sealed-secrets /v1/rotate can widen sealing scope to cluster-wide via attacker-controlled template annotations
cve-program · CVE-2026-22728
PublishedBitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret. By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or "namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext credentials.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-8795
PublishedBitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret. By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or "namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext credentials.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-22728
PublishedBitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret. By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or "namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext credentials.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj
PublishedThis report shows a scope-widening issue in the rotate (re-encrypt) flow: the output scope can be derived from untrusted `spec.template.metadata.annotations` on the input sealed secret. If a victim sealed secret is strict- or namespace-scoped, an attacker who can submit it to the rotate endpoint can set `sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true` in the template metadata and receive a rotated sealed secret that is cluster-wide, enabling retargeting (`metadata.name`/`metadata.namespace`) and unsealing to recover the victim plaintext. ## Relevant Links (Pinned) - Rotate handler uses `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)` after unsealing: https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/controller/controller.go#L560-L606 - Scope derivation reads secret annotations (`SecretScope`): https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go#L112-L122 ## Root Cause The rotate flow unseals the input sealed secret to a `Secret`, then reseals using `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)`. Because `SecretScope(secret)` is computed from secret annotations, and unsealing applies `spec.template` metadata onto the unsealed secret, an attacker can influence the scope of the rotated output by mutating template annotations on the rotate input. ## Attack Path 1. Attacker obtains a victim `SealedSecret` object (for example via read access to resources or logs) and can submit it to the controller rotate endpoint. 2. Attacker sets `spec.template.metadata.annotations.sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true` (and optionally retargets name/namespace fields). 3. Rotate returns a resealed, cluster-wide sealed secret that is no longer bound to the victim name/namespace. 4. Attacker unseals the rotated output in their chosen namespace/name to recover the victim plaintext. ## Proof of Concept Setup + run: ```bash unzip poc.zip -d poc cd poc make test ``` Canonical output (excerpt): ``` [CALLSITE_HIT]: pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go:112 SecretScope [PROOF_MARKER]: scope_widened=true rotated_scope=cluster-wide ``` Control output (excerpt): ``` [NC_MARKER]: scope_widened=false strict_scope_preserved=true ``` ## Fix Accepted When Rotate preserves the original sealing scope and does not allow scope widening based on untrusted template metadata; strict or namespace-wide inputs cannot produce cluster-wide outputs. [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080027/poc.zip) [PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080028/PR_DESCRIPTION.md) [attack_scenario.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080029/attack_scenario.md)
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-4565
PublishedSealed Secrets for Kubernetes: Rotate API Allows Scope Widening from Strict/Namespace-Wide to Cluster-Wide via Untrusted Template Annotations in github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
Source statusCISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
Which CVEs have scores here?
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.
cve-program · CVE-2026-22728
Publishedsealed-secrets /v1/rotate can widen sealing scope to cluster-wide via attacker-controlled template annotations
Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret. By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or "namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext credentials.
- Source published
- 26 Feb 2026 00:50:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Feb 2026 15:58:32 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 4.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-8795
PublishedBitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during
Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret. By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or "namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext credentials.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Feb 26, 2026, 12:50:00 AM
dateUpdated: Feb 26, 2026, 3:58:32 PM
- Source published
- Feb 26, 2026, 12:50:00 AM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Feb 26, 2026, 3:58:32 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 15 Nov 2026 07:35:15 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 4.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-22728
PublishedBitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during
Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret. By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or "namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext credentials.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-284
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-02-26T02:16:20.187
lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:20:18.457
- Source published
- 26 Feb 2026 02:16:20 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 10:20:18 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 05:17:32 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj
PublishedSealed Secrets for Kubernetes: Rotate API Allows Scope Widening from Strict/Namespace-Wide to Cluster-Wide via Untrusted Template Annotations
This report shows a scope-widening issue in the rotate (re-encrypt) flow: the output scope can be derived from untrusted `spec.template.metadata.annotations` on the input sealed secret. If a victim sealed secret is strict- or namespace-scoped, an attacker who can submit it to the rotate endpoint can set `sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true` in the template metadata and receive a rotated sealed secret that is cluster-wide, enabling retargeting (`metadata.name`/`metadata.namespace`) and unsealing to recover the victim plaintext. ## Relevant Links (Pinned) - Rotate handler uses `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)` after unsealing: https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/controller/controller.go#L560-L606 - Scope derivation reads secret annotations (`SecretScope`): https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go#L112-L122 ## Root Cause The rotate flow unseals the input sealed secret to a `Secret`, then reseals using `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)`. Because `SecretScope(secret)` is computed from secret annotations, and unsealing applies `spec.template` metadata onto the unsealed secret, an attacker can influence the scope of the rotated output by mutating template annotations on the rotate input. ## Attack Path 1. Attacker obtains a victim `SealedSecret` object (for example via read access to resources or logs) and can submit it to the controller rotate endpoint. 2. Attacker sets `spec.template.metadata.annotations.sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true` (and optionally retargets name/namespace fields). 3. Rotate returns a resealed, cluster-wide sealed secret that is no longer bound to the victim name/namespace. 4. Attacker unseals the rotated output in their chosen namespace/name to recover the victim plaintext. ## Proof of Concept Setup + run: ```bash unzip poc.zip -d poc cd poc make test ``` Canonical output (excerpt): ``` [CALLSITE_HIT]: pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go:112 SecretScope [PROOF_MARKER]: scope_widened=true rotated_scope=cluster-wide ``` Control output (excerpt): ``` [NC_MARKER]: scope_widened=false strict_scope_preserved=true ``` ## Fix Accepted When Rotate preserves the original sealing scope and does not allow scope widening based on untrusted template metadata; strict or namespace-wide inputs cannot produce cluster-wide outputs. [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080027/poc.zip) [PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080028/PR_DESCRIPTION.md) [attack_scenario.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080029/attack_scenario.md)
- Source published
- 26 Feb 2026 22:49:14 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:34 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-4565
PublishedSealed Secrets for Kubernetes: Rotate API Allows Scope Widening from Strict/Namespace-Wide to Cluster-Wide via Untrusted Template Annotations in github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets
Sealed Secrets for Kubernetes: Rotate API Allows Scope Widening from Strict/Namespace-Wide to Cluster-Wide via Untrusted Template Annotations in github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets
- Source published
- 10 Mar 2026 18:28:01 UTC
- Source modified
- 23 Mar 2026 05:11:29 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.