0770` with the intended accounts placed in the `postgres` group. **This closes the socket path only. No supported configuration closes the loopback path on these versions.** Operators on v0.9.0 – v0.10.1 should upgrade to v0.11.0.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-125323

Published

control-plane

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "pgEdge",
                    "product": "control-plane",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 0.11.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

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euvd · EUVD-2026-121705

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Nov 10, 2026, 5:52:28 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 12, 2026, 6:02:47 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

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nvd · CVE-2026-125323

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-306 · CWE-1188

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-11-10T18:17:33.703

lastModified: 2026-11-12T22:18:51.470

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-vq9p-w6wv-cr25

Published

github.com/pgEdge/control-plane

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 0.11.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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