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Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

cve-program · severity unknownEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.1 CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary 9.1 CRITICALCVSS_V4 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0osv · severity unknownFixed by gitea.dev 1.27.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-56750

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

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euvd · EUVD-2026-58145

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-56750

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-rgv6-xp99-6mgj

Published

The vulnerability is in the Remember-Me (gitea_incredible) token validation logic, specifically when handling a compromised token (hash mismatch). The vulnerable function is this one: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/689ace1ce28fd74244b8aa335d9928cdbf6b22f9/services/auth/auth_token.go#L33-L64 ### Affected Endpoint POST `/user/login` (and any endpoint triggering `autoSignIn` via the Remember-Me cookie). ### Description Gitea implements Remember-Me cookies using a split token design (ID:Hash), [citing the Paragonie secure remember-me guide](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/689ace1ce28fd74244b8aa335d9928cdbf6b22f9/services/auth/auth_token.go#L21). When a token is used, its Hash is rotated, but the ID remains the same. If an attacker steals a user's Remember-Me token and uses it to authenticate, the attacker is issued a new rotated token (same ID, new Hash). When the legitimate user later attempts to use their original token, Gitea correctly detects a hash mismatch for the given ID. According to the referenced Paragonie specification, this indicates a compromised token, and ALL active remember-me sessions for that user MUST be invalidated. However, Gitea's `CheckAuthToken` function simply returns `ErrAuthTokenInvalidHash`. The calling code (`autoSignIn`) catches this error and deletes the victim's local cookie via `ctx.DeleteSiteCookie`, but fails to delete the compromised token from the database. As a result, the attacker's active session is never invalidated, and the attacker maintains persistent, indefinite access to the victim's account, entirely defeating the purpose of the split-token security design.

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osv · GO-2026-6072

Published

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session in gitea.dev

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2026-56750 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2026-58145

GHSA-rgv6-xp99-6mgj

GO-2026-6072

cve-program · CVE-2026-56750

euvd · EUVD-2026-58145

nvd · CVE-2026-56750

osv · GHSA-rgv6-xp99-6mgj

osv · GO-2026-6072

Related changes

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Sources read 20 Nov 21:09 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current