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fast-xml-parser: Quadratic CPU consumption scanning unterminated stop-node tags

CVSS 3.1 3.7 LOWEUVD CVSS 3.1 3.7 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 3.7 LOWCVSS_V3 Publisher rating LOWFixed by fast-xml-parser 5.12.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-126066

Published

fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Prior to 5.12.0, when the non-default stopNodes option is enabled, readStopNodeData() in OrderedObjParser.js calls readTagExp() for each less-than character in an unterminated stop-node body and repeatedly rescans the remaining input while looking for a closing greater-than character. An attacker who supplies XML containing many tag fragments without a later closing character can cause quadratic rescanning before parsing fails, blocking a Node.js event loop and causing CPU-exhaustion denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 5.12.0.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-122845

Published

fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Prior to 5.12.0, when the non-default stopNodes option is enabled, readStopNodeData() in OrderedObjParser.js calls readTagExp() for each less-than character in an unterminated stop-node body and repeatedly rescans the remaining input while looking for a closing greater-than character. An attacker who supplies XML containing many tag fragments without a later closing character can cause quadratic rescanning before parsing fails, blocking a Node.js event loop and causing CPU-exhaustion denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 5.12.0.

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nvd · CVE-2026-126066

Published

fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Prior to 5.12.0, when the non-default stopNodes option is enabled, readStopNodeData() in OrderedObjParser.js calls readTagExp() for each less-than character in an unterminated stop-node body and repeatedly rescans the remaining input while looking for a closing greater-than character. An attacker who supplies XML containing many tag fragments without a later closing character can cause quadratic rescanning before parsing fails, blocking a Node.js event loop and causing CPU-exhaustion denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 5.12.0.

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osv · GHSA-474x-hrwr-fgx4

Published

### Summary With the non-default stopNodes option, a stop node's body with many "<a " fragments and no closing ">" anywhere after makes readStopNodeData() rescan the entire remaining input from every "<". The failed lookahead is neither cached nor bounded, so n fragments cost O(n²) before the parser throws. Availability-only (CPU exhaustion), needs the non-default stopNodes option — not benchmarked yet, see Proof of Concept. ### Details **CWE-407** — Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity **Code** - `OrderedObjParser.js:520` — `parseXml()` calls `readStopNodeData()` after a matching stop node opens - `OrderedObjParser.js:810` — calls `readTagExp()` for every non-special `<` - `OrderedObjParser.js:688-722` — `tagExpWithClosingIndex()` scans to end-of-input and returns `undefined` when no `>` exists - `OrderedObjParser.js:812-818` — on failure, `i` isn't advanced, so the next `<` repeats the same full scan - `OrderedObjParser.js:423` — the main parse loop throws immediately on the same failure; only the stop-node path retries **Root cause:** a failed closing-`>` lookahead is neither cached nor bounded — `n` copies of `<a ` with no later `>` means `n` scans over the remaining input, O(n²) work, before it finally throws. **Fix** 1. Throw immediately in `readStopNodeData()` when `readTagExp()` returns `undefined` 2. Or break the loop on the first failed scan 3. Or find the next `>` once and reuse/bound that result 4. Add a test asserting near-linear scaling when payload size doubles ### Proof of concept Not benchmarked — static-analysis finding, confidence 0.5. To confirm: configure `stopNodes` matching a root element. Build input as `'<stop>' + '<a '.repeat(n)`. Time `parse()` until it throws `Unexpected end of <tag>`. Start around n=10,000 and double it — quadratic should show ~4x time per doubling, linear ~2x. Control: same input with a `>` present, or `stopNodes` unset. ### Impact CPU-exhaustion DoS in Node.js services parsing untrusted XML with `stopNodes` enabled. A ~100KB payload is estimated at ~10⁹ character operations (roughly a second or more of blocked event loop) — analytical estimate, not a benchmark. No confidentiality/integrity impact. CVSS 3.1: `AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L` (3.7, Low).

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Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2026-126066 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2026-122845

GHSA-474x-hrwr-fgx4

cve-program · CVE-2026-126066

euvd · EUVD-2026-122845

nvd · CVE-2026-126066

osv · GHSA-474x-hrwr-fgx4

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