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go-tuf Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client Allows Arbitrary File Write via Malicious Repository Names

CVSS 3.1 4.7 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 4.7 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 4.7 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 4.7 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/v2 2.4.1osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/v2 2.4.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-24686

Published

go-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.4.1, if an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. Version 2.4.1 contains a patch.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-4837

Published

go-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.4.1, if an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. Version 2.4.1 contains a patch.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-24686

Published

go-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.4.1, if an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. Version 2.4.1 contains a patch.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4

Published

# Security Vulnerability: Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client ## Summary go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. If an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. ## Affected Component | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **File** | `metadata/multirepo/multirepo.go` | | **Function** | `(*MultiRepoClient) initTUFClients() error` | | **Callsite** | `metadataDir := filepath.Join(client.Config.LocalMetadataDir, repoName)` (around line 129 at the pinned commit) | ## Impact When the TAP 4 map file content is attacker-controlled, this enables arbitrary file write relative to the process permissions (via metadata persistence during client initialization). This can be used to overwrite files writable by the process (for example, configuration files in writable directories) and may enable further compromise depending on the deployment environment. > **Note:** Exploitability is deployment-dependent. If the map file is always local and trusted (not attacker-controlled), this reduces to a misconfiguration risk rather than a remotely triggerable issue. ## Attacker Model - Attacker can cause the application to load a TAP 4 map file whose `repositories` keys are attacker-controlled (for example: fetched from a URL, supply-chain substituted, or otherwise attacker-influenced input). - Local caching is enabled (`DisableLocalCache=false`) and the configured `LocalMetadataDir` is writable by the running process. **Claim Ceiling:** HIGH when the map file is attacker-controlled; if the map file is always local and trusted, this is closer to a configuration footgun and likely lands as MEDIUM/LOW. | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **Affected Versions** | ≤ 2.4.0 | | **Verified On** | Commit `bde5f18dc95dfac365fc452ee4e278e5fd66d4b4` (tag v2.4.0) | > **Note:** First affected version has not been bisected. ## Reproduction Attachments include `poc.zip` with: - `canonical.log` (contains `[CALLSITE_HIT]`, `[PROOF_MARKER]`) - `control.log` (contains `[CALLSITE_HIT]`, `[NC_MARKER]`, does not contain `[PROOF_MARKER]`) - `fix.patch` (minimal validation sketch) **Expected:** Multirepo repository names are treated as identifiers; a TAP 4 map file containing traversal or absolute paths is rejected (or safely normalized so that all writes stay under `LocalMetadataDir`). **Actual:** A traversal `repoName` escapes `LocalMetadataDir` and go-tuf persists `root.json` under the escaped path during initialization. ### Run Local Repro ```bash rm -rf _poc mkdir -p _poc unzip -q -o poc.zip -d _poc cd _poc/poc make canonical make control ``` ## Workarounds 1. Treat TAP 4 map files as trusted configuration only (do not fetch from untrusted sources). 2. Validate repo names before passing the map file to go-tuf (reject absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components like `.` / `..`). 3. If acceptable for the application, disable local caching to avoid writing metadata to disk (`DisableLocalCache=true`). ## Suggested Remediation Validate multirepo repository names as identifiers (not paths) before using them in `filepath.Join`. Reject: - Absolute paths - Path separators (`/` and `\`) - Traversal components (`.` and `..`) If it is important to accept a wider set of repo names, a safer alternative is to map repo names to a stable, validated directory name (for example via encoding or hashing) and to ensure all writes stay under the cache base directory. ## Triage Questions 1. Is the TAP 4 map file expected to ever be fetched from untrusted sources in supported deployments? 2. Should invalid repo names be treated as a hard error (reject initialization), or as a soft error (skip that repository entry)? ## Attachments - [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849854/poc.zip) - [addendum.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849855/addendum.md) - [e2e.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849856/e2e.zip) - [PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849858/PR_DESCRIPTION.md) --- *Reported by: Oleh*

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-4377

Published

Path traversal in TAP 4 multirepo client allows arbitrary file write via repo names in github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2026-24686

Published

go-tuf Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client Allows Arbitrary File Write via Malicious Repository Names

go-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.4.1, if an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. Version 2.4.1 contains a patch.

Source published
27 Jan 2026 00:45:43 UTC
Source modified
27 Jan 2026 14:40:01 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 4.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-4837

Published

go-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. Starting in…

go-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.4.1, if an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. Version 2.4.1 contains a patch.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jan 27, 2026, 12:45:43 AM

dateUpdated: Jan 27, 2026, 2:40:01 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

openSUSE-SU-2026:10664-1: kyverno-1.18.0-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2026-24686 · CVE-2026-32280 · CVE-2026-32283

Source published
Jan 27, 2026, 12:45:43 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jan 27, 2026, 2:40:01 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 07:38:24 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 4.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-24686

Published

go-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. Starting in…

go-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.4.1, if an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. Version 2.4.1 contains a patch.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-22

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-01-27T01:16:02.790

lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:23:25.357

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:theupdateframework:go-tuf:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
27 Jan 2026 01:16:02 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 10:23:25 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 06:17:10 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 4.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4

Published

go-tuf Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client Allows Arbitrary File Write via Malicious Repository Names

# Security Vulnerability: Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client ## Summary go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. If an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. ## Affected Component | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **File** | `metadata/multirepo/multirepo.go` | | **Function** | `(*MultiRepoClient) initTUFClients() error` | | **Callsite** | `metadataDir := filepath.Join(client.Config.LocalMetadataDir, repoName)` (around line 129 at the pinned commit) | ## Impact When the TAP 4 map file content is attacker-controlled, this enables arbitrary file write relative to the process permissions (via metadata persistence during client initialization). This can be used to overwrite files writable by the process (for example, configuration files in writable directories) and may enable further compromise depending on the deployment environment. > **Note:** Exploitability is deployment-dependent. If the map file is always local and trusted (not attacker-controlled), this reduces to a misconfiguration risk rather than a remotely triggerable issue. ## Attacker Model - Attacker can cause the application to load a TAP 4 map file whose `repositories` keys are attacker-controlled (for example: fetched from a URL, supply-chain substituted, or otherwise attacker-influenced input). - Local caching is enabled (`DisableLocalCache=false`) and the configured `LocalMetadataDir` is writable by the running process. **Claim Ceiling:** HIGH when the map file is attacker-controlled; if the map file is always local and trusted, this is closer to a configuration footgun and likely lands as MEDIUM/LOW. | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **Affected Versions** | ≤ 2.4.0 | | **Verified On** | Commit `bde5f18dc95dfac365fc452ee4e278e5fd66d4b4` (tag v2.4.0) | > **Note:** First affected version has not been bisected. ## Reproduction Attachments include `poc.zip` with: - `canonical.log` (contains `[CALLSITE_HIT]`, `[PROOF_MARKER]`) - `control.log` (contains `[CALLSITE_HIT]`, `[NC_MARKER]`, does not contain `[PROOF_MARKER]`) - `fix.patch` (minimal validation sketch) **Expected:** Multirepo repository names are treated as identifiers; a TAP 4 map file containing traversal or absolute paths is rejected (or safely normalized so that all writes stay under `LocalMetadataDir`). **Actual:** A traversal `repoName` escapes `LocalMetadataDir` and go-tuf persists `root.json` under the escaped path during initialization. ### Run Local Repro ```bash rm -rf _poc mkdir -p _poc unzip -q -o poc.zip -d _poc cd _poc/poc make canonical make control ``` ## Workarounds 1. Treat TAP 4 map files as trusted configuration only (do not fetch from untrusted sources). 2. Validate repo names before passing the map file to go-tuf (reject absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components like `.` / `..`). 3. If acceptable for the application, disable local caching to avoid writing metadata to disk (`DisableLocalCache=true`). ## Suggested Remediation Validate multirepo repository names as identifiers (not paths) before using them in `filepath.Join`. Reject: - Absolute paths - Path separators (`/` and `\`) - Traversal components (`.` and `..`) If it is important to accept a wider set of repo names, a safer alternative is to map repo names to a stable, validated directory name (for example via encoding or hashing) and to ensure all writes stay under the cache base directory. ## Triage Questions 1. Is the TAP 4 map file expected to ever be fetched from untrusted sources in supported deployments? 2. Should invalid repo names be treated as a hard error (reject initialization), or as a soft error (skip that repository entry)? ## Attachments - [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849854/poc.zip) - [addendum.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849855/addendum.md) - [e2e.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849856/e2e.zip) - [PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849858/PR_DESCRIPTION.md) --- *Reported by: Oleh*

Source published
26 Jan 2026 23:49:55 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:33 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-4377

Published

Path traversal in TAP 4 multirepo client allows arbitrary file write via repo names in github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf

Path traversal in TAP 4 multirepo client allows arbitrary file write via repo names in github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf

Source published
2 Feb 2026 21:05:55 UTC
Source modified
26 Feb 2026 18:26:44 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 11:47 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current