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Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

cve-program · severity unknownEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.1 CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary 9.1 CRITICALCVSS_V4 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0osv · severity unknownFixed by gitea.dev 1.27.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-56750

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-58145

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-56750

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-rgv6-xp99-6mgj

Published

The vulnerability is in the Remember-Me (gitea_incredible) token validation logic, specifically when handling a compromised token (hash mismatch). The vulnerable function is this one: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/689ace1ce28fd74244b8aa335d9928cdbf6b22f9/services/auth/auth_token.go#L33-L64 ### Affected Endpoint POST `/user/login` (and any endpoint triggering `autoSignIn` via the Remember-Me cookie). ### Description Gitea implements Remember-Me cookies using a split token design (ID:Hash), [citing the Paragonie secure remember-me guide](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/689ace1ce28fd74244b8aa335d9928cdbf6b22f9/services/auth/auth_token.go#L21). When a token is used, its Hash is rotated, but the ID remains the same. If an attacker steals a user's Remember-Me token and uses it to authenticate, the attacker is issued a new rotated token (same ID, new Hash). When the legitimate user later attempts to use their original token, Gitea correctly detects a hash mismatch for the given ID. According to the referenced Paragonie specification, this indicates a compromised token, and ALL active remember-me sessions for that user MUST be invalidated. However, Gitea's `CheckAuthToken` function simply returns `ErrAuthTokenInvalidHash`. The calling code (`autoSignIn`) catches this error and deletes the victim's local cookie via `ctx.DeleteSiteCookie`, but fails to delete the compromised token from the database. As a result, the attacker's active session is never invalidated, and the attacker maintains persistent, indefinite access to the victim's account, entirely defeating the purpose of the split-token security design.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6072

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session in gitea.dev

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2026-56750

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

Source published
13 Aug 2026 16:44:43 UTC
Source modified
14 Aug 2026 19:18:19 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

euvd · EUVD-2026-58145

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:43 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 7:18:19 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416

Source published
Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:43 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 14, 2026, 7:18:19 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
20 Nov 2026 12:09:58 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-56750

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-284

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-13T17:17:25.577

lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300

Source published
13 Aug 2026 17:17:25 UTC
Source modified
26 Aug 2026 16:53:48 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 14:19:10 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-rgv6-xp99-6mgj

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

The vulnerability is in the Remember-Me (gitea_incredible) token validation logic, specifically when handling a compromised token (hash mismatch). The vulnerable function is this one: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/689ace1ce28fd74244b8aa335d9928cdbf6b22f9/services/auth/auth_token.go#L33-L64 ### Affected Endpoint POST `/user/login` (and any endpoint triggering `autoSignIn` via the Remember-Me cookie). ### Description Gitea implements Remember-Me cookies using a split token design (ID:Hash), [citing the Paragonie secure remember-me guide](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/689ace1ce28fd74244b8aa335d9928cdbf6b22f9/services/auth/auth_token.go#L21). When a token is used, its Hash is rotated, but the ID remains the same. If an attacker steals a user's Remember-Me token and uses it to authenticate, the attacker is issued a new rotated token (same ID, new Hash). When the legitimate user later attempts to use their original token, Gitea correctly detects a hash mismatch for the given ID. According to the referenced Paragonie specification, this indicates a compromised token, and ALL active remember-me sessions for that user MUST be invalidated. However, Gitea's `CheckAuthToken` function simply returns `ErrAuthTokenInvalidHash`. The calling code (`autoSignIn`) catches this error and deletes the victim's local cookie via `ctx.DeleteSiteCookie`, but fails to delete the compromised token from the database. As a result, the attacker's active session is never invalidated, and the attacker maintains persistent, indefinite access to the victim's account, entirely defeating the purpose of the split-token security design.

Source published
21 Jul 2026 20:20:21 UTC
Source modified
27 Jul 2026 17:11:30 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

osv · GO-2026-6072

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session in gitea.dev

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session in gitea.dev

Source published
27 Jul 2026 15:32:45 UTC
Source modified
27 Jul 2026 17:00:27 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 20 Nov 20:06 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current