SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.3 and prior, the /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView endpoint constructs a filesystem path using the user-controlled id parameter without validation or path boundary enforcement. An attacker can inject path traversal sequences such as ../ into the id value to escape the intended directory and delete arbitrary .json files on the server, including global configuration files and workspace metadata. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.4.
SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.3 and prior, the /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView endpoint constructs a filesystem path using the user-controlled id parameter without validation or path boundary enforcement. An attacker can inject path traversal sequences such as ../ into the id value to escape the intended directory and delete arbitrary .json files on the server, including global configuration files and workspace metadata. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.4.
SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.3 and prior, the /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView endpoint constructs a filesystem path using the user-controlled id parameter without validation or path boundary enforcement. An attacker can inject path traversal sequences such as ../ into the id value to escape the intended directory and delete arbitrary .json files on the server, including global configuration files and workspace metadata. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.4.
## Summary
The endpoint `/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView` is vulnerable to a **path traversal (CWE-22)** that allows an attacker to delete arbitrary `.json` files on the server.
The issue arises because user-controlled input (`id`) is directly used in filesystem path construction without validation or restriction.
> Access to this endpoint (e.g., via a Reader-role or publish context) is considered a precondition and not part of the vulnerability. The root cause is unsafe path handling.
---
## Steps To Reproduce
1. Ensure the target instance has the publish service enabled (or any valid access to the endpoint).
2. Send the following request:
```http
POST /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"id": "../../../conf/conf"
}
```
3. Observe that the request is accepted.
4. The server resolves the path outside the intended directory and deletes the target file.
---
## Impact
An attacker can delete arbitrary `.json` files within the workspace directory.
This may lead to:
* Deletion of global configuration files (e.g., `conf/conf.json`)
* Loss of user data and application state
* Corruption of workspace metadata
* Persistent application instability or forced recovery
This represents a **server-side arbitrary file deletion primitive**, which can have severe impact depending on the targeted files.
---
## Technical Details
The vulnerable code constructs file paths as follows:
```go
filepath.Join(util.DataDir, "storage", "av", id+".json")
```
Because `id` is not validated, attackers can inject path traversal sequences such as `../` to escape the intended directory.
### Example payloads
* `../local` → `data/storage/local.json`
* `../../storage/outline` → `data/storage/outline.json`
* `../../../conf/conf` → `conf/conf.json`
No validation or restriction is applied to:
* input format
* path normalization
* directory boundaries
---
## Root Cause
* Untrusted user input (`id`) is directly used in filesystem path construction
* No input validation or sanitization
* No enforcement that the resolved path stays within the intended directory
---
## Remediation
1. **Validate input strictly**
* Only allow valid Attribute View IDs
* Reject any input containing path traversal sequences
2. **Enforce directory boundaries**
```go
base := filepath.Join(util.DataDir, "storage", "av")
absPath := filepath.Join(base, id+".json")
if !util.IsSubPath(base, absPath) {
return error
}
```
3. **Normalize paths before use**
* Ensure canonical paths cannot escape the base directory
4. **Add additional logical checks**
* Verify that the target object is valid and allowed to be deleted
---
SiYuan: Publish Reader Path Traversal Delete via `removeUnusedAttributeView` in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel.
NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.
(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)
The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel before 3.6.40.0.0-20260407035653-2f416e5253f1.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Apr 16, 2026, 10:54:47 PM
dateUpdated: Apr 18, 2026, 2:48:57 AM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-24
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-04-16T23:16:33.590
lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:45:01.090
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:b3log:siyuan:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.