go-tuf Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client Allows Arbitrary File Write via Malicious Repository Names
cve-program · CVE-2026-24686
Publishedgo-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.4.1, if an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. Version 2.4.1 contains a patch.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-4837
Publishedgo-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.4.1, if an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. Version 2.4.1 contains a patch.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-24686
Publishedgo-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.4.1, if an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. Version 2.4.1 contains a patch.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4
Published# Security Vulnerability: Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client ## Summary go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. If an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions. ## Affected Component | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **File** | `metadata/multirepo/multirepo.go` | | **Function** | `(*MultiRepoClient) initTUFClients() error` | | **Callsite** | `metadataDir := filepath.Join(client.Config.LocalMetadataDir, repoName)` (around line 129 at the pinned commit) | ## Impact When the TAP 4 map file content is attacker-controlled, this enables arbitrary file write relative to the process permissions (via metadata persistence during client initialization). This can be used to overwrite files writable by the process (for example, configuration files in writable directories) and may enable further compromise depending on the deployment environment. > **Note:** Exploitability is deployment-dependent. If the map file is always local and trusted (not attacker-controlled), this reduces to a misconfiguration risk rather than a remotely triggerable issue. ## Attacker Model - Attacker can cause the application to load a TAP 4 map file whose `repositories` keys are attacker-controlled (for example: fetched from a URL, supply-chain substituted, or otherwise attacker-influenced input). - Local caching is enabled (`DisableLocalCache=false`) and the configured `LocalMetadataDir` is writable by the running process. **Claim Ceiling:** HIGH when the map file is attacker-controlled; if the map file is always local and trusted, this is closer to a configuration footgun and likely lands as MEDIUM/LOW. | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **Affected Versions** | ≤ 2.4.0 | | **Verified On** | Commit `bde5f18dc95dfac365fc452ee4e278e5fd66d4b4` (tag v2.4.0) | > **Note:** First affected version has not been bisected. ## Reproduction Attachments include `poc.zip` with: - `canonical.log` (contains `[CALLSITE_HIT]`, `[PROOF_MARKER]`) - `control.log` (contains `[CALLSITE_HIT]`, `[NC_MARKER]`, does not contain `[PROOF_MARKER]`) - `fix.patch` (minimal validation sketch) **Expected:** Multirepo repository names are treated as identifiers; a TAP 4 map file containing traversal or absolute paths is rejected (or safely normalized so that all writes stay under `LocalMetadataDir`). **Actual:** A traversal `repoName` escapes `LocalMetadataDir` and go-tuf persists `root.json` under the escaped path during initialization. ### Run Local Repro ```bash rm -rf _poc mkdir -p _poc unzip -q -o poc.zip -d _poc cd _poc/poc make canonical make control ``` ## Workarounds 1. Treat TAP 4 map files as trusted configuration only (do not fetch from untrusted sources). 2. Validate repo names before passing the map file to go-tuf (reject absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components like `.` / `..`). 3. If acceptable for the application, disable local caching to avoid writing metadata to disk (`DisableLocalCache=true`). ## Suggested Remediation Validate multirepo repository names as identifiers (not paths) before using them in `filepath.Join`. Reject: - Absolute paths - Path separators (`/` and `\`) - Traversal components (`.` and `..`) If it is important to accept a wider set of repo names, a safer alternative is to map repo names to a stable, validated directory name (for example via encoding or hashing) and to ensure all writes stay under the cache base directory. ## Triage Questions 1. Is the TAP 4 map file expected to ever be fetched from untrusted sources in supported deployments? 2. Should invalid repo names be treated as a hard error (reject initialization), or as a soft error (skip that repository entry)? ## Attachments - [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849854/poc.zip) - [addendum.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849855/addendum.md) - [e2e.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849856/e2e.zip) - [PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849858/PR_DESCRIPTION.md) --- *Reported by: Oleh*
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-4377
PublishedPath traversal in TAP 4 multirepo client allows arbitrary file write via repo names in github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2026-24686 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-24686
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/commit/d361e2ea24e427581343dee5c7a32b485d79fcc0
euvd · EUVD-2026-4837
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/commit/d361e2ea24e427581343dee5c7a32b485d79fcc0
nvd · CVE-2026-24686
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/commit/d361e2ea24e427581343dee5c7a32b485d79fcc0
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4
osv · GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24686
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/commit/d361e2ea24e427581343dee5c7a32b485d79fcc0
- https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf
osv · GO-2026-4377
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifierNo related changes are available here.