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SiYuan: Publish Reader Path Traversal Delete via `removeUnusedAttributeView`

CVSS 3.1 8.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 8.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel 3.6.40.0.0-20260407035653-2f416e5253f1osv · severity unknownKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-40318

Published

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.3 and prior, the /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView endpoint constructs a filesystem path using the user-controlled id parameter without validation or path boundary enforcement. An attacker can inject path traversal sequences such as ../ into the id value to escape the intended directory and delete arbitrary .json files on the server, including global configuration files and workspace metadata. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.4.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-23328

Published

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.3 and prior, the /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView endpoint constructs a filesystem path using the user-controlled id parameter without validation or path boundary enforcement. An attacker can inject path traversal sequences such as ../ into the id value to escape the intended directory and delete arbitrary .json files on the server, including global configuration files and workspace metadata. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.4.

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nvd · CVE-2026-40318

Published

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.3 and prior, the /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView endpoint constructs a filesystem path using the user-controlled id parameter without validation or path boundary enforcement. An attacker can inject path traversal sequences such as ../ into the id value to escape the intended directory and delete arbitrary .json files on the server, including global configuration files and workspace metadata. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.4.

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osv · GHSA-vw86-c94w-v3x4

Published

## Summary The endpoint `/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView` is vulnerable to a **path traversal (CWE-22)** that allows an attacker to delete arbitrary `.json` files on the server. The issue arises because user-controlled input (`id`) is directly used in filesystem path construction without validation or restriction. > Access to this endpoint (e.g., via a Reader-role or publish context) is considered a precondition and not part of the vulnerability. The root cause is unsafe path handling. --- ## Steps To Reproduce 1. Ensure the target instance has the publish service enabled (or any valid access to the endpoint). 2. Send the following request: ```http POST /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView HTTP/1.1 Host: <target> Content-Type: application/json { "id": "../../../conf/conf" } ``` 3. Observe that the request is accepted. 4. The server resolves the path outside the intended directory and deletes the target file. --- ## Impact An attacker can delete arbitrary `.json` files within the workspace directory. This may lead to: * Deletion of global configuration files (e.g., `conf/conf.json`) * Loss of user data and application state * Corruption of workspace metadata * Persistent application instability or forced recovery This represents a **server-side arbitrary file deletion primitive**, which can have severe impact depending on the targeted files. --- ## Technical Details The vulnerable code constructs file paths as follows: ```go filepath.Join(util.DataDir, "storage", "av", id+".json") ``` Because `id` is not validated, attackers can inject path traversal sequences such as `../` to escape the intended directory. ### Example payloads * `../local` → `data/storage/local.json` * `../../storage/outline` → `data/storage/outline.json` * `../../../conf/conf` → `conf/conf.json` No validation or restriction is applied to: * input format * path normalization * directory boundaries --- ## Root Cause * Untrusted user input (`id`) is directly used in filesystem path construction * No input validation or sanitization * No enforcement that the resolved path stays within the intended directory --- ## Remediation 1. **Validate input strictly** * Only allow valid Attribute View IDs * Reject any input containing path traversal sequences 2. **Enforce directory boundaries** ```go base := filepath.Join(util.DataDir, "storage", "av") absPath := filepath.Join(base, id+".json") if !util.IsSubPath(base, absPath) { return error } ``` 3. **Normalize paths before use** * Ensure canonical paths cannot escape the base directory 4. **Add additional logical checks** * Verify that the target object is valid and allowed to be deleted ---

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osv · GO-2026-5679

Published

SiYuan: Publish Reader Path Traversal Delete via `removeUnusedAttributeView` in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel before 3.6.40.0.0-20260407035653-2f416e5253f1.

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