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flatted: Unbounded recursion DoS in parse() revive phase

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by flatted 3.4.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-32141

Published

flatted is a circular JSON parser. Prior to 3.4.0, flatted's parse() function uses a recursive revive() phase to resolve circular references in deserialized JSON. When given a crafted payload with deeply nested or self-referential $ indices, the recursion depth is unbounded, causing a stack overflow that crashes the Node.js process. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.4.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-11653

Published

flatted is a circular JSON parser. Prior to 3.4.0, flatted's parse() function uses a recursive revive() phase to resolve circular references in deserialized JSON. When given a crafted payload with deeply nested or self-referential $ indices, the recursion depth is unbounded, causing a stack overflow that crashes the Node.js process. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.4.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-32141

Published

flatted is a circular JSON parser. Prior to 3.4.0, flatted's parse() function uses a recursive revive() phase to resolve circular references in deserialized JSON. When given a crafted payload with deeply nested or self-referential $ indices, the recursion depth is unbounded, causing a stack overflow that crashes the Node.js process. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.4.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-25h7-pfq9-p65f

Published

## Summary flatted's `parse()` function uses a recursive `revive()` phase to resolve circular references in deserialized JSON. When given a crafted payload with deeply nested or self-referential `$` indices, the recursion depth is unbounded, causing a stack overflow that crashes the Node.js process. ## Impact Denial of Service (DoS). Any application that passes untrusted input to `flatted.parse()` can be crashed by an unauthenticated attacker with a single request. flatted has ~87M weekly npm downloads and is used as the circular-JSON serialization layer in many caching and logging libraries. ## Proof of Concept ```javascript const flatted = require('flatted'); // Build deeply nested circular reference chain const depth = 20000; const arr = new Array(depth + 1); arr[0] = '{"a":"1"}'; for (let i = 1; i <= depth; i++) { arr[i] = `{"a":"${i + 1}"}`; } arr[depth] = '{"a":"leaf"}'; const payload = JSON.stringify(arr); flatted.parse(payload); // RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded ``` ## Fix The maintainer has already merged an iterative (non-recursive) implementation in PR #88, converting the recursive `revive()` to a stack-based loop. ## Affected Versions All versions prior to the PR #88 fix.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2026-32141 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2026-11653

GHSA-25h7-pfq9-p65f

cve-program · CVE-2026-32141

euvd · EUVD-2026-11653

nvd · CVE-2026-32141

osv · GHSA-25h7-pfq9-p65f

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