Cosign verification accepts any valid Rekor entry under certain conditions
cve-program · CVE-2026-22703
PublishedCosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-1868
PublishedCosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-22703
PublishedCosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m
Published### Impact A Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This vulnerability only affects users that provide a trusted root via `--trusted-root` or when fetched automatically from a TUF repository, when no trusted key material is provided via `SIGSTORE_REKOR_PUBLIC_KEY`. When using the default flag values in Cosign v3 to sign and verify (`--use-signing-config=true` and `--new-bundle-format=true` for signing, `--new-bundle-format=true` for verification), users are unaffected. Cosign v2 users are affected using the default flag values. This issue had previously been fixed in https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/security/advisories/GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388 but recent refactoring caused a regression. We have added testing to prevent a future regression. #### Steps to Reproduce ``` echo blob > /tmp/blob cosign sign-blob -y --new-bundle-format=false --bundle /tmp/bundle.1 --use-signing-config=false /tmp/blob cosign sign-blob -y --new-bundle-format=false --bundle /tmp/bundle.2 --use-signing-config=false /tmp/blob jq ".rekorBundle |= $(jq .rekorBundle /tmp/bundle.2)" /tmp/bundle.1 > /tmp/bundle.3 cosign verify-blob --bundle /tmp/bundle.3 --certificate-identity-regexp='.*' --certificate-oidc-issuer-regexp='.*' /tmp/blob ``` ### Patches Upgrade to Cosign v2.6.2 or Cosign v3.0.4. This does not affect Cosign v1. ### Workarounds You can provide trusted key material via a set of flags under certain conditions. The simplest fix is to upgrade to the latest Cosign v2 or v3 release. Note that the example below works for `cosign verify`, `cosign verify-blob, `cosign verify-blob-attestation`, and `cosign verify-attestation`. ``` SIGSTORE_REKOR_PUBLIC_KEY=<path to Rekor pub key> cosign verify-blob --use-signing-config=false --new-bundle-format=false --bundle=<path to bundle> <artifact> ```
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-4309
PublishedCosign verification accepts any valid Rekor entry under certain conditions in github.com/sigstore/cosign
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2026-22703 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-22703
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/security/advisories/GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/pull/4623
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/commit/6832fba4928c1ad69400235bbc41212de5006176
euvd · EUVD-2026-1868
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/security/advisories/GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/pull/4623
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/commit/6832fba4928c1ad69400235bbc41212de5006176
nvd · CVE-2026-22703
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/commit/6832fba4928c1ad69400235bbc41212de5006176
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/pull/4623
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/security/advisories/GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m
osv · GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/security/advisories/GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22703
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/pull/4623
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/commit/6832fba4928c1ad69400235bbc41212de5006176
- https://github.com/sigstore/cosign
osv · GO-2026-4309
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifierNo related changes are available here.