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cloudreve · Vulnerability

CVSS 3.1 4.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 4.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 4.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-55496

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enumerate email addresses and profile metadata for inactive or banned accounts. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-51391

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enumerate email addresses and profile metadata for inactive or banned accounts. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-55496

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enumerate email addresses and profile metadata for inactive or banned accounts. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv

Published

## Summary `GET /api/v4/user/search` is available to any logged-in user. The service calls `userClient.SearchActive`, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and **never adds a `StatusActive` predicate** — while the sibling lookups `GetActiveByID` and `GetActiveByDavAccount`, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at `RedactLevelUser`, which includes the email address. A normal logged-in user can therefore enumerate and retrieve the email (plus nickname, avatar, creation time, redacted group, profile share-visibility) of **inactive and banned** accounts that an active-user directory is supposed to suppress. No global status interceptor compensates — the only User query interceptor is soft-delete, and inactive/banned rows are not soft-deleted. ### Details ## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`) **1. Route — logged-in + `UserInfo.Read` scope** (`routers/router.go`): ```go user := v4.Group("user") // protected user group (login required) user.GET("search", middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeUserInfoRead), controllers.FromQuery[usersvc.SearchUserService](...), controllers.UserSearch) ``` The `RequiredScopes` check applies to scoped OAuth tokens; plain session requests are not gated by it — so any logged-in user reaches the search. **2. Service — 2-char keyword to `SearchActive`** (`service/user/info.go`): ```go type SearchUserService struct { Keyword string `form:"keyword" binding:"required,min=2"` } const resultLimit = 10 func (s *SearchUserService) Search(c *gin.Context) ([]*ent.User, error) { return dep.UserClient().SearchActive(c, resultLimit, s.Keyword) } ``` **3. The bug — `SearchActive` has no status predicate** (`inventory/user.go`): ```go func (c *userClient) SearchActive(ctx context.Context, limit int, keyword string) ([]*ent.User, error) { ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, LoadUserGroup{}, true) return withUserEagerLoading(ctx, c.client.User.Query(). Where(user.Or(user.EmailContainsFold(keyword), user.NickContainsFold(keyword))). Limit(limit), // <-- no user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive) ).All(ctx) } ``` Contrast the siblings immediately above: ```go func (c *userClient) GetActiveByID(...) { ... Where(user.ID(id)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... } func (c *userClient) GetActiveByDavAccount(...) { ... Where(user.EmailEqualFold(email)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... } ``` `withUserEagerLoading` only eager-loads the group/passkey edges; it adds no status filter. Status values are `active`/`inactive`/`manual_banned`/`sys_banned` (`ent/user/user.go`). **4. No global status interceptor** — `User.Mixin()` is `CommonMixin{}` (`ent/schema/user.go`), whose `Interceptors()` returns only `softDeleteInterceptors` (`ent/schema/common.go`). Inactive/banned users are not soft-deleted, so nothing filters them out at query time. **5. Results serialized with email** (`routers/controllers/user.go` → `service/user/response.go`): ```go // UserSearch: return user.BuildUserRedacted(item, user.RedactLevelUser, hasher) // BuildUserRedacted: if level == RedactLevelUser { user.Email = userRaw.Email } // email included ``` **Secondary path:** `GET /api/v4/user/info/:id` → `GetUser` uses `GetByID` (no status filter), and the controller picks `RedactLevelUser` for any non-anonymous caller (`RedactLevelAnonymous` only for anonymous). So a logged-in caller with an inactive/banned user's hashed ID also receives the email-bearing profile. (Less practical than search, since it needs the hashed ID rather than a 2-char keyword.) ## Steps to reproduce (requires a live instance) 1. Ensure a target account exists in `inactive` or `manual_banned`/`sys_banned` status (e.g., an unconfirmed registration or a banned user). 2. As any logged-in user: ``` GET /api/v4/user/search?keyword=<>=2 chars of the target email/nick> Cookie: cloudreve-session=<attacker-session> ``` 3. Observe the inactive/banned account in the results, including its `email`. **Expected:** only active accounts appear (matching the method name and the sibling `GetActive*` behavior). **Actual:** inactive/banned accounts are returned with their email addresses. ## Impact Any logged-in user can enumerate and harvest the email addresses (and basic profile metadata) of inactive and banned accounts that active-user lookups intentionally hide. No account access, passwords, or 2FA secrets are exposed; the impact is PII leakage and user enumeration. ## Remediation - Add `Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive))` to `SearchActive` (matching `GetActiveByID`). - Apply the same active-status requirement to `GET /api/v4/user/info/:id`, or fall back to anonymous-level redaction unless the target account is active. - Consider not returning email from directory search at all — display name + hashed ID is usually sufficient. - Regression tests: searching a keyword that matches an inactive/banned account must return no result (or no email).

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osv · GO-2026-6098

Published

Cloudreve: Information Exposure in `GET /api/v4/user/search`: `SearchActive` omits the active-status predicate, leaking inactive/banned account emails in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

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18 Nov 2026 03:35:57 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51391 · Published

16 Nov 2026 02:48:30 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51391 · Published

14 Nov 2026 02:09:18 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51391 · Published

11 Nov 2026 14:02:42 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51391 · Published

9 Nov 2026 13:10:41 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51391 · Published

7 Nov 2026 12:32:12 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51391 · Published

5 Nov 2026 11:45:31 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51391 · Published

3 Nov 2026 11:05:09 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51391 · Published

1 Nov 2026 10:11:25 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51391 · Published

30 Oct 2026 09:55:43 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51391 · Published

28 Oct 2026 08:11:44 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51391 · Published

25 Oct 2026 13:17:34 UTC

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enu…

nvd · CVE-2026-55496 · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Cloudreve: Information Exposure in `GET /api/v4/user/search`: `SearchActive` omits the active-status predicate, leaking inactive/banned account emails

osv · GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Cloudreve: Information Exposure in `GET /api/v4/user/search`: `SearchActive` omits the active-status predicate, leaking inactive/banned account emails in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

osv · GO-2026-6098 · Published

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Cloudreve: Inactive/banned account emails leaked via GET /api/v4/user/search because SearchActive() omits the active-status predicate

cve-program · CVE-2026-55496 · Published

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 09:42 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current