Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enumerate email addresses and profile metadata for inactive or banned accounts. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.
Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enumerate email addresses and profile metadata for inactive or banned accounts. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.
Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enumerate email addresses and profile metadata for inactive or banned accounts. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.
## Summary
`GET /api/v4/user/search` is available to any logged-in user. The service calls `userClient.SearchActive`, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and **never adds a `StatusActive` predicate** — while the sibling lookups `GetActiveByID` and `GetActiveByDavAccount`, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at `RedactLevelUser`, which includes the email address.
A normal logged-in user can therefore enumerate and retrieve the email (plus nickname, avatar, creation time, redacted group, profile share-visibility) of **inactive and banned** accounts that an active-user directory is supposed to suppress. No global status interceptor compensates — the only User query interceptor is soft-delete, and inactive/banned rows are not soft-deleted.
### Details
## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)
**1. Route — logged-in + `UserInfo.Read` scope** (`routers/router.go`):
```go
user := v4.Group("user") // protected user group (login required)
user.GET("search",
middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeUserInfoRead),
controllers.FromQuery[usersvc.SearchUserService](...), controllers.UserSearch)
```
The `RequiredScopes` check applies to scoped OAuth tokens; plain session requests are not gated by it — so any logged-in user reaches the search.
**2. Service — 2-char keyword to `SearchActive`** (`service/user/info.go`):
```go
type SearchUserService struct { Keyword string `form:"keyword" binding:"required,min=2"` }
const resultLimit = 10
func (s *SearchUserService) Search(c *gin.Context) ([]*ent.User, error) {
return dep.UserClient().SearchActive(c, resultLimit, s.Keyword)
}
```
**3. The bug — `SearchActive` has no status predicate** (`inventory/user.go`):
```go
func (c *userClient) SearchActive(ctx context.Context, limit int, keyword string) ([]*ent.User, error) {
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, LoadUserGroup{}, true)
return withUserEagerLoading(ctx,
c.client.User.Query().
Where(user.Or(user.EmailContainsFold(keyword), user.NickContainsFold(keyword))).
Limit(limit), // <-- no user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)
).All(ctx)
}
```
Contrast the siblings immediately above:
```go
func (c *userClient) GetActiveByID(...) { ... Where(user.ID(id)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }
func (c *userClient) GetActiveByDavAccount(...) { ... Where(user.EmailEqualFold(email)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }
```
`withUserEagerLoading` only eager-loads the group/passkey edges; it adds no status filter. Status values are `active`/`inactive`/`manual_banned`/`sys_banned` (`ent/user/user.go`).
**4. No global status interceptor** — `User.Mixin()` is `CommonMixin{}` (`ent/schema/user.go`), whose `Interceptors()` returns only `softDeleteInterceptors` (`ent/schema/common.go`). Inactive/banned users are not soft-deleted, so nothing filters them out at query time.
**5. Results serialized with email** (`routers/controllers/user.go` → `service/user/response.go`):
```go
// UserSearch:
return user.BuildUserRedacted(item, user.RedactLevelUser, hasher)
// BuildUserRedacted:
if level == RedactLevelUser { user.Email = userRaw.Email } // email included
```
**Secondary path:** `GET /api/v4/user/info/:id` → `GetUser` uses `GetByID` (no status filter), and the controller picks `RedactLevelUser` for any non-anonymous caller (`RedactLevelAnonymous` only for anonymous). So a logged-in caller with an inactive/banned user's hashed ID also receives the email-bearing profile. (Less practical than search, since it needs the hashed ID rather than a 2-char keyword.)
## Steps to reproduce (requires a live instance)
1. Ensure a target account exists in `inactive` or `manual_banned`/`sys_banned` status (e.g., an unconfirmed registration or a banned user).
2. As any logged-in user:
```
GET /api/v4/user/search?keyword=<>=2 chars of the target email/nick>
Cookie: cloudreve-session=<attacker-session>
```
3. Observe the inactive/banned account in the results, including its `email`.
**Expected:** only active accounts appear (matching the method name and the sibling `GetActive*` behavior).
**Actual:** inactive/banned accounts are returned with their email addresses.
## Impact
Any logged-in user can enumerate and harvest the email addresses (and basic profile metadata) of inactive and banned accounts that active-user lookups intentionally hide. No account access, passwords, or 2FA secrets are exposed; the impact is PII leakage and user enumeration.
## Remediation
- Add `Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive))` to `SearchActive` (matching `GetActiveByID`).
- Apply the same active-status requirement to `GET /api/v4/user/info/:id`, or fall back to anonymous-level redaction unless the target account is active.
- Consider not returning email from directory search at all — display name + hashed ID is usually sufficient.
- Regression tests: searching a keyword that matches an inactive/banned account must return no result (or no email).
Cloudreve: Information Exposure in `GET /api/v4/user/search`: `SearchActive` omits the active-status predicate, leaking inactive/banned account emails in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 31, 2026, 3:23:33 AM
dateUpdated: Jul 31, 2026, 2:02:34 PM
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · CWE-359
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-07-31T04:17:22.877
lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:51:43.490
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.