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Docker: `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` executes container binary on the host

CVSS 3.1 7.2 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.2 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/moby/moby/v2 2.0.0-beta.14osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/moby/moby/v2 2.0.0-beta.14KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-41567

Published

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container's filesystem rather than the host's due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-34779

Published

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container's filesystem rather than the host's due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-41567

Published

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container's filesystem rather than the host's due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r

Published

## Summary When a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges. ## Details When handling `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container's filesystem rather than the host's. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container. The executed binary runs with the daemon's full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities. ## Impact Arbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary. ### Conditions for exploitation - A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary. - The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via `docker cp -` or by calling the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API directly with compressed content. ### Not affected Standard `docker cp` usage is **not** affected, because the CLI sends uncompressed tar by default: ``` docker cp ./file.txt mycontainer:/file.txt ``` This can only be exploited when explicitly passing a xz or gzip-compressed archive to `docker cp` or the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API, for example: ``` cat archive.tar.xz | docker cp - mycontainer:/dir ``` Decompression formats using pure Go implementations (bzip2, zstd, and gzip when the container image does not contain an `unpigz` binary) are also not affected. ## Workarounds - Only run containers from trusted images. - Use authorization plugins to limit access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint. - Avoid piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-5746

Published

The Docker daemon's implementation of the "PUT /containers/{id}/archive" endpoint executes a container binary on the host when extracting an archive to a container. On Unix-like systems, this can be exploited if an attacker can control the container's filesystem or the archive being extracted, potentially leading to privilege escalation or host compromise. The affected code is located in the daemon package, specifically in the containerExtractToDir method of the Daemon struct. This package is part of the Moby daemon's core and is not intended for external use as a library.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

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Advisory history

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15 Nov 2026 16:45:26 UTC

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the…

euvd · EUVD-2026-34779 · Published

13 Nov 2026 15:59:57 UTC

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the…

euvd · EUVD-2026-34779 · Published

11 Nov 2026 14:58:52 UTC

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the…

euvd · EUVD-2026-34779 · Published

9 Nov 2026 14:05:10 UTC

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the…

euvd · EUVD-2026-34779 · Published

7 Nov 2026 13:22:36 UTC

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the…

euvd · EUVD-2026-34779 · Published

5 Nov 2026 12:39:40 UTC

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the…

euvd · EUVD-2026-34779 · Published

3 Nov 2026 11:58:28 UTC

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the…

euvd · EUVD-2026-34779 · Published

1 Nov 2026 10:23:34 UTC

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the…

euvd · EUVD-2026-34779 · Published

30 Oct 2026 06:53:05 UTC

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the…

euvd · EUVD-2026-34779 · Published

28 Oct 2026 05:10:11 UTC

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the…

euvd · EUVD-2026-34779 · Published

25 Oct 2026 09:17:41 UTC

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the…

nvd · CVE-2026-41567 · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Docker: `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` executes container binary on the host

osv · GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Docker: 'PUT /containers/{id}/archive' executes container binary on the host in github.com/docker/docker

osv · GO-2026-5746 · Published

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Docker: `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` executes container binary on the host

cve-program · CVE-2026-41567 · Published

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Sources read 16 Nov 06:51 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current