Omni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-45726
PublishedOmni manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud. From 1.3.0 until 1.6.6 and 1.7.3, importing a standalone Talos cluster creates an ImportedClusterSecrets resource containing the cluster's complete CA secrets bundle. The access rules in internal/backend/runtime/omni/state_access.go allow an authenticated user with the Reader role to retrieve the resource through ResourceService if the importing actor has not rotated those secrets, exposing Kubernetes, Talos, and etcd CA private keys plus the service-account key. The Kubernetes CA private key permits certificate signing for privileged identities such as system:masters and provides control of the imported cluster outside Omni's authorization boundary, including its workloads, credentials, and secrets. This issue is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.3.
- Source published
- 17 Sep 2026 19:37:50 UTC
- Source modified
- 21 Sep 2026 21:09:15 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · 7.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2026-82401
PublishedOmni manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud. From 1.3.0 until 1.6.6 and 1.7.3, importing a standalone Talos cluster creates an ImportedClusterSecrets resource containing the cluster's complete CA secrets bundle. The access rules in internal/backend/runtime/omni/state_access.go allow an authenticated user with the Reader role to retrieve the resource through ResourceService if the importing actor has not rotated those secrets, exposing Kubernetes, Talos, and etcd CA private keys plus the service-account key. The Kubernetes CA private key permits certificate signing for privileged identities such as system:masters and provides control of the imported cluster outside Omni's authorization boundary, including its workloads, credentials, and secrets. This issue is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.3.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Sep 17, 2026, 7:37:50 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 21, 2026, 9:09:15 PM
- Source published
- Sep 17, 2026, 7:37:50 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Sep 21, 2026, 9:09:15 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 11 Nov 2026 12:04:21 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd · CVE-2026-45726
PublishedOmni manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud. From 1.3.0 until 1.6.6 and 1.7.3, importing a standalone Talos cluster creates an ImportedClusterSecrets resource containing the cluster's complete CA secrets bundle. The access rules in internal/backend/runtime/omni/state_access.go allow an authenticated user with the Reader role to retrieve the resource through ResourceService if the importing actor has not rotated those secrets, exposing Kubernetes, Talos, and etcd CA private keys plus the service-account key. The Kubernetes CA private key permits certificate signing for privileged identities such as system:masters and provides control of the imported cluster outside Omni's authorization boundary, including its workloads, credentials, and secrets. This issue is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.3.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · CWE-522 · CWE-732
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-09-17T20:16:49.650
lastModified: 2026-09-24T21:25:27.050
- Source published
- 17 Sep 2026 20:16:49 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Sep 2026 21:25:27 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 12:17:14 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv · GHSA-wv8c-6mx2-xf4j
Published## Summary Omni supports importing standalone Talos clusters. During this process, an ImportedClusterSecrets resource is created, which contains the full CA secrets bundle for the cluster being imported. If these secrets are not rotated by the importing actor, an authenticated Omni user with Reader access can read this resource and gain full access to the Talos, Kubernetes and etcd APIs of the cluster. ## Severity - **Attack Vector:** Adjacent: the attacker needs to be in the same network to be able to access Talos/Kubernetes APIs with the compromised keys. - **Attack Complexity:** High: the attacker needs a deep understanding of Omni's internals. The resource is only created for imported clusters, and is normally not represented to users via any high-level API. - **Privileges Required:** Low: the role `Reader` is sufficient for the attacker to be able to read an imported cluster's secrets. - **User Interaction:** Required: another user must have imported a cluster to Omni for this vulnerability to exist. - **Scope:** Changed: the leaked CA private keys let an attacker directly get full control on Kubernetes or Talos, beyond the limitations enforced by Omni. - **Confidentiality Impact:** High: full cluster CA private keys (Kubernetes, Talos, etcd, service account) are exposed. - **Integrity Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. - **Availability Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. ## Impact - Any Reader-level account can exfiltrate the complete CA private key hierarchy (Kubernetes CA, etcd CA, service account key) of the imported clusters whose secrets are not yet rotated ("tainted" imported clusters). - With the Kubernetes CA private key, an attacker can sign certificates for any Kubernetes user or group, including `system:masters`, achieving cluster-admin access to the imported cluster entirely outside Omni's control plane. - Impact scope extends beyond Omni to every Kubernetes workload, credential, and secret stored in the affected imported cluster. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).
- Source published
- 5 Jun 2026 15:26:24 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Jun 2026 23:11:14 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Publisher rating · HIGH
osv · GO-2026-5725
PublishedOmni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService in github.com/siderolabs/omni
- Source published
- 25 Jun 2026 22:34:38 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Jun 2026 23:01:40 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.