Nimiq: Validity store off by one error
cve-program · CVE-2026-46369
PublishedNimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Through 1.5.0, the validity store uses a strict lower-bound comparison that expires a stored transaction too early relative to Transaction::is_valid_at, allowing a remote attacker to replay the same signed transaction during a blocks_per_batch minus one block window and cause the sender and recipient balances to be updated twice. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.1.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-66705
PublishedNimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Through 1.5.0, the validity store uses a strict lower-bound comparison that expires a stored transaction too early relative to Transaction::is_valid_at, allowing a remote attacker to replay the same signed transaction during a blocks_per_batch minus one block window and cause the sender and recipient balances to be updated twice. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.1.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-46369
PublishedNimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Through 1.5.0, the validity store uses a strict lower-bound comparison that expires a stored transaction too early relative to Transaction::is_valid_at, allowing a remote attacker to replay the same signed transaction during a blocks_per_batch minus one block window and cause the sender and recipient balances to be updated twice. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.1.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf
Published### Impact The validity store treats a transaction with stored `block_number = X` as "in window" only when `X > last_bn - transaction_validity_window_blocks` (strict inequality). However the protocol's `Transaction::is_valid_at` accepts a transaction for inclusion in any block in `[validity_start_height - blocks_per_batch, validity_start_height + window - 1]`. By choosing `validity_start_height = X + blocks_per_batch` (the largest value still compatible with first inclusion at block X), an attacker can replay the same signed transaction in any block B such that `X + window < B < validity_start_height + window`, i.e., a contiguous window of `blocks_per_batch - 1` blocks (59 on MainNet, ~10 minutes) during which the replay-protection check fails to flag it. The same transaction is then executed twice: the sender is debited twice, the recipient credited twice. ### Patches https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3772 ### Workarounds No known workarounds
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
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CVE-2026-46369 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-46369
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3772
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/a530b2434ebca6e3716f07c73079786fcc6f2e41
euvd · EUVD-2026-66705
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3772
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/a530b2434ebca6e3716f07c73079786fcc6f2e41
nvd · CVE-2026-46369
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/a530b2434ebca6e3716f07c73079786fcc6f2e41
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3772
- https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf
osv · GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifierNo related changes are available here.