Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Through 1.5.0, the validity store uses a strict lower-bound comparison that expires a stored transaction too early relative to Transaction::is_valid_at, allowing a remote attacker to replay the same signed transaction during a blocks_per_batch minus one block window and cause the sender and recipient balances to be updated twice. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.1.
Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Through 1.5.0, the validity store uses a strict lower-bound comparison that expires a stored transaction too early relative to Transaction::is_valid_at, allowing a remote attacker to replay the same signed transaction during a blocks_per_batch minus one block window and cause the sender and recipient balances to be updated twice. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.1.
Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Through 1.5.0, the validity store uses a strict lower-bound comparison that expires a stored transaction too early relative to Transaction::is_valid_at, allowing a remote attacker to replay the same signed transaction during a blocks_per_batch minus one block window and cause the sender and recipient balances to be updated twice. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.1.
### Impact
The validity store treats a transaction with stored `block_number = X` as "in window" only when `X > last_bn - transaction_validity_window_blocks` (strict inequality). However the protocol's `Transaction::is_valid_at` accepts a transaction for inclusion in any block in `[validity_start_height - blocks_per_batch, validity_start_height + window - 1]`. By choosing `validity_start_height = X + blocks_per_batch` (the largest value still compatible with first inclusion at block X), an attacker can replay the same signed transaction in any block B such that `X + window < B < validity_start_height + window`, i.e., a contiguous window of `blocks_per_batch - 1` blocks (59 on MainNet, ~10 minutes) during which the replay-protection check fails to flag it. The same transaction is then executed twice: the sender is debited twice, the recipient credited twice.
### Patches
https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3772
### Workarounds
No known workarounds
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 26, 2026, 7:32:46 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 27, 2026, 3:22:58 PM
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-193 · CWE-294
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-26T20:17:23.163
lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:09:13.080
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.