Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means
Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)
Read the publisher's advisoryFork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)
Read the publisher's advisoryFork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)
Read the publisher's advisory### Summary `GetActionsUserRepoPermission` (`models/perm/access/repo_permission.go`) decides whether an Actions task token may access a target repo. Its cross-repo branches each enforce a fork-PR discriminator — **except the collaborative-owner branch**, which is missing the `!task.IsForkPullRequest` guard that its sibling has. As a result, when a private repo **B** lists owner **A** as a collaborative owner, an **attacker-controlled fork pull-request** workflow whose base repo is owned by A is granted code-read on B — i.e. the fork's YAML can clone a third private repository it has no rights to. ### Details ```go // models/perm/access/repo_permission.go (v1.26.2), in GetActionsUserRepoPermission if checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, repo, task.IsForkPullRequest) { // passes isForkPR -> denies forks return maxPerm, nil } ... if taskRepo.IsPrivate { // <-- NO IsForkPullRequest check here actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions) if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) { return maxPerm, nil // grants code-read to target repo B } } ``` The sibling same-owner path correctly denies fork PRs: ```go func checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, targetRepo, isForkPR bool) bool { if isForkPR { return false // Fork PRs are never allowed cross-repo access to other private repositories. } ... } ``` `taskRepo` = the repo whose workflow is running (the PR's base repo A); `repo` = the target being cloned (B). `IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID)` asks "does target B's Actions config trust A's owner for cross-repo read?" When B trusts ownerA, the branch returns `maxPerm` (code-read) **even when `task.IsForkPullRequest` is true** — i.e. when the executing YAML is the fork's, not A's. Every sibling enforces the fork-PR discriminator; except for this branch: `checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess` denies forks; `ComputeTaskTokenPermissions` (`models/actions/token_permissions.go`) only clamps the token *ceiling* to read-only for fork/cross-repo (its own comment notes the access *decision* is in `GetActionsUserRepoPermission`, so it does not neutralize the gap — it just makes the leak read-only); secrets (`models/secret/secret.go`) and the approval gate (`services/actions/notifier_helper.go`) both correctly key on `IsForkPullRequest`. **Reachability** — the runner clones target repo B over git-HTTP with the task token: `routers/web/repo/githttp.go` → `GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repoB, ActionsUser)` → `GetActionsUserRepoPermission(ctx, repoB, actionsUser, taskID)` with `IsForkPullRequest == true` → collaborative-owner branch returns code-read → `p.CanAccess(Read, code)` passes → private clone of B succeeds. (`CheckRepoScopedToken` in githttp is a no-op for the Actions token.) ### PoC Setup: private base repo A (`usera/repoA`), private third repo B (`userb/repoB`) with a planted `SECRET.txt`, B's Actions config trusting `usera` as a collaborative owner, and a genuine running fork-PR task token (`token_hash` computed with Gitea's own `HashToken`) presented as HTTP Basic. Requesting `GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`: | Condition (same fork-PR token) | HTTP | Meaning | |---|---|---| | anonymous (no token) | 401 | auth required | | token, A **public**, B trusts A | 404 | branch gated on `taskRepo.IsPrivate` ⇒ A public skips it | | token, A private, B has **no** collab-owner config | 404 | no trust ⇒ denied | | **token, A private, B trusts A (collab-owner)** | **200** | **`git clone` of private B succeeds** | | config removed / restored | 404 / 200 | deterministic | In the 200 case, `git clone` of private repo B succeeded and yielded its `SECRET.txt` — the full source of a third private repo the fork-PR author has no rights to. ### Impact Read-only confidentiality breach: discloses the full source of a *third* private repository (B) to an untrusted external fork-PR author. Read-only, not write/RCE. Preconditions (honest): 1. B is deliberately configured with a collaborative owner — but that is exactly the feature's intended use, so realistic for any deployment using it. 2. The fork PR's base repo A is itself private (the branch is gated on `taskRepo.IsPrivate`). Forking a private A already requires read on A, so this is a normal internal-contributor situation, not a weakening — the escalation is "read A (granted) → read a *different* private repo B (never granted)." 3. The fork-PR workflow must actually run — most realistically via an attacker who had one earlier PR approved (the "approved before" path in `ifNeedApproval`), after which fork PRs auto-run. ### Suggested remediation Add the same fork-PR guard the sibling path has (one line): ```go if taskRepo.IsPrivate && !task.IsForkPullRequest { actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions) if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) { return maxPerm, nil } } ``` This flips `Vuln_ForkPR_LeaksThirdPrivateRepo` to PASS, keeps `Control_NonFork_Allowed` PASS (legitimate collaborative-owner sharing still works), and leaves the existing `TestGetActionsUserRepoPermission` suite all green.
Read the publisher's advisoryGitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard) in gitea.dev
Read the publisher's advisoryCISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.
Compare earlier KEV listings and EPSS scores. Advisory wording and affected versions have a separate history.
A prediction change is reported when EPSS rises from below 10% to 10% or higher. Every daily score change from the last 30 days stays in this history. Before that, it keeps KEV changes and moves between EPSS bands (0.1%, 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 90%).
See how the publisher's advisory changed over time. Each link opens the version saved at that time. The publisher's update date can differ from the date shown here.
Each link identifies one complete publisher record. History can include advisories that previously shared an identifier; an identifier removed by a publisher no longer establishes a current relationship. A historical link shows only that record and earlier saved versions. Failed checks and unchanged reads do not create new versions.
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
euvd · EUVD-2026-58151 · Published
nvd · CVE-2026-58416 · Published
osv · GHSA-fj8v-hjwv-qm88 · Published
osv · GO-2026-6052 · Published
cve-program · CVE-2026-58416 · Published