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elo · Vulnerability

CVSS 3.1 9.8 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.8 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.8 CRITICALCVSS_V3 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by @enspirit/elo 1.0.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-44267

Published

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, plain Elo strings supplied to defaultFormats.elo.parse(), bin/elo, or elo-lang.org/try can use .constructor.constructor to reach JavaScript Function because the member_access handler in src/transform.ts does not reject meta-properties, src/compilers/javascript.ts emits the surviving property directly, and src/parser.ts accepts constructor as an ordinary identifier. The resulting generated JavaScript executes attacker-selected code in the host runtime. This permits browser script execution and session compromise on the auto-running playground and arbitrary Node.js code execution on library, CI, or DevOps hosts. This plain-string path is distinct from the programmatic AST-object injection issue. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-116111

Published

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, plain Elo strings supplied to defaultFormats.elo.parse(), bin/elo, or elo-lang.org/try can use .constructor.constructor to reach JavaScript Function because the member_access handler in src/transform.ts does not reject meta-properties, src/compilers/javascript.ts emits the surviving property directly, and src/parser.ts accepts constructor as an ordinary identifier. The resulting generated JavaScript executes attacker-selected code in the host runtime. This permits browser script execution and session compromise on the auto-running playground and arbitrary Node.js code execution on library, CI, or DevOps hosts. This plain-string path is distinct from the programmatic AST-object injection issue. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-44267

Published

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, plain Elo strings supplied to defaultFormats.elo.parse(), bin/elo, or elo-lang.org/try can use .constructor.constructor to reach JavaScript Function because the member_access handler in src/transform.ts does not reject meta-properties, src/compilers/javascript.ts emits the surviving property directly, and src/parser.ts accepts constructor as an ordinary identifier. The resulting generated JavaScript executes attacker-selected code in the host runtime. This permits browser script execution and session compromise on the auto-running playground and arbitrary Node.js code execution on library, CI, or DevOps hosts. This plain-string path is distinct from the programmatic AST-object injection issue. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5

Published

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker who controls a string passed to any Elo JavaScript-emission path — `defaultFormats.elo.parse()`, the `bin/elo` CLI, or the live browser playground at `elo-lang.org/try` — can execute arbitrary code in the host JavaScript runtime. A payload built from the `.constructor.constructor` chain compiles, without modification, to a live `Function` invocation in the emitted JavaScript, escaping any sandbox assumption around "Elo is a safe data/DSL language." ### Vulnerable sink and root cause Three interacting sites in `src/` produce the bug at commit `749af7b`: 1. **`src/transform.ts:144–158`** — the `member_access` handler allows access on types `any`, `object`, or `array` without filtering the property name. This is the only place an integrator could have plugged a denylist. 2. **`src/compilers/javascript.ts:210`** — the JS emitter writes `${objectExpr}.${ir.property}` verbatim into the output, so any property name that survives the transform step flows unescaped into emitted JavaScript. 3. **`src/parser.ts:163–170, 748–750`** — the parser accepts `constructor` (and other JS meta-property names) as an ordinary identifier, so `.constructor` clears type-checking without triggering any warning. Combined, the Elo expression `({}).constructor.constructor('…')()` compiles to a live `Function('…')()` call in the emitted JS, executing in the realm of whichever sink runs the compiled code. ### Attack surfaces All three surfaces share the same root cause (no denylist in `transform.ts`) and are addressed by the same one-file patch: | # | Entry point | Threat model | |---|---|---| | 1 | Browser playground — `https://elo-lang.org/try/?code=…&run=1` | **0-click XSS / account takeover** against elo-lang.org. `?run=1` triggers `setTimeout(() => this.run(), 100)` in `playground_controller.ts:531`; the server issues a 301 that preserves `?code=`. Any shared URL that contains a payload compromises the visitor's session on elo-lang.org. | | 2 | `bin/elo` CLI | **RCE on CI / DevOps hosts.** Both `node bin/elo payload.elo` and `node bin/elo -e "_" -d @payload.elo -f elo` fire. The `-f elo` path is especially severe: the flag exists to pass user-supplied files as *data* into an Elo pipeline. No integrator expects a data-format flag to shell out to `/usr/bin/id`. | | 3 | Library API — `defaultFormats.elo.parse()` | **Node.js RCE for any downstream integrator** using Elo as a rule engine, configuration DSL, or form builder DSL (the primary documented use cases). | ### Proof of Concept **Common payload (works on all three entry points):** ```elo ({}).constructor.constructor('return this.constructor.constructor(\'return process\')().mainModule.require(\'child_process\').execSync(\'id\').toString()')() ``` **Library API** — `poc-minimal.js`: ```js // npm install elo const { defaultFormats } = require('elo'); const payload = "({}).constructor.constructor('return this.constructor.constructor(\\'return process\\')().mainModule.require(\\'child_process\\').execSync(\\'id\\').toString()')()"; console.log(defaultFormats.elo.parse(payload)); // → uid=1000(ultrasupara) gid=1000(ultrasupara) groups=… ``` **CLI** — `poc-cli.sh`: ```sh node bin/elo payload.elo # uid=1000(ultrasupara)… node bin/elo -e "_" -d @payload.elo -f elo # uid=1000(ultrasupara)… ``` **Browser playground** — 0-click XSS URL: ``` https://elo-lang.org/try/?code=%28%7B%7D%29.constructor.constructor%28%27alert%28document.domain%29%27%29%28%29&run=1 ``` Opening this URL causes `alert(document.domain)` to fire automatically after ~100 ms with no user interaction beyond navigating to the link. The 301 redirect preserves the `?code=` parameter intact. End-to-end execution on the live production site was captured in a screen recording attached to the original report. ### Independence from GHSA #3 (AST-API injection) This finding is independent of the Medium-severity AST-API report (GHSA #3). That fix's identifier regex `^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$` happens to accept `constructor`, and its threat model requires an attacker-controlled AST *object* rather than a plain string. The current finding requires only a plain Elo string, which is a strictly weaker attacker model.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-44267

Published

elo

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "enspirit",
                    "product": "elo",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 1.0.1",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-116111

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Nov 3, 2026, 5:52:25 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 7, 2026, 3:20:59 AM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-44267

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-79 · CWE-94 · CWE-693 · CWE-1336

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-11-03T18:18:03.130

lastModified: 2026-11-12T22:18:51.470

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5

Published

@enspirit/elo

npm

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.0.1

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

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