fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Prior to 5.12.0, when the non-default stopNodes option is enabled, readStopNodeData() in OrderedObjParser.js calls readTagExp() for each less-than character in an unterminated stop-node body and repeatedly rescans the remaining input while looking for a closing greater-than character. An attacker who supplies XML containing many tag fragments without a later closing character can cause quadratic rescanning before parsing fails, blocking a Node.js event loop and causing CPU-exhaustion denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 5.12.0.
fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Prior to 5.12.0, when the non-default stopNodes option is enabled, readStopNodeData() in OrderedObjParser.js calls readTagExp() for each less-than character in an unterminated stop-node body and repeatedly rescans the remaining input while looking for a closing greater-than character. An attacker who supplies XML containing many tag fragments without a later closing character can cause quadratic rescanning before parsing fails, blocking a Node.js event loop and causing CPU-exhaustion denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 5.12.0.
fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Prior to 5.12.0, when the non-default stopNodes option is enabled, readStopNodeData() in OrderedObjParser.js calls readTagExp() for each less-than character in an unterminated stop-node body and repeatedly rescans the remaining input while looking for a closing greater-than character. An attacker who supplies XML containing many tag fragments without a later closing character can cause quadratic rescanning before parsing fails, blocking a Node.js event loop and causing CPU-exhaustion denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 5.12.0.
### Summary
With the non-default stopNodes option, a stop node's body with many "<a " fragments and no closing ">" anywhere after makes readStopNodeData() rescan the entire remaining input from every "<". The failed lookahead is neither cached nor bounded, so n fragments cost O(n²) before the parser throws. Availability-only (CPU exhaustion), needs the non-default stopNodes option — not benchmarked yet, see Proof of Concept.
### Details
**CWE-407** — Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
**Code**
- `OrderedObjParser.js:520` — `parseXml()` calls `readStopNodeData()` after a matching stop node opens
- `OrderedObjParser.js:810` — calls `readTagExp()` for every non-special `<`
- `OrderedObjParser.js:688-722` — `tagExpWithClosingIndex()` scans to end-of-input and returns `undefined` when no `>` exists
- `OrderedObjParser.js:812-818` — on failure, `i` isn't advanced, so the next `<` repeats the same full scan
- `OrderedObjParser.js:423` — the main parse loop throws immediately on the same failure; only the stop-node path retries
**Root cause:** a failed closing-`>` lookahead is neither cached nor bounded — `n` copies of `<a ` with no later `>` means `n` scans over the remaining input, O(n²) work, before it finally throws.
**Fix**
1. Throw immediately in `readStopNodeData()` when `readTagExp()` returns `undefined`
2. Or break the loop on the first failed scan
3. Or find the next `>` once and reuse/bound that result
4. Add a test asserting near-linear scaling when payload size doubles
### Proof of concept
Not benchmarked — static-analysis finding, confidence 0.5.
To confirm: configure `stopNodes` matching a root element. Build input as `'<stop>' + '<a '.repeat(n)`. Time `parse()` until it throws `Unexpected end of <tag>`. Start around n=10,000 and double it — quadratic should show ~4x time per doubling, linear ~2x. Control: same input with a `>` present, or `stopNodes` unset.
### Impact
CPU-exhaustion DoS in Node.js services parsing untrusted XML with `stopNodes` enabled. A ~100KB payload is estimated at ~10⁹ character operations (roughly a second or more of blocked event loop) — analytical estimate, not a benchmark. No confidentiality/integrity impact. CVSS 3.1: `AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L` (3.7, Low).
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 10, 2026, 8:23:16 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 12, 2026, 6:01:44 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-407
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-10T21:19:24.487
lastModified: 2026-11-12T18:17:23.860
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.