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Cosign verification accepts any valid Rekor entry under certain conditions

CVSS 3.1 5.5 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 5.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/sigstore/cosign/v3 3.0.4Fixed by github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 2.6.2osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 2.6.2Fixed by github.com/sigstore/cosign/v3 3.0.4KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-22703

Published

Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-1868

Published

Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-22703

Published

Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m

Published

### Impact A Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This vulnerability only affects users that provide a trusted root via `--trusted-root` or when fetched automatically from a TUF repository, when no trusted key material is provided via `SIGSTORE_REKOR_PUBLIC_KEY`. When using the default flag values in Cosign v3 to sign and verify (`--use-signing-config=true` and `--new-bundle-format=true` for signing, `--new-bundle-format=true` for verification), users are unaffected. Cosign v2 users are affected using the default flag values. This issue had previously been fixed in https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/security/advisories/GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388 but recent refactoring caused a regression. We have added testing to prevent a future regression. #### Steps to Reproduce ``` echo blob > /tmp/blob cosign sign-blob -y --new-bundle-format=false --bundle /tmp/bundle.1 --use-signing-config=false /tmp/blob cosign sign-blob -y --new-bundle-format=false --bundle /tmp/bundle.2 --use-signing-config=false /tmp/blob jq ".rekorBundle |= $(jq .rekorBundle /tmp/bundle.2)" /tmp/bundle.1 > /tmp/bundle.3 cosign verify-blob --bundle /tmp/bundle.3 --certificate-identity-regexp='.*' --certificate-oidc-issuer-regexp='.*' /tmp/blob ``` ### Patches Upgrade to Cosign v2.6.2 or Cosign v3.0.4. This does not affect Cosign v1. ### Workarounds You can provide trusted key material via a set of flags under certain conditions. The simplest fix is to upgrade to the latest Cosign v2 or v3 release. Note that the example below works for `cosign verify`, `cosign verify-blob, `cosign verify-blob-attestation`, and `cosign verify-attestation`. ``` SIGSTORE_REKOR_PUBLIC_KEY=<path to Rekor pub key> cosign verify-blob --use-signing-config=false --new-bundle-format=false --bundle=<path to bundle> <artifact> ```

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osv · GO-2026-4309

Published

Cosign verification accepts any valid Rekor entry under certain conditions in github.com/sigstore/cosign

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-22703

Published

cosign

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "sigstore",
                    "product": "cosign",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 3.0.4",
                            "status": "affected"
                        },
                        {
                            "version": "< 2.6.2",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-1868

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jan 10, 2026, 6:11:09 AM

dateUpdated: Jan 12, 2026, 4:43:57 PM

4 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

SUSE-SU-2026:0777-1: Security update for cosign

CVE-2025-11065 · CVE-2025-58181 · CVE-2026-22703 · CVE-2026-22772 · CVE-2026-23991 · CVE-2026-23992 · CVE-2026-24122 · CVE-2026-24137 · CVE-2026-26958

openSUSE-SU-2026:10232-1: cosign-3.0.4-2.1 on GA media

CVE-2025-11065 · CVE-2025-58181 · CVE-2026-22703

SUSE-SU-2026:20904-1: Security update for cosign

CVE-2025-11065 · CVE-2025-58181 · CVE-2026-22703 · CVE-2026-22772 · CVE-2026-23991 · CVE-2026-23992 · CVE-2026-24122 · CVE-2026-24137 · CVE-2026-26958

openSUSE-SU-2026:20386-1: Security update for cosign

CVE-2025-11065 · CVE-2025-58181 · CVE-2026-22703 · CVE-2026-22772 · CVE-2026-23991 · CVE-2026-23992 · CVE-2026-24122 · CVE-2026-24137 · CVE-2026-26958

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-22703

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-345

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-01-10T07:16:03.030

lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:20:15.880

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:sigstore:cosign:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m

Published

github.com/sigstore/cosign/v3

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 3.0.4

github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 2.6.2

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2026-4309

Published

github.com/sigstore/cosign

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 2.6.2

github.com/sigstore/cosign/v3

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 3.0.4

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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