No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means
apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7, apko verifies the signature on APKINDEX.tar.gz but never compares individually downloaded .apk packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via ChecksumString(), and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in getPackageImpl(). Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can substitute download responses (compromised mirror, HTTP repository, poisoned CDN cache) can install arbitrary packages into built images. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.7.
Read the publisher's advisoryapko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7, apko verifies the signature on APKINDEX.tar.gz but never compares individually downloaded .apk packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via ChecksumString(), and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in getPackageImpl(). Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can substitute download responses (compromised mirror, HTTP repository, poisoned CDN cache) can install arbitrary packages into built images. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.7.
Read the publisher's advisoryapko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7, apko verifies the signature on APKINDEX.tar.gz but never compares individually downloaded .apk packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via ChecksumString(), and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in getPackageImpl(). Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can substitute download responses (compromised mirror, HTTP repository, poisoned CDN cache) can install arbitrary packages into built images. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.7.
Read the publisher's advisoryapko verifies the signature on `APKINDEX.tar.gz` but never compares individually downloaded `.apk` packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via `ChecksumString()`, and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in `getPackageImpl()`. Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can substitute download responses (compromised mirror, HTTP repository, poisoned CDN cache) can install arbitrary packages into built images. **Fix:** No fix available yet. **Acknowledgements** apko thanks Oleh Konko from [1seal](https://1seal.org/) for discovering and reporting this issue.
Read the publisher's advisoryapko doesn't verify downloaded apk packages against APKINDEX checksum (package substitution possible) in chainguard.dev/apko
Read the publisher's advisoryVendor product
Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.
{
"vendor": "chainguard-dev",
"product": "apko",
"versions": [
{
"version": "< 1.2.7",
"status": "affected"
}
]
}Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
datePublished: May 9, 2026, 7:26:27 PM
dateUpdated: May 13, 2026, 5:45:37 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-345 · CWE-494
published: 2026-05-09T20:16:29.573
lastModified: 2026-07-24T20:10:00.147
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Go
SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.2.7
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Go
SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.2.7
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON